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In this dissertation, I investigate Plato’s apparently diverse usages of the notion 
‘harmonia’ in order to ascertain a) whether these usages have anything in common and, 
relatedly, b) whether this notion plays a significant role in Plato’s philosophy. I begin 
with a survey of pre-Platonic texts before turning to four key Platonic dialogues: the 
Gorgias, the Phaedo, the Republic, and the Timaeus in order to argue that, even though 
most contemporary studies of Plato’s thought fail to study this notion in any detail, it 
nonetheless plays an important role in many of his central doctrines. I contend that 
harmonia is an intelligible, mathematical structure that operates throughout the 
microcosm (soul, body, city-state) and macrocosm (the universe) and, in each case, it 
serves to improve the entities in which it is instantiated. We need harmonia in order to 
ascend to the study of the Good which, for Plato, is the highest study; harmonia is, then, 
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Sit, Jessica. Look how the floor of heaven 
Is thick inlaid with patines of bright gold: 
There’s not the smallest orb which thou behold'st 
But in his motion like an angel sings, 
Still quiring to the young-eyed cherubins; 
Such harmony is in immortal souls; 
— The Merchant of Venice 
 
The notion of harmonia occupies a central position for the early Greeks in their writings 
on cosmology, society, and the self. As Emile Benveniste (1973, pp. 101–102) has 
noted, “order” is, in general, an extremely important concept for Indo-Europeans and 
is denoted by the Greek harmonia, the Sanskrit ṛta (order), Avestan aša (order), and the 
Old Persian arta (truthful order), all of which descend from the same Indo-European 
root — *H2er. For the Pythagoreans — and, arguably, for other pre-Socratics such as 
Heraclitus and Empedocles — harmonia described the structure of a unified world order 
and, moreover, a particular kind of order, not only in the universe but in many other 
domains, including mathematics, cosmology, psychology, ethics, poetics, and music. 
What differentiates harmonia from some other notions of order is the fact that, although 
it joins entities together, it does not simply unite them into a homogeneity – it consists, 
rather, in alliance of multiple entities wherein both their similarity and their 
dissimilarity is recognized. I hope to clarify what this means in the chapters that follow. 
My goal in this dissertation is to show that the harmonia is an important notion 
in Plato’s ethics, politics, and metaphysics – even though it has been largely ignored 
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by contemporary commentators, especially in the anglophone world – and, further, 
that Plato’s usage of harmonia, although indebted to pre-Platonic usages of the term, is 
a unique function of his philosophical system. I lay the ground by exploring pre-
Platonic notions of harmonia before turning to our central question: what is the role of 
harmonia in Plato’s philosophy? In answering this question, I focus primarily on the 
Phaedo, Republic, and Timaeus, while also drawing on material from some of the earlier 
dialogues.  
I begin, in Chapter 1, by discussing the use of harmonia in pre-Platonic thinkers 
in order to illustrate the range of meanings that might have been available to Plato. 
Although the term “harmonia” is part of a broader conceptual field denoting order we 
see, in our survey of its pre-Platonic uses, how part of its power lies in its ability to lend 
itself to a range of contexts. First, we see the basic meaning, closest to its etymological 
roots, of ‘joining together,’ used in the context of carpentry in Homer’s Odyssey. 
Already in Homer, though, harmonia is used in an abstract sense to mean something 
like “agreement”.  
Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar also all write about the goddess Harmonia who is 
the daughter of Ares and Aphrodite – in other words, even the goddess is a product of 
entities in tension. Although I do not discuss the Derveni Papyrus in the chapter, we 
might also note an interesting passage explaining why the goddess Harmonia received 
the name that she did: 
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 ‘[Ἁ]ρμον`ί΄α’  
δὲ 
ὅτι πο[λλὰ ....ή]ρμοσε τῶν ἐ̣όντων ἑ̣κά̣στω[ι.] 
 
Harmonia [scil. received her name] because she fitted together (hērmosē) many 
of the things that are to each [scil. among them]. Col. XXI,12-14 
 
The earliest extant evidence of “harmonia” as denoting something musical is 
found in a fragment attributed to Pindar’s teacher, Lasus of Hermione; Pindar, too, 
seems to have been aware of different kinds of musical harmoniai (modes) – he mentions 
the Dorian, the Aeolian, and the Lydian in his odes. Pindar’s usage of harmonia, 
however, is much more nuanced – we encounter an abstract notion of harmonia in his 
odes that applies to cities and human behavior as well as to his own poetics.  Pindar is, 
perhaps, the first to write about harmonia as a cosmological principle responsible for 
regulating both the microcosm and the macrocosm – an idea that is central to his near 
contemporary Heraclitus’ thought.  
Heraclitus saw the universe as one that consisted of conflictual pairs that were 
held together by some kind of regulatory principle; I contend that this principle is 
harmonia and not the apparent harmonia that is found in music or in carpentry but what 
Heraclitus calls “harmoniē aphanēs” – the hidden metaphysical structure of the universe. 
Indeed Kahn (1981, p. 203) even claims that “harmoniē aphanēs might be taken as a 
general title for Heraclitus’ philosophical thought. Although much of Platonic 
metaphysics is at odds with Heraclitus’, they both share the notion of an intelligible 
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cosmic harmonia that most mortals fail to grasp. Heraclitus also plays with the multiple 
meanings of our word, invoking musical harmonia, mechanical harmonia, and, finally, 
intelligible cosmic harmonia. Empedocles’ universe is driven by Love (philotēs) and 
Strife (neikos) and, thus, harmonia does not play as central a role as it does for Heraclitus. 
Empedocles does, however, connect harmonia to corporeal composition and even uses 
it to refer to a cosmic fitting together. What is most striking is his connection of 
harmonia to mathematical ratios – this is an idea that finds it fullest early expression in 
the fragments of Philolaus. 
Philolaus, who is often regarded as our only source of pre-Platonic 
Pythagoreanism, describes a kosmos in which unlimited and limited entities are joined 
together according to harmonic ratios. I follow McKirahan (2013) in arguing that 
Philolaus takes number to be the key to knowledge and harmonia to be the key to 
reality; knowledge and reality are then connected, for him, by relating harmonia to 
number. Harmonia is a mathematical structure for Philolaus and, as I hope to show, it 
is this view that is closest to that of Plato’s. I conclude the first chapter by considering 
the role of harmonia in the Hippocratic corpus. I argue that Hippocratic medicine did 
not conceive only of isonomic proportion as a positive somatic state, as was presumably 
the case for Alcmaeon. Harmonia plays an important role both in Hippocratic dietetics 
and in Hippocratic embryology. The Hippocratic texts also use the word in a variety 
of ways – we read about, for instance, the harmoniai in various technai, the harmonia 
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that has to do with number, and mechanical harmonia that stands for the joint between 
the two hemispheres of the skull.  
Having laid out some key pre-Platonic notions of harmonia, I go on to discuss 
order that isn’t harmonia in Chapter 2. I discuss the Gorgias in order to show how Plato 
emphasizes the connection between order (kosmos, taxis) and goodness. Already in the 
Gorgias we have the notion that a soul with order (kosmos) will be a healthy and 
virtuous soul.  Plato doesn’t talk about good souls as possessing harmonia, though, until 
the Phaedo, which I discuss in Chapter 3. This is understandable, since Plato does not 
really discuss the nature of the soul until the Phaedo. I show, in Chapter 1, that the basic 
prerequisite for harmonia is the presence of two or more entities in a state of tension. 
Plato does not even consider that the soul could be mereologically complex until the 
Phaedo; it is unsurprising, then, that he uses “kosmos” rather than “harmonia” to denote 
psychic order in the Gorgias. In the Phaedo, however, we are presented with Simmias’ 
rather remarkable thesis about souls being mereologically complex harmoniai, which I 
read as a materialist thesis. Socrates famously offers a series of refutations to Simmias’ 
claim and in the course of his arguments against Simmias, Socrates describes harmonia 
as something that good souls possess and evil souls lack. We learn, thus, that Simmias 
is making a category mistake and harmonia is something that a soul has and not 
something that a soul is since harmonious entities are good entities. 
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The ideas that are hinted at and briefly mentioned in the Phaedo and the early 
dialogues are then developed more fully in the Republic, to which I devote Chapter 4. 
First, I discuss the educational program for auxiliaries and guardians in Plato’s ideal 
cities; this education will only include those harmoniai – here understood as musical 
modes – that inculcate virtues in the malleable souls of children. Then, I turn to the 
famous discussion of justice and virtue, showing how Plato believes that not only 
justice but virtue in general requires that the soul possess harmonia. His discussion of 
vicious souls and vicious cities in Book VIII of the Republic reinforces the ideas found 
in Book IV and gives us even more evidence that his choice of “harmonia” isn’t just 
coincidental – he explicitly identifies an isonomic proportion, such as that found in a 
democracy, with a vicious state of the soul and the city. Harmonia, unlike isonomia, 
binds elements together in an unequal proportion and justice, for Plato, requires that 
the higher elements master and the lower elements be mastered1. Republic VII also 
emphasizes that the young people selected to be guardians of the ideal city will be 
required to study the mathematical sciences for ten years – these sciences, propaedeutic 
for dialectic that culminates in the study of the Good, are, in ascending order of 
                                              
1 Mathematically, harmonia is a kind of ratio; musically, these ratios are used to designate intervals 
(diastēma) between notes. Intervals can only occur between sounds that are not one and harmonia can 




importance2, arithmetic, geometry, stereometry, astronomy and, finally, harmonics. 
However, in each of these cases, the concern ought to be intelligible rather than 
sensible entities. Thus the object of philosophical harmonics will be intelligible 
harmonia – that which is found in numbers – and not audible consonances. This is an 
important key for understanding Plato’s views on harmonia.  
The Timaeus, which I discuss in Chapter 5, fills in, as it were, the remaining 
blanks, In this dialogue, Plato posits that the world (to pan), which was created by a 
Demiurge, an intelligent creator-god, has a harmonically structured soul. The World 
Soul, which gives intelligence and life to the body of the world, and which is identical 
in structure to the immortal part of the human soul before it is embodied, participates 
in harmonia, which is said to belong to the realm of intelligible and eternal entities. I 
discuss the passages describing the harmonic structure of the World Soul before 
turning to disorder in the human soul and showing how, through audible music, the 
disordered and disharmonious embodied human soul is expected to regain the harmonia 
bestowed upon it prior to embodiment by the Demiurge. The Timaeus shows how 
harmonia functions in the universe and also in the individual – both in the soul and the 
body – and clearly identifies the best kind of harmonia as being an intelligible entity, 
reinforcing our conclusions from Republic Book VII.  
                                              
2 See Burnyeat (2000) and Wersinger (2007) for the contention that the order in which the sciences are 
presented represents a hierarchy.   
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 This brief survey should be enough to show us that harmonia is not an 
insignificant aspect of Plato’s ethical and metaphysical views. However, most works 
that treat these topics in Plato do not even mention the notion. The few times that it 
does get discussed is in the context of musical harmony3 or in the context of the so-
called harmony of the spheres – an idea which, although much discussed by neo-
Platonists, neo-Pythagoreans, and medieval philosophers, is rarely even alluded to by 
Plato4 or his predecessors. A few examples from the literature might make my point 
clearer.  
In his otherwise detailed study of Plato’s ethics, Irwin (1995), for instance, fails 
to devote any attention to harmonia. White (2002) talks about ‘Hellenic harmony’ and 
attempts to situate Plato’s discussion of harmonia in Republic IV within the broader 
Hellenic notion of harmony between one’s happiness and ethical norms; such a 
discussion completely ignores the particularity of the Platonic notion of harmonia. The 
‘harmony’ of the soul in Republic IV is indeed often read as a metaphorical harmony or 
                                              
3 Even in the case of music, Moutsopoulos (1959) offers the only comprehensive account of the role of 
music in Plato’s thought. Pelosi (2010) also discusses music in Plato philosophy with an aim to exposing 
Plato’s views on psychological dualism. As I go on to argue, musical harmonia does not occupy an 
especially exalted place in Plato’s thought and it is a mistake to focus on musical harmonia to the exclusion 
of all the other kinds of harmoniai or to treat the other harmoniai separately from musical harmonia. Rizek 
(1998) purports to write about harmonia in Plato, but, again, his analysis, although interesting,  is 
restricted to music and attributes a kind of ‘Pythagoreanism’ to Plato that is little supported by textual 
evidence.  
 




as little more than a synonym for ‘unity’ or ‘agreement’ as, for example, in Irwin (1995, 
p. 227). 5 Even those, such as Annas (1981) and Vlastos (1969) who write about psychic 
harmony in Republic IV fail to connect it to Book VII of the Republic, let alone to any 
other work within the Platonic corpus.  
On another extreme we have scholars such as Rizek (1998) and McClain (1984) 
who seek to assimilate Plato’s views on harmonia to a kind of Pythagoreanism; this 
approach, too, is misleading and ignores Plato’s explicit distancing of his views from 
Pythagorean ones in Republic VII and elsewhere. In the first place, we have very little 
evidence of Pythagoreanism that is prior to Plato. Further, the evidence that we do 
have, suggests that, although they were interested in the harmonia present in nature, 
there were nonetheless empirical constraints on their investigation and Plato would 
have found them guilty of putting their ‘ears before understanding’ because of the 
privileged position allegedly accorded by them to audible consonances6.  
                                              
5 Burnyeat (2000) remains a notable exception and I touch upon his rejection of a metaphorical reading 
of Platonic harmonia in the final chapter of this dissertation. 
 
6 See Horky (2013) for a recent and fairly comprehensive account of the relation of Plato to earlier 
Pythagoreans, especially with respect to his views on mathematics. Even though he argues that, in a 
way, Plato was a Pythagorean, this statement is qualified throughout by what we understand by 
‘Pythagoreanism’ and by which aspects of early Pythagorean doctrine had an influence on Plato. His 
account seeks only to establish that Plato’s theories about language (particularly essential predication) 
and number were influenced by the theories of Hippasus, Philolaus, and Archytas. This seems to me to 
be both plausible and well-founded, unlike claims about the musical composition of Plato’s dialogues or 
the presence of a ‘Pythagorean’ belief about the harmonia of spheres in Plato’s dialogues. 
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The only work, at least in the last century,  that deals exclusively with the notion 
of harmonia in Greek thought in Plato (and prior to Plato) is P. Bonaventura Meyer’s 
dissertation (1932) on the Bedeutungsgeschichte of the term from Homer until Aristotle 
and, although he does an excellent job of collecting and organizing most of the relevant 
passages and offers some valuable insights, he does not offer much by way of 
philosophical analysis; indeed it would be impossible to do complete justice to a corpus 
of that size in work as brief as his. Since then, Anne-Gabriel Wersinger has discussed 
Platonic harmonia in two books : Platon et la dysharmonie (2001) and La sphère et 
l'intervalle (2001). In the latter work, she discusses a range of ideas – such as peras and 
apeiron, one and many, and also harmonia – in the works of Heraclitus, Parmenides, 
Empedocles, Zeno, and the later Plato. In the former work, she is concerned mostly 
with the philosophical implications of the musical form of harmonia.  
As I’ve mentioned earlier, my goal is not just to study any one aspect of harmonia 
but, rather, to uncover what these different harmoniai have in common. In her book 
on the metaphysics of structure in Plato, Harte (2002, p. 271) claims that the 
normativity of structure has an ethical dimension and that, perhaps, “the best way to 
illustrate this dimension is to pick up on the wider resonances of Plato’s talk of harmony 
in describing the nature of wholes”; however, as she states, such an examination is 
beyond her scope. I hope to at least begin such an investigation in this dissertation.  
11 
 
While the works of Meyer and Wersinger have been invaluable to me, my 
scope in this dissertation is at once narrower and deeper, since I aim to uncover what, 
if anything, Plato’s different usages of harmonia have in common by focusing on three 
key texts (Phaedo, Republic, and Timaeus).  I do not believe that there are glaring lacunae 
in my treatment of Platonic harmonia, my discussion of harmonia – both in the Platonic 
corpus7 and in pre-Platonic thought – is not intended, by any means, to be exhaustive. 
I do not discuss every single token of the word “harmonia” or relevant cognates from 
Homer until Plato. Rather, my goal is to show that harmonia is an important structural 
principle in Plato’s philosophy, both in the microcosm and the macrocosm – 
consequently, I only discuss a representative sample of pre-Platonic views and I only 
discuss those passages in Platonic texts that are necessary for me to illuminate my 
argument.  






                                              
7 Notably, I do not discuss harmonia in the Laws, except for brief comments in my chapter on the 
Republic. I also do not spend time on harmonia in the Philebus. Among the pre-Platonic figures, I have 
not discussed harmonia as used by the tragedians, for instance, because my goal in the first chapter was 
to lay out the different types of harmonia and I believe that I have done so. I do not, perhaps, have as 
detailed a discussion of pre-Platonic political harmonia as I could but I hope that my discussion of 
harmonia in Plato’s Republic corrects for this to some extent.  
12 
 




 As I mentioned in the introduction, the term “harmonia” has a rich pre-Platonic 
life and it is important that we be clear about the multiple meanings of ‘harmonia’ 
(‘harmoniē’ in Epic and Ionic Greek) in order to better understand Plato’s usage of the 
term. In this chapter, I attempt to shed light on these multiple meanings by discussing 
the uses of harmonia in the writing of Homer, Pindar, Heraclitus, Empedocles, 
Philolaus, and in the Hippocratic corpus. While the primary meaning of ‘harmonia’, as 
evidenced in the Homeric corpus, is a mechanical one, ‘harmonia’ also functions as a 
cosmological principle of balance (Heraclitus and Empedocles), a cosmogonic 
principle related to musical-mathematical ratios (Philolaus), and a state of physical 
well-being (Hippocratic corpus). 
 Before we begin, I would like to say something about the etymology of our word 
— “ια”, (-iə̯) is an abstract suffix added to a conjectural theme *ar-mn, which itself 
presumably comes from the Indo-European root *H2er- (fit)8. Harmonia does not, of 
course, mean what contemporary music theorists define as ‘harmony.’ In fact, as the 
                                              
8 Ilievski (1993) traces the root back to Linear B. He claims that the dialectical basis of the noun (h)armo 
and the verb harmozō can be explained only by phonetic rules according to which the inherit IE vocalic 
nasal –mn- developed a reflex –mo-; the verb is a technical term too and, he claims, there is no doubt 




other words that are derived from this root suggest9, the earliest uses of harmonia are 
not even specifically musical; it refers not only to musical fitting together but also to 
the physical act of binding. Finney (1973, p. 383) puts it well when she describes 
harmonia as a “reconciliation of opposites, a fitting together of disparate elements, 
whether in music, universe, the body politic, or the body of man.” 
 I would like to make one final note before turning to Homer. The reader might 
wonder why I have chosen to discuss Homer and Pindar alongside the pre-Platonic 
‘philosophers’. The reasons for this are numerous. For one, as Glenn Most (2006, p. 
332) has rightly pointed out, many archaic Greek ‘philosophers’ didn’t make a sharp 
distinction between ‘poets’ and ‘philosophers’. Heraclitus, for instance, mentions 
Hesiod and Hecateus alongside Xenophanes and Pythagoras without giving us any 
reason to believe that he thought of the first two as engaged in a different pursuit than 
the latter two; even Plato does not seem to make such a distinction. Indeed, it is not 
until Aristotle that mythologoi are contrasted with physiologoi10 and even with Aristotle’s 
taxonomy in mind, some pre-Platonic figures defy easy categorization.   
 However, there are yet more substantive reasons, some of which I will discuss 
                                              
9 These include verbs like harmozō (fit together), arariskō (join together) and nouns like harma (chariot), 
arithmos (number), artus (bond), arthron (joint), etc. 
10 See, for instance, the beginning of Aristotle’s Poetics: οὐδὲν δὲ κοινόν ἐστιν Ὁμήρῳ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ 





later, and many of which map on to the arguments that Most (2006) offers. He 
contends that some of the “fundamental criteria that the Greek philosophers were 
obliged to try to satisfy in their reflections” resemble, in striking ways, “the most 
prominent features of the works of Homer and Hesiod” (334). He understands these 
similarities not as an accidental feature but rather “as a concrete measure of the 
extraordinary literary, educational, and cultural successes of a very small number of 
poetic texts, those ascribed to Homer or Hesiod” (ibid.).  Most (2006, pp. 335–336) also 
draws attention to the “curious decision” of Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Empedocles 
to use dactylic hexameters to convey their philosophical views, even though they 
postdate the invention of philosophical prose and to the “immanent poetics” of these 
three as well as Heraclitus who, too, made great use of poetic language11. He concludes: 
[I]t is not surprising that they [early Greek philosophers] had a more 
conscious, and perhaps more fruitful, dependence upon the basic texts 
of their culture (which in the case of Greek culture were poetic texts) 
than many modern philosophers do. To ignore this dependence, to 
disparage it as unphilosophical, or even just to excuse it as a regrettable 
form of primitive thought from which the really interesting core, the 
logical arguments, can be extracted and rescued, is inadvertently to 
acknowledge allegiance to a very recent and quite provincial notion of 
what philosophy is and is not, and to retroject that notion unhistorically 
into a discursive situation of the distant past whose participants would 
certainly have found such ideas very strange indeed.  
 
For my purposes, it is neither informative nor prudent to restrict my study only to 
                                              
11 For more on Heraclitus’ style, see Kahn (1981). 
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those whom Diels — following Theophrastus who was, in turn, following Aristotle — 
termed the “Vorsokratiker”. With the caveats out of the way, let us now begin our 
survey of pre-Platonic uses of “harmonia”. 
I. Homer 
 
The primary Homeric use of “harmonia” illustrates its basic meaning of “physical 
joining together”. The noun occurs six times in the corpus and is only ever used in its 
plural form. Our word can be found twice in Book V of the Odyssey. This first time is 
when Odysseus is building his raft in order to leave Calypso’s island12. He cuts down 
twenty tall alder, poplar, and fir trees in order to do so: 
τέτρηνεν δ' ἄρα πάντα καὶ ἥρμοσεν ἀλλήλοισι, 
γόμφοισιν δ' ἄρα τήν γε καὶ ἁρμονίῃσιν ἄρασσεν.  
 
...and he bored all of them and fit them to each other, then with pegs 
and fastenings (harmoniai) joined it together. Odyssey, V.247-813 
 
It is striking that these two lines use four words that all come from the same root — ar* 
(to join, fit together). As Meyer (1932, p. 10) notes, the words surrounding 
“harmoniēsin” help us understand what it means: “harmozō” means to fit things together 
and “arassō” means to strike hard or to smite. In the raft, the “harmoniai” are parallel to 
                                              
12 A similar usage can be found in Herodotus’ Persian Wars II.96:  “ἐπεὰν δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ 
ναυπηγήσωνται, ζυγὰ ἐπιπολῆς τείνουσι αὐτῶν· νομεῦσι δὲ οὐδὲν χρέωνται· ἔσωθεν δὲ τὰς ἁρμονίας 
ἐν ὦν ἐπάκτωσαν τῇ βύβλῳ.”   
 
13 Translations in this chapter are mine unless otherwise noted. 
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the “gomphoi” (bolts) and are a means by which the planks are joined together. 
“Harmozein,” “arassen,” and “harmonia” all put one in mind of a compound composed 
of discrete entities that are then fixed together. The other instance in the Odyssey is 
later in Book V (361-2): 
ὄφρ' ἂν μέν κεν δούρατ' ἐν ἁρμονίῃσιν ἀρήρῃ,/τόφρ' αὐτοῦ μενέω καὶ 
τλήσομαι ἄλγεα πάσχων·  
 
As long as these timbers are held together by fastenings (harmoniai), I’ll 
stay where I am and endure it, suffering sorrows.  
 
Here, we are given yet another word derived from ar*, namely arariskō, which also 
means “to fit together”.  The harmoniai here are like the gomphoi — they physically 
bind discrete entities. However, we have evidence, even in Homer, for a non-material 
use of “harmonia” — in the Iliad, where the term is used only once. 
 In Book XXII of the Iliad, Zeus weighs the fate of Hector and Achilles, and in 
the brief exchange between Athena (disguised as Deiphobos) and the heroes, she tells 
Achilles to stand and draw breath and encourages Hector to face Achilles. Hector then 
tells Achilles that he is ready to fight and has a discussion with him about the terms of 
the duel: 
ἀλλ' ἄγε δεῦρο θεοὺς ἐπιδώμεθα· τοὶ γὰρ ἄριστοι/μάρτυροι ἔσσονται 
καὶ ἐπίσκοποι ἁρμονιάων·  
 
Come then let us take as witness the gods; For these are the best who 




Here, too, harmonia refers to a kind of joining or adapting, but its use here is figurative, 
unlike in the Odyssey. In this passage, harmonia refers to the product of the joining or 
balancing of the oaths between two people in a state of tension; the relata of harmonia 
were planks of wood in the case of the Odyssey and here they are words or, more 
specifically, oaths14. Mele (2009, p. 37) claims that we can even see shadows of 
“harmonia” in the anthroponym for the carpenter who built the ships with which Paris 
left for Sparta — ‘Αρμονίδης.   
 The fourth and final occurrence of the term in the Homeric corpus is in the 
Homeric hymn to Apollo (194-6), where the reference is to ῾Αρμονία rather than 
ἁρμονία: 
αὐτὰρ ἐϋπλόκαμοι Χάριτες καὶ ἐΰφρονες Ὧραι/Ἁρμονίη θ' Ἥβη τε 
Διὸς θυγάτηρ τ' Ἀφροδίτη/ὀρχεῦντ' ἀλλήλων ἐπὶ καρπῷ χεῖρας 
ἔχουσαι·  
 
Meanwhile the Charites with the beautiful hair and the gracious Horae 
join with Harmonia, Hebe, and the daughter of Zeus, Aphrodite in 
dance holding each other’s hands by the wrist. 
 
Aphrodite is associated with the Charites in dance elsewhere in Homer (Od. 18.194, 
                                              
14 A similar use of harmonia can also be seen, centuries later, in Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound (547-551): 
τίς ἐφαμερίων ἄρηξις; οὐδ' ἐδέρχθης/ὀλιγοδρανίαν ἄκικυν,/ἰσόνειρον, ᾇ τὸ φωτῶν ἀλαὸν γένος 
ἐμπεποδισμένον; οὔποτε ––/τὰν Διὸς ἁρμονίαν θνατῶν παρεξίασι βουλαί.  
 
What help can there be from creatures of a day? Did you not even consider the helpless, dreamlike 
feebleness by which the blind race of men is fettered? Never will the schemes of mortals transgress the 
ordering (harmonia) of Zeus. tr. Sommerstein   
 
We might call this a civic or political use of the term. 
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HH 5.61); her robe is also called the work of the Charites and, sometimes, the work of 
the Charities and Horae. The Charites are also often associated with Apollo and the 
Muses and they, along with the Horae, are usually portrayed singing, dancing, and 
playing instruments. It is unclear why exactly Harmonia and Hebe are part of this 
procession. According to Hesiod, Harmonia was the daughter of Aphrodite and Ares, 
so perhaps this is why she is included15. At any rate, this shows us that there was some 
kind of loose association of Harmonia with song and dance and with the Delian 
Apollo16.  We learn more about the goddess in the odes of Pindar, to whom I turn next. 
II. Pindar 
 
The association of harmonia with the semantic field of ‘music’ seems to have remained 
alien to Homer (the loose association of the goddess with music aside) and it is in a 
fragment (702) by Pindar’s teacher, Lasus of Hermione, that we have the earliest extant 
reference to harmonia as a musical mode: 
Δάματρα μέλπω Κόραν τε Κλυμένοι᾿ ἄλοχον μελιβόαν ὕμνον 
                                              
15 For more on the goddess, see Jouan (1980). 
 
16 I have not chosen to comment on any post-Platonic writings about Pythagoras in this chapter, but it 
nonetheless might be worth pointing out, here, that Iamblichus reports that Pythagoras considered the 
power of the Muses to include ‘the concord and harmony of being’ in a speech that he supposedly made 
to the young men of Croton: ὃ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοῖς συνεβούλευεν ἱδρύσασθαι Μουσῶν ἱερόν, ἵνα 
τηρῶσι τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ὁμόνοιαν· ταύτας γὰρ τὰς θεὰς καὶ τὴν προσηγορίαν τὴν αὐτὴν ἁπάσας 
ἔχειν καὶ μετ' ἀλλήλων παραδεδόσθαι καὶ ταῖς κοιναῖς τιμαῖς μάλιστα χαίρειν, καὶ τὸ σύνολον ἕνα 
καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀεὶ χορὸν εἶναι τῶν Μουσῶν, ἔτι δὲ συμφωνίαν, ἁρμονίαν, ῥυθμόν, ἅπαντα 
περιειληφέναι τὰ παρασκευάζοντα τὴν ὁμsόνοιαν. ἐπεδείκνυε δὲ αὐτῶν τὴν δύναμιν οὐ περὶ τὰ 





ἀναγνέων Αἰολίδ᾿ ἂμ βαρύβρομον ἁρμονίαν. 
 
I sing of Demeter and the Maiden, wife of Clymenus, raising the honied 
shout of a hymn in the deep-sounding Aeolian harmonia.  
 
Although Lasus was supposed to have written the first logos about music according to 
Martianus Capella (9.936), this text has not survived17. In Pindar’s odes, we encounter 
the goddess Harmonia – who had already been written about in Hesiod and in the 
Homeric corpus — in addition to harmonia as musical mode. In this section, I discuss 
both of these. I also follow Hubbard (1979, pp. 350–359) in positing that Pindar might 
also have used harmonia in an abstract, cosmological sense. In Hubbard’s words, Pindar 
is the “ultimate figure of mediation” — 
Pindar was situated between the indeterminate boundlessness of Heraclitean 
becoming and the secure boundedness of Parmenidean being. He was 
situated between Anaxamandrian apeiron and Pythagorean peras, between 
the semantic fluidity of archaism and the semantic discrimination of the 
sophists. (1979, p. 355) 
 
It is fitting, then, that we look at Pindar’s usage of the term before we turn to 
Heraclitus. 
 
                                              
17 According to Porter (2007, p. 1), “(Lasus) was a musical innovator on several fronts: he wrote the first 
treatise on music and conducted empirical acoustic experiments; he introduced the dithyrambic 
competitions in Athens at around 508 BCE after the death of his patron Hipparchus, and was himself a 
composer and innovator in the genre; he also innovated in auletic technique, choral arrangements 
(having invented the circular chorus), and the sounds of choral songs.” However, as Barker (2011, p. 19) 
notes, “We are in no position to reconstruct Lasus’ ideas or to identify the relation, if any, in which his 
logos stood to the writings of the later theorists.” 
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III. 1 The goddess Harmonia 
 
Pindar mentions the goddess in Pythian 3 and Pythian 11:  
αἰὼν δ' ἀσφαλής/οὐκ ἔγεντ' οὔτ' Αἰακίδᾳ παρὰ Πηλεῖ/οὔτε παρ' 
ἀντιθέῳ Κάδμῳ· λέγονται {γε} μὰν βροτῶν/ὄλβον ὑπέρτατον οἳ 
σχεῖν, οἵτε καὶ χρυσαμπύκων/μελπομενᾶν ἐν ὄρει Μοισᾶν καὶ ἐν 
ἑπταπύλοις /ἄϊον Θήβαις, ὁπόθ' Ἁρμονίαν γᾶμεν βοῶπιν,/ ⸐ὁ δὲ 
Νηρέος εὐβούλου Θέτιν παῖδα κˈλυτάν 
 
But a life unshaken befell neither Peleus called Aiakidas nor godlike 
Kadmus, yet men say these two were given blessedness beyond all 
mortals. They heard on the mountain and at seven-gated Thebes the 
gold-chapleted Muses singing when one married ox-eyed Harmonia, 
and the other wise Nereus’ legendary daughter, Thetis. Pythian, 3.87-
92. tr. Lattimore 
 
ὦ παῖδες Ἁρμονίας,/ἔνθα καί νυν ἐπίνομον ἡρωΐδων /στρατὸν 
ὁμαγερέα καλεῖ συνίμεν,̄/ ὄφˈρα θέμιν ἱερὰν […] 
 
Children of Harmonia, there even now he calls the local host of heroines 
to gather together in assembly, so that you may celebrate holy 
righteousness[…] Pythian, 11.7-12  tr. Lattimore 
 
 Pythian 3 was written in honor of Hieron of Syracuse, who won the race for 
single horse and the approximate date of composition is 474 BCE; Pythian 11 was 
written for Thrasydaeus of Thebes, probably for a victory at a stadion race, and most 
of the scholia settle on 474 BCE as the date of composition. P.11 also gives us a vivid 
account of the Agamemnon myth. In both these odes, the reference is to the goddess 
Harmonia who was married to Kadmus. 
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 Harmonia was the child of Ares and Aphrodite18 and, when Athena assigned the 
government of Thebes to Kadmus, Zeus gave him Harmonia as his wife.  She was the 
mother of Ino, Semele, Agave, Autonoe, and Polydorus according to Hesiod (Theog. 
933-37); Pindar mentions these daughters of Harmonia in P. 11 as well. Harmonia’s 
wedding to Kadmus was represented in various vase paintings in antiquity and was 
also a popular literary topic19. According to Pindar (O. 2.78), Harmonia and Kadmus 
were transferred to the Isle of the Blessed at the end of their lives.  
 It is worth noting that Harmonia was born of gods who represent polarities — 
love and strife. In this way, she embodies the abstract quality of harmonia as well. 
Further, she was a goddess who married a mortal (Kadmus) — again, a junction of sorts 
between polarities. This idea of joining discrete entities into a whole serves well as a 
description of harmonia in all its domains, especially music. 
III.2 Harmonia as musical mode 
 
Let us begin with an ode that explicitly mentions the Lydian harmonia. 
ἐξύφαινε, γλυκεῖα, καὶ τόδ' αὐτίκα, φόρμιγξ,/Λυδίᾳ σὺν ἁρμονίᾳ μέλος 
πεφιλημένον Οἰνώνᾳ τε καὶ Κύπρῳ̆, ἔνθα Τεῦκρος ἀπάρχει/ὁ 
Τελαμωνιάδας· […] 
 
                                              
18 A Samothracian cult saw her as the daughter of Zeus and Electra, but this is not the version that Pindar 
refers to.  
 
19 The marriage resembles, to a great extent, the wedding of Peleus and Thetis — a goddess marrying a 
mortal and the presence of an object destined to bring misfortune (the apple of discord in the case of 




Weave then this song to its end without delay, sweet lyre, in the Lydian 
harmonia, one loved by Oenone  and Cyprus, where Teucer son of Telamon 
rules, far from home;[…]  Nemean, 4.44-49 tr. Lattimore  
 
Nemean 4 is an epinician of an uncertain date and, along with N.8 and O.14, uses the 
Lydian mode20 in connection with young athletes. O. 14 addresses the Charites and 
mentions Apollo as well:  
[…]Λυδῷ γὰρ Ἀσώπιχον ἐν τρόπῳ/ἐν μελέταις τ' ἀείδων ἔμολον,/οὕνεκ' 
Ὀλυμπιόνικος ἁ Μινύεια/σεῦ ἕκατι.[…] 
 
[…] for I have come singing of Asopichus, composing in my accustomed 
way in the Lydian tropos, because with your aid the city of the Minyans has 
triumphed at Olympia. 
Olympian, 14.17-20  
 
Even though Pindar uses “tropos” and not “harmonia” we can follow Anderson (1966, 
p. 35) who has argued that tropos can largely be identified with the kinetic aspects of 
harmonia. Finley (1966, pp. 78–9) contends that this poem shows Pindar’s belief that 
harmony is the special trait and possession of the Olympian gods, that the presence of 
                                              
20 Nemean 8 also mentions the “Lydian” but doesn’t use the term ἁρμονία: 
Λυδίαν μίτραν καναχηδὰ πεποικιλμέναν,/Δείνιος δισσῶν σταδίων/καὶ πατρὸς Μέγα Νεμεαῖον 
ἄγαλμα. 
I bring a Lydian mitra patterned with resonant music, a Nemean decoration for the double stadion 
victories of Deinias and of his father Megas.  
Nemean, 8.14-16  tr. Bowra 
 
 The term ἁρμονία isn’t used here, but τρόπῳ can be considered to be more or less synonymous with 
it as it is in, for example, ps-Plut. Mus. p. 12.37 Ziegler and Bacch. Isag. 46, p. 303.3 Jan. According to 





the Charites is “harmonious order” and that the harmony then “passes inward and is 
felt in the Minyan past, but in the present also as shown in wisdom (poetry), personal 
beauty, or the beauty of act…[and] the beauty of the gods’ pure being.”  
 The Lydian mode has been associated with Orpheus’ charming of animals and 
the Amphion stones and Plato bans it from his ideal city in the Republic because of its 
strange and pathetic power, which induces softness in those who hear it. It is possible 
that there are allusions to the Dorian mode in Pindar’s odes as well as well, but none 
of the tokens of “Δωρίαν” refer explicitly to a harmonia, tropos or melos, and it is beyond 
my scope to delve into the textual debates surrounding these instances, since I seek 
only to establish that Pindar was aware of the existence and variety of harmoniai 
(modes)21.  
 We are on firmer ground when it comes to the Aeolian because, even though 
the term “harmonia” isn’t used, the context is clearly musical:  
τὸ Καστόρειον22 δ' ἐν Αἰολίδεσσι χορδαῖς θέλων/ἄθρησον χάριν 
                                              
21 The relevant passages are: O. 1.17-19, O. 3.3-9, P. 8.19, and fr 191  M. In the first case the reference 
is to a Dorian phorminx(...ἀλλὰ Δωρίαν ἀπὸ φόρμιγγα πασσάλου/λάμβαν...), in the second to a 
Dorian measure (... τρόπον/⸏Δωρίῳ φωνὰν ἐναρμόξαι πεδίλῳ/ ἀγˈλαόκωμον·...), in the third to a 
Dorian victory, and the final fragment is too obscure to even gloss with any ease (Αἰολεὺς ἔβαινε 
Δωρίαν κέλευθον ὕμνων). None of the usual musical vocabulary that is associated with harmonia (melos, 
tonos) is used here.  Cf. Mathiesen (1976). 
 
22 The exact meaning of “Καστόρειον” is lost to us. Bowra (1964, p. 19) suggests that this was a tune of 
Spartan origin, connected with chariot-victories because Castor was regarded as the inventor of the 
chariot and played an important part as a patron of racing. However, it seems to have been transposed 
from the Dorian to the Aeolian mode, presumably by Pindar. Bowra (1964) also connects it to O. 1.102 
— “...ἱππίῳ νόμῳ Αἰοληΐδι μολπᾷ…” (the horseman’s song in Aeolian melody) since the “ἱππίῳ” 
might be Castor. It is interesting that the game inspired by the song of Castor is mainly devoted to 
gnomic considerations on the dangers of flattery, slander and envy. 
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ἑπτακτύπου/φόρμιγγος ἀντόμενος.  
 
The song of Castor on Aeolian strings so please you, look and greet it 
for the sake of my seven-stringed lyre.  
Pythian, 2.69-71 tr. Lattimore 
 
The scholia on this ode reveal that the exact meaning of “harmonia” has been the source 
of debate for centuries  — one of the scholiasts used it interchangeably with rhythmos, 
for instance23. Harmonia could be related to rhythmos, symphōnia, melos (melody, tune) 
or even to the sound created by an aulos (flute), distinct from song. At any rate, it is 
often associated with one or the other of the later ‘modes’ — Aeloian, Dorian, Lydian.  
 Our earliest solid evidence for the structure of these modes, however, is in 
Aristides Quintilianus’ de Musica; since he was a writer of the late Empire, we cannot 
assume that the harmoniai as he described them were what Pindar had in mind. We can 
see, though, that Pindar was aware of the diversity of the harmoniai and seemed to 
associate certain harmoniai with certain occasions or moods. He was also aware of the 
psychological effects of music, seeing the lyre as a vehicle whereby good order can be 
instilled into the hearts of the people. We will examine this last aspect in some more 
detail in the following pages.  
III.3 Harmonia in human life and conduct 
 
Many of Pindar’s poems exhibit his views on the relationship between civic order 
                                              
 
23 “τὸ δὲ μέλος Αἰολικῷ ρυθμῷ συνέταξε. ἢ τὸ ποίημα” Sch. Py. II, 128a. 
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harmonia, symphōnia, and music, generally speaking. Pythian I, for instance, is full of 
musical imagery and it is the song of the lyre that results in peace and good order in 
Hieron’s new city of Aetna. Here, as in Pythian 5, he talks about the lyre and not its 
harmonia; the enchanted music of the lyre makes discord sleep. Discord, here, is 
personified as an eagle which is, itself, a symbol of Zeus. The power of this lyre is 
evident from the very beginning of the poem when the steps of the dancers are said to 
“listen” to it and the voices of the singers “obey” the music24: 
Αʹ Χρυσέα φόρμιγξ, Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ ἰοπˈλοκάμων /σύνδικον Μοισᾶν 
κτέανον· τᾶς ἀκούει/ μὲν βάσις ἀγˈλαΐας ἀρχά, /πείθονται δ' ἀοιδοὶ 
σάμασιν/ ἁγησιχόρων ὁπόταν προοιμίων… 
 
Oh golden lyre25, shared possession of Apollo and violet-tressed Muses, to 
whom the steps, leader of the festivities, listen and whom singers obey 
when, quivering and giving them their lead, you strike up a prelude… P. 
I.1-3  
 
It is also somewhat unusual that the poem begins with an invocation to the lyre rather 
than to some divinity: this sets the tone for what is to come, and the music of the lyre 
                                              
24 The connection of the Muses to persuasion would hardly have been surprising to a reader of Hesiod’s 
Theogony.  
 
25 It isn’t wholly accurate to translate both kithara and phorminx as lyre and I acknowledge that I am 
glossing over some of the nuanced differences between the two words for convenience’s sake. They 
both referred to similar instruments; however, phorminx is a stylized, Homeric term, less common in the 
Classical period, and is a particular kind of lyre. The word “phorminx” occurs at least 21 times in the 
Odyssey and Iliad. It seldom occurs in later texts (with the scholia on this poem and others using ‘kithara’ 
interchangeably with ‘phorminx’) and more or less ceases to be depicted on vases by the end of the fifth 
century. The kithara is also a kind of lyre and there are various kinds of kitharai. I use “lyre” throughout 
in its broadest sense. See Mathiesen (1999, pp. 235–258) for detailed descriptions of different kinds of 
ancient Greek lyres.  
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is both a celebration of Hieron’s victory in the chariot races and expressive of a wish 
for civic harmony. Following the invocation, Pindar describes the music of the lyre as 
being so powerful that it affects even Zeus’ thunderbolt and Ares’ spear while putting 
a dark cloud of sleep over the head of Zeus’ eagle; this music manages to exert its power 
over the gods on Mount Olympus as well and, while it begins quite literally with the 
lyre, it becomes more and more abstract as the poem progresses, culminating with a 
musical term being used to designate an orderly, peaceful city: 
σύν τοι τίν κεν ἁγητὴρ ἀνήρ, υἱῷ τ' ἐπιτελλόμενος, δᾶμον γεραίρων 
τράποι σύμφωνον ἐς ἡσυχίαν.26  
                                              
26 Pierre Chantraine (1968), in his entry on phōnē, mentions that is sometimes occurs with the prefixes 
“homo—” and “sym—”: he defines the former (homophōnia) as “qui parle le même langage, à l’unisson” 
and the latter (symphōnia) as “qui résonne ensemble, harmonieux.” The LSJ, however defines “symphōnia” 
as unison. I contend that we should follow Chantraine in distinguishing symphōnia from homophōnia 
since this contrast of meanings is well borne out by a range of texts. 
Let us take the case of the Hippocratic de alimento, for instance, where we are told that the 
periods “symphōnoi” for the embryo and its nourishment (37); it wouldn’t make any sense to render 
“symphōnoi” as “come together as one” since the natural meaning is something like “are arranged in a 
way that is conducive to (the embryo and its nourishment)” or, as most translators render it, “harmonize 
(for the embryo and its nourishment)”.  In Vict. 1.8, symphōnia is used in a manner that is more or less 
interchangeable with harmonia. One of the earliest uses of symphōnia is in the Homeric hymn to Hermes, 
where the poet describes how Hermes made a lyre; he first affixed reeds of the right length into a tortoise 
shell and then (49-51): 
ἀμφὶ δὲ δέρμα τάνυσσε βοὸς πραπίδεσσιν ἑῆισιν, 
καὶ πήχυς ἐνέθηκ᾿, ἐπὶ δὲ ζυγὸν ἤραρεν ἀμφοῖν, 
ἑπτὰ δὲ συμφώνους ὀΐων ἐτανύσσατο χορδάς. 
 
Given that the seven-stringed lyre was played in such a manner that its strings were struck successively, 
it is highly unlikely that symphōnia here could mean anything like “unison”. This is not, of course, to 
say that it didn’t mean “concord”; this is precisely what it means in the first Pythian (69-70), for instance.  
On the other hand, we can use the example of “homophōnia” in Aeschylus’ Agamemmnon: “τοῖς δ' 
ὁμόφωνον/  αἵλινον αἵλινον εἰπέ, τὸ δ' εὖ νικάτω/…” (158-9); it clearly means “unison” here. Meyer 
(1932, p. 46) links this text to Cratylus 405d and claims a strong kinship between symphōnia and 
harmonia; according to him it is a mistake to read symphōnia as some kind of “simultane 
Zusammentönen”.  Even though this last text is Platonic, we have ample evidence from pre-Platonic 
texts as well that symphōnia is, at least in the musical sense, more or less interchangeable with harmonia. 
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For with your [Zeus’] help, a man who is a ruler, and orders his son, in 
honoring his people could turn them to harmonious peace. (69-70)27   
 
The soothing power of these harmonies is also mentioned, inter alia, in Nemean 4: 
 
οὐδὲ θερμὸν ὕδωρ τόσον γε μαλθακὰ τεύχει/ γυῖα, τόσσον εὐλογία 
φόρμιγγι συνάορος.  
 
Nor does warm water so much soothe gentle limbs as fine words linked to  
the lyre. (4-5) 
 
Both Pythian 4 and 5 (dedicated to Arkesilas, the tyrant of Cyrene) mention the power 
of Apollo; this is especially vivid in Pythian 5 when Pindar claims that instilling ‘good 
order’ (eunomia), an important political virtue, is one of the functions of the lyre: 
Γʹ ὃ καὶ βαρειᾶν νόσων/ἀκέσματ' ἄνδρεσσι καὶ γυναιξὶ νέμει,/πόρεν 
τε/κίθαριν, δίδωσί τε Μοῖσαν οἷς ἂν ἐθέλῃ,/ἀπόλεμον ἀγαγών /ἐς 
πραπίδας εὐνομίαν, […] 
 
[Apollo] it is who dispenses cures for painful diseases to men and women; 
he has also given them the lyre, granting the Muse to whomsoever he 
wishes, instilling peace and good order in their hearts[…] Pythian 5.63-66 
tr. Lattimore 
 
I would like to conclude this section with a consideration of Pythian 8 — this is one of 
the most interesting uses of “harmonia” in Pindar’s odes; we have already seen how 
music affects all of human life (and divine lives as well, according to P. I) but in this 
                                              
It is narrower in its scope than harmonia; however it overlaps significantly with our word in all of its 
uses. I contend that the difference between isonomia and harmonia maps on, more or less, to the difference 
between homophōnia and symphōnia: isonomia and homophōnia imply a unison or homogeneity that is 
not implied either by harmonia or symphōnia.   
 
27 For the contrast between war and harmonious hēsuchia, see also N. 9 
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ode we have, perhaps, one of the earliest acknowledgements of harmonia as a notion 
that has cosmological import.  
 Pythian 8, written for Aristomenes, who won the Pythian wrestling contest, is 
probably one of Pindar’s last poems and 446 BCE is a widely accepted date of 
composition — this would mean that Pindar was close to eighty when he wrote this 
poem. It was most likely Pindar’s last victory ode as well as the only one that celebrates 
Aegina (which had lost its independence to Athens in 457 BCE); according to some of 
the scholia28, it’s quite possible that the hēsuchia invoked at the beginning of the poem 
is a reference to the calm that followed this victory — it seems almost necessary to find 
some explanation for the invocation of calm at the beginning of an ode celebrating 
victory in a wrestling contest.  We have already seen two instances where the lyre and 
symphōnia are connected to “hēsuchia”; here, hēsuchia is personified: 
Αʹ Φιλόφρον Ἡσυχία, Δίκας /ὦ μεγιστόπολι θύγατερ, /βουλᾶν τε καὶ 
πολέμων ἔχοισα κλαῗδας ὑπερτάτας /Πυθιόνικον τιμὰν Ἀριστομένει 
δέκευ.  
 
Oh thought loving Hēsuchia, daughter of Dikē, of the greatest of city-states, 
you who possess the mighty keys to the counsels and wars, receive for 
Aristomenes the honor of the Pythian victory. P. 8.1-3 
 
Pindar follows this invocation with a description of how Hēsuchia puts an end to hostile 
                                              
28 See Drachmann (1964) II, 206. The second scholium relates it to the Persian wars and the first to 
political disturbances in the 35th Pythiad, i.e. 446 BCE. Given that the Persian wars ended more than 
thirty years before 446 BCE, most scholars have opted for the suggestion given in the first scholium. 
This was, then, most likely a reference to Aegina’s defeat. 
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violence; Zeus (“thunderbolt”) and Apollo, too, subdue their enemies, but Apollo 
welcomes Aristomenes and his band of revellers. Pindar then offers a series of 
extravagant praises — first of Aegina, ‘the polis of dikē ’ and then of Aristomenes. Then, 
we have the invocation to Apollo, beginning at the end of the fourth strophe: 
κατά τιν' ἁρμονίαν βλέπειν/ἀμφ' ἕκαστον, ὅσα νέομαι./κώμῳ μὲν 
ἁδυμελεῖ/Δίκα παρέστακε· θεῶν δ' ὄπιν/ἄφθονον αἰτ<έω>, Ξέναρκες, 
ὑμετέραις τύχαις./εἰ γάρ τις ἐσλὰ πέπαται μὴ σὺν μακρῷ 
πόνῳ,/πολλοῖς σοφὸς δοκεῖ πεδ' ἀφˈρόνων /βίον κορυσσέμεν 
ὀρθοβούλοισι μαχαναῖς·  
 
O Lord, I pray that with a willing mind and with some harmonia you look 
upon each step that I take in my path. Dikē presides over the band of 
revelers with their sweet song. From the gods, ungrudging favor I request, 
Xenarkes, for your fortunes. If someone has achieved great things without 
an ordeal, the many think he is wise among ignorant ones, the way he 
arranges his life with correctly planned stratagems. P. 8.67-75. tr. Hubbard 
(1983)29 
 
                                              
29 The above translation assumes that Apollo is the subject of  “βλέπειν” although there has been 
controversy — dating back to the scholia — over whether Apollo or Pindar himself is the subject. One 
of the reasons for considering Apollo to be the subject is that scholars have assumed that harmonia is little 
more than synecdoche for “song” — music is, after all, one of Apollo’s domains. Some prominent 
translations do not even translate “harmonia”; consider, for instance, Lattimore’s (1947) translation of 
8.67-71: “I look on each thing in my course even as you look also. Justice herself stands over sweet 
singing in celebration…” Hubbard’s (1983, p. 288) more straightforward translation of 8.67-69 is: “With 
willing mind, O Lord Apollo, do I pray to look according to some harmonia concerning each thing, as 
many things as I come to.” Hubbard (1983) construes “ἑκόντι...νόῳ” with “εὔχομαι” rather than with 
“βλέπειν” and this is a very natural rendering given the word-order and the fact that “βλέπειν” is 
technically part of the antistrophe whereas “ἑκόντι δ' εὔχομαι νόῳ” is part of the strophe. He also points 
out that, in other Pindaric odes where exhortation is used (N. 8, 9, P. 11), no real action is required on 
the part of the deity and “they are merely rhetorical (exhortations), invoking the god as a witness to the 




 The preceding strophe begins “τὺ δ', Ἑκαταβόλε30, πάνδοκον…”, which gives 
us the central point of the ode — the “far-shooter” Apollo controls athletics as well as 
arts, so it is meet that he be invoked here. I am primarily concerned with explaining 
what Pindar might have meant by “τιν' ἁρμονίαν” in this context. I argue, along with 
Hubbard, that we oughtn’t interpret “harmonia” as nothing more than synecdoche for 
“song”. Further, we needn’t assume the meaning of harmonia here is straightforwardly 
musical. By Pindar’s time “harmonia” was already being used in a more abstract sense 
— as we saw in the previous section,  his predecessor Homer used it to mean 
“agreement” and we will see, in the next section, how his near contemporary, 
Heraclitus, took it to cosmological heights. It is not unreasonable to posit that Pindar, 
too, might have been invoking a more abstract harmonia in this ode.  
 It seems that Pindar is entreating with Apollo that he, the poet, may look with 
“harmonia” at the path ahead of him. The fact that this is “τιν' ἁρμονίαν” and not just 
“ἁρμονίαν” could also be a clue to the fact that “harmonia” is not being used in its usual 
sense. If we pay attention to the positioning of harmonia in this ode, we find the word 
at the very end of the strophe — “harmonia” makes the seemingly tense interstrophic 
crossover more consistent, reflecting, perhaps Pindar’s poetics. As Michel Briand (2010, 
                                              
30 It is common in ancient Greek prayer for the ritual name of the god to be given first, hence the old 





pp. 114–116) has argued, the poetic art, for Pindar, involves the harmonizing of words, 
an activity that is analogous to weaving of cloth or to architectural construction. So 
here is one kind of harmonia — that which is a part of the craft of the poet. Let us 
consider, next, the content of this poem — it is a celebration of achievement resulting 
from violent conflict, both with respect to the wrestling match and (if the scholiasts are 
right) the peace that followed Athens’ subjugation of Aegina; it is fitting that the poet 
look upon these with “harmonia,” which is, as we have already seen, often the positive 
product of conflict between entities that are in opposition or in tension.  
 In the lines that follow the passage above, measure and order are mentioned yet 
again when we are told that the daimōn exalts some men and brings others down 
according to metron (due measure). Being exalted and brought down again are not the 
only opposites that Pindar mentions — Helion’s enemies are in a state of restless ill-will 
(ἀμείλιχος κότος, 8-9) while victory ushers in a calm epoch (μείλιχος αἰών, 97); 
someone may be perceived as wise (σοφὸς, 75), but relative to those who are ignorant 
(ἀφˈρόνων ,75); for some the Pythian games involve pleasurable nostos, for other bad 
fortune (84); the pleasure gained by mortals waxes quickly and then wanes with the 
same speed (92-3); mortals are creatures of shade (σκιά), but are given brightness 
(αἴγλη) by Zeus that then brings bright light (λαμπρός φέγγος) into their lives (95-
7); Zeus is also responsible for giving a long life span (αἰών, 97) to the ephemeral 
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mortals31 (ἐπάμεροι, 95).  
 It is, of course, difficult not to think of Heraclitus when one invokes harmonia in 
connection with opposites and there are, indeed, some striking similarities between 
Pindar and Heraclitus. Hubbard (1979) offers an illuminating discussion of some of 
these affinities (both philosophical and stylistic, insofar as the two can be meaningfully 
separated). We have ample evidence, for instance, that polar opposites are fundamental 
to the thought of both Heraclitus and Pindar, and the presence of these opposites is 
characterized by a kind of dialectical irresolution. Hubbard uses the case of Nemean 3 
to show how the opposition as a whole tends to be “ambivalent, successively 
privileging either pole and thus sustaining them in perpetual tension…” This 
description could quite easily be adapted to characterize Heraclitus’ views on the nature 





For Heraclitus, ‘harmonia’ comes to stand for more than just musical mode, or a 
goddess, or a vague metaphor — one could argue, in fact, that is one of the central 
conceptual schemes in his cosmology.  He often speaks of pairs of opposites as “to auto” 
(the same) or “hen,” (one) and a proper understanding of this doctrine of unity can help 
                                              
31 Cf. Hom. Od. 21.85 — “ἐφημέρια φρονέοντες” 
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us recognize the explanatory force of some of the most perplexing formulations of ho 
skoteinos. I argue, in this section, that the concept of harmonia is key to understanding 
this doctrine32.  
 The coherence of Heraclitus’ claim that “ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν ἓν πάντα 
εἶναι” (“it is wise to agree that all things are one,” DK22 B50) is often explained by 
drawing a distinction between Heraclitus’ expression and his intention. Various 
interpreters have tried to explain what his formulations about the identity of opposites 
really meant because taking them at face value would require us to agree with Aristotle 
(Metaph. 1005b) in viewing them as a violation of the law of contradiction33. It is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to enter into a discussion of these various 
interpretations; I offer but one manner in which we can understand his claim about 
the unity of all things. My goal in this chapter is to show what harmonia meant for 
Plato’s predecessors. In the case of Heraclitus, though, it is not possible to demonstrate 
the heights to which he took the notion without a more general discussion of his 
cosmology.  
 There are three tokens of harmoniē in the Heraclitean corpus — in DK22 B54, 
DK22 B51, and DK22 B8. Heraclitus claims that the hidden attunement (ἁρμονίη 
                                              
32 I should say that I use the word ‘doctrine’ with the appropriate reservations – far too many 
interpretations of Heraclitus have suffered from a Stoicized reading and I am keen to avoid this.  





αφανὴς) is better than the obvious one (DK22 B54) and we can better understand what 
hidden and apparent harmonies are by turning to fragments such as DK22 B51 where 
the image of the lyre is a striking illustration of the harmony of things in tension: 
οὐ ξυνιᾶσιν ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῶι ὁμολογέει· παλίντροπος 
ἁρμονίη ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης.  
 
They do not comprehend how a thing agrees at variance with itself; it 
is a harmoniē turning back on itself, like that of the bow and the lyre. 
 
The opposites here are ‘διαφερόμενον’ (disagree) and ‘ὁμολογέει’  (agree). The bow 
and the lyre are the key to understanding how things that are at variance can agree.  
We can understand the harmoniē as the consonance created when strings in tension 
come together to create ‘harmony’ in the musical sense. But the common translation 
of ‘attunement’ doesn’t capture the full sense of harmoniē34. Both the bow and lyre 
illustrate the unity of entities in tension on account of their shape as well: they are 
similarly constructed and contain at least one string that is in tension. The tension 
between the string and the frame in both the bow and the lyre shows how something 
being stretched apart also comes together in a productive way. Both the duality and 
the unity of opposites as well as the importance of balance are clearly brought out in 
this fragment.  
 Further, as Jane Snyder (1984, p. 93) comments, the shape of the bow and of the 
                                              
34 Hussey’s (1999) non-literal translation of DK22 B54 captures an important and oft overlooked aspect 
of harmoniē: “Latent structure is master of obvious structure”. 
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lyre illustrates the unity of the opposites in yet another way. The hunting bow can 
either be shaped like a curved ‘M’ or it can be an arc; the string is fixed on both sides 
of the frame. The lyre, too, describes an arc. The frame of the lyre, as shown in 6th 
and 5th century vase paintings, is curved in depth in addition to curving outwards – 
we can see this in depictions of the side of the lyre. We are accustomed to front or back 
views of the lyre but this side view of the lyre shows the outward curve.  Both describe 
arcs of circles and, as Heraclitus states in DK22 B103, a circle exemplifies how opposites 
(beginning and end) are common.  
  Finally, we mustn’t neglect the role of Apollo in this fragment. Both the bow 
and lyre have been associated with Apollo — the Homeric hymn to Apollo (131) 
describes him as master of the κίθαρις (lyre) and the καμπύλα τόξα (curved bow). 
Apollo embodies pairs of opposites as well — his instrument is the bow (bios) and, as 
DK22 B48 tells us, its name is life (bios) but its work is death. Apollo is the god of 
healing but he also uses his bow to send premature death to men (cf. Od. 7.64); he sends 
the plague (Il 1.44-52), but he is also able to cure it. He is also shown to be figure both 
of concealment and revelation — Heraclitus describes him as the god who neither 
declares nor conceals, but gives signs (DK22 B93). In the figure of Apollo, we have a 
harmony similar to that of the bow, i.e. a harmony between opposing attributes of the 
same entity. The harmony of the bow and lyre is a musical harmony, a physical 
harmony, and also a sign of harmony between opposites like life and death and 
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concealment and revelation in light of the relation to Apollo.  
 The context in which DK22 B51 is given to us might also prove enlightening. 
Hippolytus quotes it just after DK22 B50:  
οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν ἓν πάντα 
εἶναι.  
 
Listening not to me, but to the logos, it is wise to agree that all is one.  
 
B50 indicates that wisdom consists in comprehending unity and DK22 B51 reproaches 
people for being uncomprehending (echoing, inter alia, DK22 B15, DK22 B20, DK22 
B23, and DK22 B104) of the fact that even things that appear to be in tension are 
harmonized. Then, Hippolytus quotes DK 51 again before quoting DK 54 (the hidden 
harmony is better than the obvious one). We are told that Heraclitus claimed that 
wisdom consisted in agreeing that all things were one (DK 50), that one ought to 
understand how something at variance agrees with itself in terms of the harmoniē of 
the bow and lyre (DK 51), and then we are told that a hidden harmoniē is superior to 
an obvious one (DK 54).  The fragment (DK 51) presents us with a paradox and it is 
up to us to uncover the real meaning behind it; we must pay attention to the invisible 
harmony. 
 This invisible harmony is, perhaps, the metaphysical organization that underlies 
the world of sense-experience. There is an obvious unity in experience, but there is 
also a unity in reality. Heraclitus probably objected to the so-called Pythagorean belief 
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in the sounding of spheres — this is an obvious harmoniē — but pointed out the hidden 
harmoniē, which is the harmoniē of opposed entities that underlies all change. We have 
seen that the only prerequisite for harmoniē is the existence of two opposed or conflicted 
entities that can somehow be brought into balance : these are the so-called opposites, 
which are not all, strictly speaking, opposites but all are conflicting entities or 
conflicting aspects of a singular entity.   
 It should be also be emphasized that tension and conflict is necessary for harmoniē 
as Heraclitus conceives of it. He emphasizes the role of strife and war since nothing 
would exist in the absence of separation and tension; after all, “Πόλεμος πάντων μὲν 
πατήρ ἐστι[…]” (DK22 B53) and 
τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν 
καὶ πάντα κατ' ἔριν γίνεσθαι 
 
What opposes brings together and out of things bearing in different 
directions [comes] the finest harmoniē and all comes to be by strife. 
DK22 B8 
Strife is necessary because harmony comes about through strife35 and some kind of 
                                              
35 Some ancient Chinese thinkers held a similar view on the nature of harmony (和,he). Shi Bo, a pre-
Confucian scholar-minister who lived around 1066 BCE is reported to have said (according to the 
Guoyu) that “harmony (he) is indeed productive of things but sameness does not advance growth (ji). 
Smoothing one thing with another is called harmony. For this reason things come together and flourish. 
If one uses the same thing to complement the same thing, it is a dead end and becomes wasted […] a 
single sound is nothing to hear, a single color[?] (Wu se ye) does not make a pattern, a single taste does 
not satisfy the stomach, and a single item does not harmonize.”  
The same text also connects harmony to number — harmony obtains between five 
elements (Earth, Metal, Wood, Water, and Fire) and involves the balancing of five flavors of taste; there 
are four limbs in the body, six measures of sound, seven parts of the body involved in the heart/mind 
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disturbance or violence is necessary for maintaining the harmonized order of things: 
καὶ ὁ κυκεὼν δίσταται <μὴ> κινούμενος.  
 
The potion not stirred separates. 
DK22 B125. 
 
Even Aristotle seemed to have been aware of this aspect of Heraclitus thought: 
 
καὶ Ἡράκλειτος  ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ ποιήσαντι  “ὡς ἔρις ἔκ τε θεῶν καὶ 
ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο,”  οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἶναι ἁρμονίαν μὴ ὄντος ὀξέος καὶ 
βαρέος, οὐδὲ τὰ  ζῷα ἄνευ θήλεως καὶ ἄρρενος ἐναντίων ὄντων. 
 
And Heraclitus criticizes the poet who wrote “if only strife would perish 
among gods and mortals,”36 because he says that harmoniē would not exist 
were there not a high and a low note, or life without the female and male 
sexes which are opposites. DK22 A22/ EE 1235a 25-7 
 
Opposites in a state of strife along with a principle that balances them are both essential 
components of Heraclitus’ cosmos.   
 Even though “harmonia” is more than a merely musical idea for Heraclitus, he 
also borrows from music to explain how harmonia functions in the kosmos. DK22 B10 
is one of the most interesting fragments in this context, even though Heraclitus doesn’t 
explicitly mention harmonia: 
                                              
balance and eight in the whole person, nine social rules for pure virtues, and, finally, ten social offices 
for the regulation of the multitude. In all these cases, harmony out of diversity is of prime importance.  
 




Συνάψιες37. ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα, συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον, συνᾶιδον 
διᾶιδον, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα. 
Connections. Whole and not whole, coming together and going apart, 
singing together and singing apart, one out of many and all out of one.  
 
There are manifest musical ideas in this fragment. It is also one of the richest, and most 
puzzling, fragments pertaining to the unity of opposites and indeed to the unity of all 
things. Even though most of our evidence regarding the first word is significantly later 
than Heraclitus, it seems that synapsis implies connection and, more specifically, a 
connection that involves unity; the cognate verb, synhapto, means to join together. 
Synapsis also refers to conjunct tetrachords and Shipton (1985, p. 115) draws attention 
to the cognate form ‘synaphē,’ which has the general meaning of ‘union’ and the more 
specific meaning of the ‘conjunction’ or ‘contact’ of two tetrachords on a lyre. 
Seventh century vase paintings show seven stringed lyres in which the middle 
string was shared by the two tetrachords. A tetrachord consists of four notes played 
successively and the ancient Greeks recognized three genera of tetrachords: diatonic, 
enharmonic, and chromatic, the details of which needn’t concern us here. What is 
relevant is the fact that the two outer notes – the lowest and highest – in a tetrachord 
were fixed whereas the inner two notes could fluctuate. Now, when conjoint 
                                              
37 There is disagreement about how to read this and Kahn (1979), Marcovich (2001), and Kirk (1953) 
all opt for συλλάψιες. It is beyond my scope to enter into details about this conflict. I follow the text of 
Diels-Kranz and am convinced by Shipton’s (1985) arguments. 
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tetrachords were played, the highest note of the first tetrachord would become the 
lowest note of the second – synaphē refers to this point of contact between the two 
tetrachords. Let us return to DK22 B10.  
Shipton (1985) argues that we can interpret the fragment in light of the 
structure of the seven-stringed lyre. The tetrachords themselves are οὐχ ὅλα (not 
whole) but, together, they are ὅλα (whole). The shared string is where the two 
tetrachords come together, but it can also be seen as the point from which they diverge 
from one another. συνᾶιδον and διᾶιδον could refer to harmonious and non-
harmonious intervals as well as the sounding together of tetrachords and the separate 
sounding of each tetrachord. The two tetrachords made up an octave, and musical 
writers often called the octave ‘hē dia pasōn’ –  it is the structure which involves all the 
strings. Out of all the strings we have one octave and within the one octave we have 
all the strings that constitute it. The harmony, in this fragment, can be said to have a 
specifically musical meaning, brought out by the concept of ‘synaphē.’ The obvious 
harmonia discussed here is a metaphor for a deeper harmony– that of disparate entities 
in the kosmos. 
Harmonious sound arises because of the different sounds of the tetrachords just 
as all things in the universe come to be through strife. In the absence of tetrachords in 
tension, there would be no harmony and one tetrachord is incomplete and meaningless 
without the other; similarly, when it comes to pairs that are in conflict, one couldn’t 
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exist without the other. If one took away sickness, health would mean nothing. One 
is necessary for the other. Tetrachords are also struck successively, not simultaneously; 
first one dominates and then the other in order to create a harmony. Similarly, one of 
the pairs has mastery at one time and the other at another in order to maintain unity. 
 The harmoniē described by Heraclitus is dynamic rather than static. It is important 
that we note this both because it differs from other Presocratic conceptions of harmoniē, 
to which I turn in the following sections, and because Heraclitus is the only pre-
Platonic philosopher to be explicitly invoked in connection with harmoniē in the 
Platonic corpus, during Erixymachus’ discourse in the Symposium.  
 V. Empedocles 
 
 
 Empedocles’ universe consists of the four elements (rhizōmata) being controlled by the 
cosmic principles of Love (philōtēs) and Strife (neikos); Love unites the elements and 
Strife forces them apart. In the final stage of development, because of Love all things 
come together “ἓν μόνον εἶναι” (DK31 B35.5) — there is complete unity of the 
elements in the form of a homogenous sphere, with Strife left completely outside the 
sphere (DK31 B17, 27). Empedocles describes the current ordered universe as being at 
a point where Love predominates but Strife nonetheless presents enough resistance to 
prevent all things from becoming homogenized. Some elements are mixed and some 
aren’t. When Strife prevails, however, there is a complete separation of the elements 
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(DK31 B35). Love integrates living organisms while Strife disintegrates them (DK31 
B20).  
 Since Love is the principle that joins the elements, eventually resulting in total 
fusion, we can see why almost every commentator from Plutarch onwards has 
unhesitatingly identified Love (philotēs) with Harmoniē (harmoniē) in fragments such 
as DK31 B27: 
 ἔνθ' οὔτ' ἠελίοιο διείδεται ὠκέα γυῖα 
 [...] 
 οὕτως Ἁρμονίης πυκινῶι κρύφωι ἐστήρικται 
 Σφαῖρος κυκλοτερὴς μονίηι περιηγέι γαίων.  
 
then were not described the swift limbs of sun [...] thus it was set in place 
with the tight covering of harmoniē, a rounded sphere rejoicing in 
circular solitude. 
 
Another fragment (DK 122) mentions “Δῆρίς θ' αἱματόεσσα καὶ Ἁρμονίη θεμερῶπις” 
in a list of pairs of opposites — Plutarch and Simplicius both claimed that “Dēris” and 
“Harmoniē” are, respectively, equivalent to “Neikos” and “Philotēs” and contemporary 
commentators, such as Wright (1981) and Inwood (2001), have followed suit. It is 
undoubtedly tempting to view harmoniē as something that binds the elements together, 
just like Love. Indeed, Empedocles even describes harmoniē as a kind of glue (kolla): 
 
ἡ δὲ χθὼν ἐν εὐτύκτοις χοάνοισι 
τὰς δύο τῶν ὀκτὼ μοιράων λάχε Νήστιδος αἲγλης, 
τέσσαρα δ᾽ ῾Ηφαίστοιο· τὰ δ᾽ ὀστέα λευκὰ γένοντο 




Pleasant earth in well-wrought crucibles got two parts of glittering 
Nestis, out of its eight parts, and four from Hephaestus; and white bones 
were produced, joined by the wondrous glue of harmoniē. 
DK31 B96 
 
However, we oughtn’t be so quick to accept the standard interpretation of the 
Empedoclean notion of harmoniē. For one, we mustn’t lose sight of the earlier meanings 
of the term and the other contexts for its usage. Harmoniē certainly joins disparate 
entities together, but it doesn’t unify them completely. Two planks of wood are bound 
together by harmoniē but they aren’t fused into one. Second, even the goddess 
Harmonia was the product of the union of Aphrodite (Love) and Ares (Strife). 
Furthermore, this is nothing like any other notion of harmoniē that we have discussed 
above —  that, of course, isn’t sufficient to show that Empedocles couldn’t have 
conceived of harmoniē as a homogenizing principle, but it should at the very least give 
us reason for pause. Finally, it isn’t even clear that all of Empedocles’ fragments depict 
harmoniē as being equivalent to Love. Let us begin by reconsidering DK31 B96, quoted 
above. 
 This fragment is remarkable for presenting us with one of the earliest instances 
of harmoniē being used in a case of explicitly numerical proportion — bone is made out 
of earth, fire, and water in a ratio of 2:4:2. So harmoniē stands for mixing in a particular 
proportion — there is balance and not complete unity or merging. Aristotle, in De 
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Generatione et Corruptione, speaks of Empedoclean elements being placed together side 
by side (synkeimai): 
ἀνάγκη γὰρ σύνθεσιν εἶναι καθάπερ ἐξ πλίνθων καὶ λίθων τοῖχος· 
καὶ τὸ μίγμα δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ σωζομένων μὲν ἔσται τῶν στοιχείων, κατὰ 
μικρὰ δὲ παρ' ἄλληλα συγκειμένων. Οὕτω δὴ σὰρξ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
ἕκαστον.  
 
They must conceive it as composition — just as a wall comes-to-be out 
of bricks and stones; and this mixture will be composed of elements, 
these being preserved in it unaltered but with their small particles 
juxtaposed each to each. That will be the manner, presumably, in which 
flesh and every other compound results from the elements. 
GC, 334a 26-30 
 
If the harmonious blending of the elements is likened to the construction of a wall out 
of individual bricks and stones, this gives us even more reason to understand harmoniē 
as a proper fitting together of discrete entities that do not simply blend into one 
another. Further, as in the case of Homer, the use of the verb arariskō draws attention 
to the physical meaning of harmoniē.  We can turn to yet another fragment for a similar 
usage: 
[…] οἵτ' ἐπεὶ οὖν μάρψωσι πολύχροα φάρμακα χερσίν, 
 ἁρμονίηι μείξαντε τὰ μὲν πλέω, ἄλλα δ' ἐλάσσω, 
 ἐκ τῶν εἴδεα πᾶσιν ἀλίγκια πορσύνουσι, 
 δένδρεά τε κτίζοντε καὶ ἀνέρας ἠδὲ γυναῖκας 
 θῆράς τ' οἰωνούς τε καὶ ὑδατοθρέμμονας ἰχθῦς 
 καί τε θεοὺς δολιχαίωνας τιμῆισι φερίστους·    
 
[…] and so when they take pigments of various colors in their hands, 
mixing them in harmoniē, some more, some less, from them prepare 
forms resembling all things, making trees, men, women, beasts, birds 
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water-nourished fish, and long-lived gods that are foremost in honors.  
DK31 B23 
 
 This fragment likens the work of painters to the effects of Love and Strife on the 
four elements — Empedocles even uses dual forms to describe the work of the painters 
(meizante, ktizonte), and this serves to emphasize the analogy to Love and Strife. In an 
article on Empedocles and painting, Ierodiakanou (2004) cites a range of sources, 
including Pliny (N.H. 35.50), Cicero (Brutus 18.70), and Plutarch (De. def. or. 436B-C), 
in support of her assertion that the only colors used in antiquity were white from 
Melos, Attic yellow, red from Sinope, and lamp back (91). She goes on to clarify: 
 
‘Mix’ is not used in the sense of completely blending pigments of various 
colours to produce new hues, but in the sense of arranging pigments side 
by side in order to realistically portray the world.38 It seems that this was 
exactly the practice followed by painters of the fifth century BC…They 
drew an outline, filled it with a colour, and then juxtaposed washes of 
different colours on top; different shades were produced by superposing 
layers of colour rather than blending in advance.  
 
 
Fragment 123 problematizes the standard reading of Empedoclean harmoniē in two 
ways. First, if Love and Strife are “mixing in harmoniē,” it is not coherent to equate 
‘harmoniē’ with Love just as it would be incoherent to equate the ‘juxtaposition’ with 
painters. Second, if the style of painting that Empedocles was aware of did not involve 
                                              
38 See Kranz (1912), Richter (1944), and Devambez (1962) for more evidence on the use of pigments by 
archaic Greek painters.  
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blending of colours and he refers to a juxtaposition of components when he talks about 
‘mixing in harmoniē,’ harmoniē cannot just be like Love since Love blends and 
homogenizes the entities it acts upon. We have yet another fragment that uses a 
cognate of harmonia and lends support to my reading: 
 εἰ δέ τί σοι περὶ τῶνδε λιπόξυλος ἔπλετο πίστις, /πῶς ὕδατος γαίης τε 
καὶ αἰθέρος ἠελίου τε/ κιρναμένων εἴδη τε γενοίατο χροῖά τε θνητῶν/ 
τόσσ', ὅσα νῦν γεγάασι συναρμοσθέντ' Ἀφροδίτηι ...  
 
If your faith concerning these things is feeble, how from water and earth 
and aether and the sun mixed were born forms and colours of mortals, those 
that have been fitted together by Aphroditē… B71 
 
The word used for the actions of Aphrodite, who must here refer to the cosmic 
principle of ‘Love,’ (see B17.24) is “συνάρμοσις”; Aphrodite is also described as joining 
parts together to create the “earth and the sky and the sea” in fragment B22.    
 If we take these fragments in conjunction with B96, it is much more reasonable 
to understand “mixing in harmoniē” as ‘mixing in an proportionate and fitting way’. 
Indeed, this may well be the state of affairs described in fragments like DK 35, when 
Love and Strife are optimally balanced for the existence of the world as we know it, 
partly mixed and partly unmixed, since the prevalence of either extreme would result 
in the destruction of our world.  
 Harmoniē isn’t as central a cosmological principle for Empedocles as it was for 
Heraclitus. Those who have claimed that this is the case tend to equate harmoniē with 
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Love and, while both serve to bind discrete entities, there are important differences in 
how they do so. Love is just the force that simply fuses, eventually to excess; harmoniē, 
on the other hand, doesn’t refer to just any fitting but to a proper fitting together, as I 
have argued above. The harmonizing activity of the painters is an excellent example 
of the manner in which harmoniē fuses — alternating colors and creating unity while 
at the same time separating out elements to create icons (eidea) of what is represented39. 
Philolaus certainly had such a notion of fitting together in mind, but he understood 
harmoniē as a cosmological principle with a close connection to a mathematical-musical 





Philolaus of Croton was born around 470 BCE and died around 390 BCE40. He has 
been called a ‘Pythagorean’ by many and ancient slander even attributed parts of Plato’s 
                                              
39 For more arguments in support of this reading of Empedoclean ‘harmony,’ see Ierodiakanou (2005, 
pp 4-10). 
 
40 One cannot date the fragments of Philolaus with certainty. According to Huffman (1993, p. 1), Plato’s 
remarks in the Phaedo (61 d) are significant — Philolaus was heard by Simmias and Cebes at Thebes, so 
that places him sometime before 399 BCE, the dramatic date of the Phaedo. Huffman continues that 
Philolaus must have been at least forty years old to have been the teacher of Simmias and Cebes, so 440 
BCE becomes the terminus ad quem for his death. Of course, he may have been born significantly before 
that. Huffman (1993, p. 5) concludes, on the basis of various testimonia, that he must have been born 





Timaeus to him41. I will not dwell further on biographical details; whether or not he 
was a ‘Pythagorean’ is material for a different book, and one that has already been 
written (Huffman, 1993). I will instead limit myself here to a close reading of some of 
the extant fragments of Philolaus. While we have little reason to give credence to 
reports of Plato’s supposed plagiarism from Philolaus, many of Philolaus’ views seem 
to have influenced Plato’s discussion of harmonia in the Timaeus and also in the Philebus; 
it is important, then, that we be as clear as we possibly can about Philolaus’ doctrines.   
Five fragments of Philolaus are of particular interest to anyone wishing to 
understand his doctrine of harmonia: DK44 B1, DK44 B2, DK44 B6, DK 44B6a, and  
DK44 B10. Let us begin by considering Fragments 1 and 2: 
Περὶ φύσεως> ὧν ἀρχὴ ἥδε· <‘ἁ φύσις δ' ἐν τῶι κόσμωι ἁρμόχθη ἐξ 
ἀπείρων τε καὶ περαινόντων, καὶ ὅλος <ὁ> κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῶι 
πάντα. 
 
Nature in the world order (kosmos) was fitted together both out of things 
which are unlimited and out of things which are limiting, both the 
world order as a whole and all the things in it42. B1 
 
                                              
41 See, for instance, DL 8.7: Γέγραφε δὲ βιβλίον ἕν, ὅ φησιν Ἕρμιππος λέγειν τινὰ τῶν συγγραφέων 
Πλάτωνα τὸν φιλόσοφον παραγενόμενον εἰς Σικελίαν πρὸς Διονύσιον ὠνήσασθαι παρὰ τῶν 
συγγενῶν τοῦ Φιλολάου ἀργυρίου Ἀλεξανδρινῶν μνῶν τετταράκοντα καὶ ἐντεῦθεν μεταγεγραφέναι 
τὸν Τίμαιον.  Cicero also has Scipio claim that Plato got his hands on Philolaus’ notes: Platonem Socrate 
mortuo primum in Aegyptum discendi causa, post in Italiam et in Siciliam contendisse, ut Pythagorae 
inventa per-disceret…  et Philoleo commentarios esse nanctum… (I.x)  
On the other end of the spectrum, we have those who cast doubt upon the authenticity of 
Philolaus’ extant fragments, claiming that they are a late forgery based on the Timaeus; see Huffman (1993, 
pp. 149-50) on why such a view is highly implausible.  
 
42 All translations of Philolaus are after Huffman (1996) 
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Ἐκ τοῦ Φιλολάου περὶ κόσμου. <ἀνάγκα τὰ ἐόντα εἶμεν πάντα ἢ 
περαίνοντα ἢ ἄπειρα ἢ περαίνοντά τε καὶ ἄπειρα· ἄπειρα δὲ μόνον 
<ἢ περαίνοντα μόνον> οὔ κα εἴη. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν φαίνεται οὔτ' ἐκ 
περαινόντων πάντων ἐόντα οὔτ' ἐξ ἀπείρων πάντων, δῆλον τἆρα ὅτι 
ἐκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων ὅ τε κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῶι 
συναρμόχθη. δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις. τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐκ 
περαινόντων περαίνοντι, τὰ δ' ἐκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων 
περαίνοντί τε καὶ οὐ περαίνοντι, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀπείρων ἄπειρα φανέονται 
 
(1) It is necessary that things be all either limiting, or unlimited, or both 
limiting and unlimited (2) but not in every case unlimited alone. (3) 
Well then, since it is manifest that they are neither from limiting things 
alone, nor from unlimited things alone, it is clear then that the world-
order and the things in it were fitted together from both limiting and 
unlimited things. (4) Things in their actions also make this clear. (5) For, 
some of them from limiting limit, others from both limiting and 
unlimited both limit and do not limit, others from unlimited will be 
manifestly unlimited. B2, tr. Huffman 
 
The building blocks of Philolaus’ universe are unlimited things and limited things — 
entities with derivative reality are then of three kinds: limited limiteds, unlimited 
unlimited, and limited unlimiteds43. Unlimited things and limited things need to be 
joined together in order for the kosmos to come about and the two fragments quoted 
above are connected because the terms for “fitting together in an orderly way” are the 
verbs “harmochthē” and “sunharmochthē” (cognates of harmonia); Philolaus does not make 
                                              
43 It is beyond my scope to enter into a detailed discussion of what these ‘limiters’ and ‘unlimiteds’ might 
be — Burkert (1972, p. 258) understands them as atoms and void (1983, p. 326) and Schofield (1983, p. 
326) takes them to be odd and even numbers. I follow Huffman (1993) and Graham (2014, pp. 52–55) 
in construing them as broadly as possible. Graham (ibid.) offers a brief yet excellent discussion of limiters 
and unlimiteds in Philolaus’ ontology. See also Huffman (1999) for a general discussion of the notions 
of ‘limit’ and ‘unlimit’ in Greek thought. 
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use of the substantive “harmonia” in these fragments, but merely points out that there 
exists a relationship between ta apeira (unlimited things) and ta perainonta (limited 
things). The substantive — hē harmonia —  is introduced in Fragment 6: 
περὶ δὲ φύσιος καὶ ἁρμονίας ὧδε ἔχει· ἁ μὲν ἐστὼ τῶν πραγμάτων 
ἀίδιος ἔσσα καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν ἁ φύσις θείαν γα καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνην 
ἐνδέχεται γνῶσιν πλέον γα ἢ ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἦν οὐθὲν τῶν ἐόντων καὶ 
γιγνωσκόμενον ὑφ' ἁμῶν γα γενέσθαι μὴ ὑπαρχούσας   τᾶς ἐστοῦς 
τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐξ ὧν συνέστα ὁ κόσμος, καὶ τῶν περαινόντων καὶ 
τῶν ἀπείρων. ἐπεὶ δὲ ταὶ ἀρχαὶ ὑπᾶρχον οὐχ ὁμοῖαι οὐδ' ὁμόφυλοι 
ἔσσαι, ἤδη ἀδύνατον ἦς κα αὐταῖς κοσμηθῆναι, εἰ μὴ ἁρμονία 
ἐπεγένετο ὡιτινιῶν ἅδε τρόπωι ἐγένετο. τὰ μὲν ὦν ὁμοῖα καὶ 
ὁμόφυλα ἁρμονίας οὐδὲν ἐπεδέοντο, τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια μηδὲ ὁμόφυλα 
μηδὲ ἰσοταγῆ ἀνάγκα τᾶι τοιαύται ἁρμονίαι συγκεκλεῖσθαι, οἵαι 
μέλλοντι ἐν κόσμωι κατέχεσθαι. 
 
Concerning nature and harmony the situation is this: the being of 
things, which is eternal, and nature in itself admit of divine and not 
human knowledge, except that it was impossible for any of the things 
that are and are known by us to have come to be, if the being of the 
things from which the world-order came together, both the limiting 
things and the unlimited things, did not preexist. But since these 
beginnings preexisted and were neither alike nor even related, it would 
have been impossible for ‘them’ to be ordered, if a harmony had not 
come upon them, in whatever way it came to be. Like things and related 
things did not in addition require any harmony, but things that are 
unlike and not even related nor of [? the same speed], it is necessary that 
such things be bonded together by harmony, if they are going to be held 
in an order. B6 
 
This fragment introduces harmonia as a central principle in Philolaus’ cosmology but 
also creates a puzzle about its ontological status. It’s not clear whether harmonia is (1) 
the product of the principles peras and apeiron or whether it is (2) some pre-existing 
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metaprinciple that ‘supervenes’ upon limited things (ta perainonta) and unlimited things 
(ta apeira) in order to join them together or whether it is (3) some kind of Empedoclean 
cosmic glue that preexists everything else.  
De Vogel (1966) reads harmonia as a kind of metaprinciple that orders the 
principles apeira and perainonta and claims that, “together with number, “harmony” is 
also mentioned by Aristotle as being a fundamental cosmic principle, a doctrine which 
we find clearly stated in the fragments of Philolaus” (1966, p. 4). Aristotle does, indeed, 
claim that, for the Pythagoreans, mathematical principles are the principles of all things: 
Ἐν δε ̀ τουτ́οις καὶ προ ̀ τούτων [Leucippus and Democritus] οἱ 
καλούμενοι Πυθαγορ́ειοι τῶν μαθημάτων αψ̓αμ́ενοι πρῶτοι ταῦτα 
προήγαγον, καὶ ἐντραφέντες ἐν αὐτοῖς τας̀ τούτων ἀρχας̀ τῶν ὄντων 
ἀρχὰς εἲναι πάντων.[…] ἐπεὶ δὴ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ἐφαίνοντο 
τὴν φύσιν ἀφωμοιῶσθαι πᾶσαν, οἱ δ' ἀριθμοὶ πάσης τῆς φύσεως 
πρῶτοι, τὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα πάντων 
ὑπέλαβον εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι καὶ ἀριθμόν· 
 
At the same time and even earlier than Leucippus and Democritus the 
so-called Pythagoreans applied themselves to mathematics and were the 
first to develop this science and through studying it they came to believe 
that its archai are the archai of everything […] and since it seemed clear 
that all other things have their whole nature modeled upon numbers, 
and that numbers are the ultimate things in the whole physical universe 
they assumed the elements of numbers to be the elements of everything, 
and the whole universe to be a harmonia or number.   
Met. A, 985b 23–6; 985b 31–986a2 
 
According to Aristotle, the Pythagoreans considered that mathematical principles were 
the principles of all things and numbers were the principles of mathematical principles; 
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so it follows that all is number. ‘Number’ becomes an ontological principle, both the 
origin and the essence of being, and harmonia occupies a central role in this ontology 
since harmonia is to be understood in terms of number, even though the precise 
connection between the two remains somewhat opaque. Many, including Burkert 
(1979) and Huffman (1993) have claimed that Aristotle’s description of the 
Pythagorean theory in Metaphysics A (as well as De Caelo) corresponds to Philolaus’ 
theories.  
However, while I will go on to argue that harmonia must be connected with 
number, both for Philolaus and for Plato, we must be wary of unhesitatingly 
attributing such a view to Philolaus44. Further, both number and harmonia play 
important roles in Philolaus’ cosmology, but that is not tantamount to their being 
cosmological metaprinciples. At any rate, the ontological status of harmonia remains 
our primary concern in this section and, even if harmonia was a metaprinciple for some 
                                              
44 I am not commenting, here, on the difficulties associated with attributing such a view to the early 
Pythagoreans in general. Cherniss (1935, p. 590) expressed skepticism about the veracity of Aristotle’s 
reports on the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers. Zhmud (2012) goes as far as to claim that Aristotle 
invents a number philosophy that never existed in early Pythagoreanism. I think that Zhmud’s criticisms 
are excessive — the genuine fragments of Philolaus are reason enough to believe that the early 
Pythagoreans had some kind of ‘number philosophy’ even if Aristotle’s reconstruction of it isn’t wholly 
accurate (as is often the case with his reconstructions of Presocratic thought). Philolaus certainly did not 
claim that everything was number; he did, however, claim that all things must possess number in order 
to be known (DK44 B4) — number is an important epistemological — rather than ontological — principle 




Pythagoreans, I will go on to argue, pace De Vogel, that we do not have sufficient 
textual evidence for this view in the fragments of Philolaus45.  
Huffman (1993, pp. 128-130) doesn’t propose outright that harmonia is a cosmic 
metaprinciple but suggests that although Philolaus thinks that some sort of harmony 
must “supervene” upon the limiters and unlimiteds in order to bind them together in 
the kosmos, he remains agnostic about the ontological status of that which "fits 
together” because he simply says that it supervenes "in whatever way it came to be." 
According to Huffman, we have no good basis on which to conclude what kind of 
harmonizing force is active in the world; we have no grounds to claim that it is 
Empedoclean love or strife or an Anaxagorean vortex or any other particular type of 
force. Thus, since we can conclude only that a "fitting together" has occurred, a 
harmonia of some sort must also be included among the characteristics of ultimate 
reality (1993, p. 129). In the remainder of this section, I will offer a close examination 
of Fragment 6 in order to tease out the possible interpretations and attempt to answer 
which of these is most plausible.  
 The first problem that confronts us is the following phrase: “εἰ μὴ ἁρμονία 
ἐπεγένετο ὡιτινιῶν ἅδε τρόπωι ἐγένετο”. Huffman translates “epegeneto” as “came 
upon”, Burkert as “supervened” and Lang as “appeared later” but it is not clear how this 
should be understood. Presumably, it should be viewed in connection with the 
                                              
45 See Huffman (1993) on the difficulties associated with calling Philolaus a ‘Pythagorean’. 
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previously used words hyparchousas and hyparchon since they would be opposites: 
epegeneto would refer to that which “appears later” (literally: “is born later”46) or to 
harmonia; hyparchousas and hyparchon, on the other hand, refer to that which “is before.” 
Both hyparchousas and hyparchon are active participles of hyparchein. In the context of 
Fragment 6, Huffman translates these as “preexist”; here, hyparchousas refers to τᾶς 
ἐστοῦς τῶν πραγμάτων – thus, “ἁ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστώ” (“the essence/being of 
things”) preexists both tōn perainontōn, and tōn apeirōn. However, this gives us our 
second puzzle — how should we interpret this ‘estō’?  
Scoon (1922) suggests that “estō” must be something like Aristotelian matter; 
however, as Huffman (1993, pp. 130-1) points out, there is little evidence for such a 
reading47. Huffman (ibid.) himself suggest that it refers to the physis of the earlier pre-
Socratic thinkers. Yet another possible reading would connect it to the “archai” 
mentioned later in the fragment. We could connect the “essence” of limiters and 
unlimited to their archai (understood ontologically and not only temporally)48 — peras 
                                              
46 LSJ cites such definitions as: to be born after, come into being after, come at the end, come as 
fulfillment 
47 The primary reason for such a claim is probably pseudo-Archytas’ use of it in the phrase “ἁ ἐστω τῶν 
πραγμάτων” where “ἐστώ” is clearly Aristotelian matter. However, as Huffman (1993:131) argues, in 
the absence of an Aristotelian conceptual framework, there seems no basis for attributing an overly 
technical sense to “ἐστώ” (be it ‘matter’ or ‘form’).   
48 See Huffman (1993, pp. 80-3) for reasons why it is not anachronistic to translate ἀρχή as “(first) 
principle” rather than as “beginning” even though the latter was common among pre-Socratics and the 
former tends to be associated with Aristotle and his followers. For one, this sense of ἀρχή is already 
attested in the Hippocratic corpus, parts of which are more or less contemporaneous with the writings 
of Philolaus.  
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and to apeiron, an opposition even more familiar in later Greek thought. If we wanted 
to read ta perainonta and ta apeira as the “archai” in question, we would have to accept 
that ta perainonta and ta apeira are synonyms of “ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστώ”, but it seems, 
rather, that they are synonyms of “ta pragmata”. Moreover, “tai archai” cannot be 
synonymous with ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστώ because they do not match in number. 
One way to resolve this puzzle is to posit that the existence of ἡ τῶν περαινόντων 
ἐστώ and ἡ τῶν ἀπείρων ἐστώ where the former is peras and the latter is to apeiron. 
These, then, could be the “archai”, that preexist harmonia.  
 However, there is limited textual evidence for any of the hypotheses offered 
above, so let us bracket the question until we resolve some other puzzles in Fragment 
6. The most pressing of these is one that has already been touched upon: what does it 
mean for harmonia to ‘come upon’ limited and unlimited things? Philolaus uses the 
words “epegeneto” and “egeneto”, both forms derived from gignomai, the basic meaning 
of which is “to be begotten, to be created”. It is, perhaps, worth noting that in the first 
part of Fragment 6 we encounter a different form of gignomai, namely gegnēsthai, and 
there it refers to ουθ̓ενί τῶν ἐόντων καὶ γιγνωσκόμενον ὑφ' ἁμῶν, or to αὐτα ̀α ̔φύσις 
— in other words to ἁ φύσις γεγενῆσθαι.  
In conjunction with Fragment 1, then, we have the following ideas: physis in 
the kosmos “is born,” “is produced,” or is “harmonized” from the limiting things and 
unlimiting things (whose archai could be peras and apeiron). We also know that 
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harmony “is born,” and not hyparchē: ᾡτινιῶν ἁδ́ε τρόπῳ ἐγένετο. However, if we 
were to translate epegeneto as supervene (in the sense of “come additionally”, not 
“happen”), then we would need to accept that harmonia joins or acts upon the archai to 
beget harmonia. This would mean that Philolaus uses the “harmonia” in two different 
senses: first as a metaprinciple and then a product.  
The infinitives “synkeklesthai,” “katachesthai,” and “kosmēthēnai” complicate the 
matter even more — they could refer either to “tai archai” or to “ta perainonta” and “ta 
apeira” (assuming that they are not the archai in question). Read in the latter way, the 
kosmos is made up of ta perainonta, ta apeira, and their connection (harmonia); they are 
elements of the kosmos whereas their archai or estō are not elements of the kosmos since 
it is not they who have to kosmēthēnai. The final interpretation would then be the 
following: the world is an ordered kosmos; this kosmos contains ta perainonta, ta apeira 
and harmonia; their archai constitute the “pre-existent” essence of things limited and 
unlimited. However, since these principles are different, while the perceived kosmos is 
a unity and not a divisible duality, harmonia had to have been “begotten later” than the 
principles, with “later” understood in relation to “ταὶ αῤχαί ὑπαρ͂χον”. This allows us, 
at any rate, to see that De Vogel’s interpretation is mistaken: harmonia is not some kind 
of meta-principle on par with the pre-existent archai. However, we still need to arrive 
at some idea of what harmonia is, for Philolaus.  
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 I propose that one natural way of understanding harmonia, given all the textual 
evidence, is that it — along with ta perainonta and ta apeira — is produced or begotten 
from pre-existence principles and it serves, in various domains, to harmonize (properly 
fit together) what ought to be harmonized (dissimilar things). One problem with many 
existent interpretations of Philolaus’ view of harmonia is the tendency to read Fragment 
6 without Fragment 6a — I believe that McKirahan (forthcoming) is correct to point 
out that Fragment 6a is the key to better understanding Fragment 6: 
ἁρμονίας δὲ μέγεθός ἐστι συλλαβὰ καὶ δι' ὀξειᾶν· τὸ δὲ δι' ὀξειᾶν 
μεῖζον τᾶς συλλαβᾶς ἐπογδόωι. ἔστι γὰρ ἀπὸ ὑπάτας ἐπὶ μέσσαν 
συλλαβά, ἀπὸ δὲ μέσσας ἐπὶ νεάταν δι' ὀξειᾶν, ἀπὸ δὲ νεάτας ἐς 
τρίταν συλλαβά, ἀπὸ δὲ τρίτας ἐς ὑπάταν δι' ὀξειᾶν· τὸ δ' ἐν μέσωι 
μέσσας καὶ τρίτας ἐπόγδοον· ἁ δὲ συλλαβὰ ἐπίτριτον, τὸ δὲ δι' ὀξειᾶν 
ἡμιόλιον, τὸ διὰ πασᾶν δὲ διπλόον. οὕτως ἁρμονία πέντε ἐπόγδοα 
καὶ δύο διέσιες, δι' ὀξειᾶν δὲ τρία ἐπόγδοα καὶ δίεσις, συλλαβὰ δὲ 
δύ' ἐπόγδοα καὶ δίεσις. 
 
The magnitude of the harmonia is the fourth (syllaba) and the fifth (di’ 
oxeian). The fifth is greater than the fourth by the ratio 9:8 [tone]. For 
from lowest tone to middle string is a fourth and from middle string to 
highest tone is a fifth but from the highest tone to third string is a fourth 
and from the third string to the lowest tone is a fifth. That which is 
between the third string and the middle string is the ratio 9:8 (epogdoos), 
the fourth has the ratio 4:3 (epitritos), the fifth 3:2 (hēmiolios), and the 
octave 2:1 (diploos). Thus the harmonia is five 9:8 ratios [tones] and two 
dieses [semitones]. The fifth is three 9:8 ratios and a diesis, and the fourth 
two tones and a diesis. 
 
We can understand these ratios with reference to the structure of a Greek lyre in the 
5th century. The lyre had seven strings, each of which could sound one note. As Vitrac 
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(2006) and McKirahan (2013), among others, have noted, one of the greatest 
Pythagorean innovations was the discovery of the ratios created by stopping the string 
at a particular point along its length — a string played when stopped halfway created a 
sound that was an octave below the unstopped string, a string played when it has been 
stopped three quarters of the way along its length created a sound a fourth below the 
unstopped string, and so on49.  The most basic ratios that were derived from this system 
were the octave (2:1), the fifth (3:2) and the fourth (4:3). While integers could be used 
to denote the pitch of a tone, ratios were of utmost importance for measuring intervals. 
 In this fragment, harmonia is simply the imposition of limit (ratios) on the 
unlimited (strings). The harmonia here is a particular systēma hērmosmenon (tuning) 
— more specifically, the octave — and we are told that its ‘magnitude’ is the fifth and 
the fourth, the ratios of which are 3:2 and 4:3 respectively. It is evident that we do not 
reach 2:1 by adding these ratios; however as Tannery (1920) has remarked, multiplying 
the fourth and the fifth does give us the the ratio of the octave/harmonia/dia pasōn (2:1). 
It is also worth noting that Philolaus uses the epigdoic ratio (9:8) to express the 
                                              
49 Aristides Quintilianus reports that Pythagoras urged his disciplines to work on the monochord even 
as he lay dying: διὸ καὶ Πυθαγόραν φασὶ τὴν ἐντεῦθεν ἀπαλλαγὴν ποιούμενον μονοχορδίζειν τοῖς 
ἑταίροις παραινέσαι δηλοῦντα ὡς τὴν ἀκρότητα τὴν ἐν μουσικῇ νοητῶς μᾶλλον δι' ἀριθμῶν ἢ 
αἰσθητῶς δι' ἀκοῆς ἀναληπτέον. (De Musica 3.2.7-10). This ‘monochord’ was not a musical 
instrument, since it could not be played to produce a melody of any kind, but it was an important tool 




difference between the fifth and the fourth rather the more familiar musical term, 
tonos.50  
We could argue, if we take 6a to be an elaboration of the kind of harmonia that 
Philolaus has in mind, that harmonia in Fragment 6 need not be read as a grand 
cosmological claim and, further, that, pace Huffman, “in whatever way in came to be” 
is not a marker of Philolaus’ agnosticism about the nature of harmonia; he is simply 
claiming that there are many limited and unlimited things that make up the kosmos 
and, in order for unlimited things to join as well as for unlimited things to join limited 
things, there needs to be some proper fitting together, i.e. harmonia. In McKirahan’s 
(2013, p. 185) words, harmonia “is the way the limiters and unlimiteds that constitute 
it are arranged in an orderly structure.”  
We could also, on this view, take the archai to be not the first principles of the 
universe but, rather, the explanatory principles of the various unlimited and limited 
things or of the domains within which they fall. Huffman (1993 passim) calls attention 
                                              
50 See McKirahan (2013) and Barker (2007, pp. 264-71) for a detailed description of Philolaus’ harmonic 
system. Barker comments on the unusual vocabulary — di’ oxeian where one might expect dia pente and 
syllaba where one might expect dia tessaron. It seems that many of the terms used in this fragment are 
borrowed from music. At the same time, the use of ratios and the claim that all things have number (B4) 
provides this fragment with mathematical overtones as well. For this reason, Barker (2007, p. 271) 
concludes that “Philolaus’ approach is a hybrid between two perspectives [i.e. empirical and 
abstract/mathematical] which were later treated as incompatible.” 
McKirahan’s main disagreement with Barker’s analysis concerns the importance of the epogdoic ratio 
(9:8). Barker thinks that the mathematical sense of this ratio can be dismissed; McKirahan, on the 
contrary, thinks that the 9:8 ratio is crucial in order for us to understand the precise nature of the musical-
mathematical innovation in this fragment.   
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to the use of archai in the Hippocratic corpus and in the domain of mathematics 
(especially by Hippocrates of Chios) in order to argue that this is how we should 
understand the archai (even though he continues to regard harmonia as a ‘principle’ of 
sorts). I think that Huffman’s reading of the archai taken with McKirahan’s (2013) 
interpretation of harmonia offers us a coherent explanation of Philolaus’ views on 
harmonia.  
 Reading 6 and 6a together, Philolaus is claiming that we can comprehend music 
by knowing (1) the unlimiteds and limiters it is composed out of (range of possible 
intervals and particular tunings, perhaps), (2) by understanding how those unlimited 
and limiters fit together to compose it, i.e. by understanding the manner in which 
harmonia ‘supervenes’ on them and, finally, (3) by knowing the number the thing ‘has’. 
These steps can applied to all things in the kosmos (McKirahan 2013, p. 199) — 
everything is made up of some combination of unlimiteds and limiters and harmonia 
tells us about the nature of this fitting together. On this reading, Philolaus takes number 
to be the key to knowledge (B4) and harmonia to be the key to reality (B6); knowledge 
and reality are then connected by relating harmonia to number (B6a). I will return to 
the Philolaic doctrine of harmonia in Chapter 5 on the Timaeus. However, we also find 
an interesting echo of Fragment 6a in the Hippocratic de Victu, which I discuss in the 




VII. Hippocratic Corpus 
 
In a very influential article, Gregory Vlastos has claimed that “harmoniē” is a 
Pythagorean concept that is “without parallel in Alcmaeon or any other of the 
physiologoi or medical writers” (1953, p. 345) and that “harmonious order” in pre-
Socratic cosmology and Hippocratic medicine entails “equality, i.e. the 1/1 ratio (ibid.).” 
This is obviously not the case for Heraclitus or Empedocles, as I have argued earlier in 
this chapter. I will now attempt to show that Vlastos’ description is not wholly accurate 
with respect to the Hippocratics either by analyzing two key passages from περὶ 
διαίτης (hereafter Vict.). While I will center my discussion on the passages on harmonia 
in Vict., I will also talk about possible ‘Presocratic’ influences on Vict..  
There are eight tokens of the noun “harmonia” in the entire Hippocratic corpus 
— twice in κατ  ̓ἱητρεῖον (Off. 25.4, 25.11), four times in περὶ διαίτης (Vict. 8.8, 8.10 
9.3, 18.2), once in περὶ ἑπταμήνου (Septim. 9.27), and once in περὶ ὀστέων φύσιος 
(Oss. 12.3)51. In both Oss. and Off., “harmonia” refers to the commissure between the 
bones of the head. This usage brings to mind the mechanical sense used in the Odyssey 
since harmonia refers to the literal joining together of material components — it was 
planks of wood in the case of the Odyssey and it is cranial bones in this context. In 
Septim., the author invokes an order which is held to be the true and perfect number 
                                              
51 There are, however, dozens of tokens of the cognate verb harmozō.  
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system on the basis of the “doctrine” (logos) of harmoniē: 
σκοπεῖν γὰρ χρὴ τὸν μέλλοντα ἰητρὸν ὀρθῶς στοχάζεσθαι τῆς τῶν 
καμνόντων σωτηρίης, θεωροῦντα μὲν περίττας πάσας, τῶν δὲ ἀρτίων 
τὴν τεσσαρεσκαιδεκάτην καὶ τὴν ὀγδόην εἰκοστὴν καὶ 
τεσσαρακοστὴν καὶ δευτέρην. Οὗτος γὰρ ὁ ὅρος τίθεται τῷ τῆς 
ἁρμονίης λόγῳ πρός τινων καὶ ὁ ἀρτιφυής τε καὶ τέλειος ἀριθμός· δι' 
ἣν δὲ αἰτίην, μακρότερον ἂν εἴη ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος διεξελθεῖν· θεωρεῖν 
δὲ χρὴ οὕτως τριάσι τε καὶ τετράσι· ταῖς μὲν τριάσι συνημμέναις 
ἁπάσαις, ταῖς δὲ τετράσι δύο μὲν παρὰ δύο συνημμέναις, δύο δὲ παρὰ 
δύο συνεζευγμέναις. 
 
For a person who intends correctly to assess the treatment of patients 
must make his investigation by attending to all the odd days, and of the 
even ones to the fourteenth, the twenty-eighth, and the forty-second. 
For this order is held by some people, on the basis of the logos of harmonia, 
to be the artiphyēs52 and perfect number system, for reasons it would be 
too long to go into on this occasion. He must base his observations on 
triads and tetrads of days, the triads in joining them all and the tetrads in 
joining them two by two and coupling them two by two. Septim. 9.25-
8,  tr. after the French of Littré53.  
  
One rather wishes that the author hadn’t found the reasons μακρότερον ἂν εἴη ἐπὶ τοῦ 
παρόντος διεξελθεῖν. We might turn to a parallel in Diogenes Laertius’ Vita of 
Pythagoras for some clarification: 
 
τὸ δὲ σπέρμα εἶναι σταγόνα ἐγκεφάλου περιέχουσαν ἐν ἑαυτῇ θερμὸν 
                                              
52 This is a hapax in the Hippocratic corpus (and very rare in general) and its meaning is far from clear. 
It has been variously understood as “even” (LSJ definition II) and “true” (in the Loeb translation).  The 
DGE defines our word as “par por naturaleza” (emphasis mine). Literally it means, of course, something 
like “just born”. For more, see Delatte (1930, pp. 170–171) 
 
53 Here, as well as in the text translated below, some have translated ‘logos’ as ‘doctrine’ whereas others 
have translated it ‘ratio’ — since there is some ambiguity about whether or not ‘logos’ is to be taken in 
its mathematical sense, I leave it untranslated. 
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ἀτμόν· ταύτην δὲ προσφερομένην τῇ μήτρᾳ ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου 
ἰχῶρα καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ αἷμα προΐεσθαι, ἐξ ὧν σάρκας τε καὶ νεῦρα καὶ 
ὀστᾶ καὶ τρίχας καὶ τὸ ὅλον συνίστασθαι σῶμα· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἀτμοῦ 
ψυχὴν καὶ αἴσθησιν. μορφοῦσθαι δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον παγὲν ἐν ἡμέραις 
τεσσαράκοντα, κατὰ δὲ τοὺς τῆς ἁρμονίας λόγους ἐν ἑπτὰ ἢ ἐννέα ἢ 
δέκα τὸ πλεῖστον μησὶ τελεωθὲν ἀποκυΐσκεσθαι τὸ βρέφος· ἔχειν δ᾿ 
ἐν αὑτῷ πάντας τοὺς λόγους τῆς ζωῆς, ὧν εἰρομένων συνέχεσθαι 
κατὰ τοὺς τῆς ἁρμονίας λόγους, ἑκάστων ἐν τεταγμένοις καιροῖς 
ἐπιγινομένων.  
 
The seed is a drop of brain containing within it hot vapor; and this when 
brought to the womb expels ichor and water and blood from the brain, 
and from this are formed flesh and tendons and bones and hair and the 
whole frame of the body; soul and perception [are formed] from the 
vapor. First, to be formed it congeals in forty days, according to the logoi 
of harmonia in seven or nine or, at the most, ten months the infant having 
reached completion is born. He has within himself all the [harmonic] 
logoi of life, and these, being a connected system, keep it together 
according to the logoi of harmonia, each appearing at regular intervals.   
DL, VIII.29 
 
Delatte (1930) cites this passage, attributed by Diogenes to Alexander Polyhistor (floriat 
50 BCE), in support of his view that the Hippocratic description was ‘borrowed’ from 
older Pythagorean sources. He cites, further, Censorinus’ De die natali (9 and 12) in 
order to clarify both the passage in Septim. and the passage cited above which, he fairly 
notes, is not much clearer than the Hippocratic one (ibid.: 166).  
According to Censorinus (apud Delatte) Pythagoras believed in two types of 
pregnancy: a seven-month one (completed in 210 days) and a ten-month one 
(completed in 274 days). There are four stages of fetal development: for the first six 
days, the seed turns into a milky humor; during the following eight days, this humor 
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turns into blood; then after nine more days the blood is turned into hair; finally, after 
twelve days, the human form appears. It is no coincidence that the numbers are 6, 8, 
9, and 12: the ratio of 8:6 is that of the fourth, of 9:6 that of the fifth, and 12:6 that of 
the octave. Furthermore, the sum of these numbers (6+8+9+12) multiplied by 6 gives 
us the number 210, which is one of the two possible number of days of gestation.  
With this key, let us return to our earlier texts. For the moment, I leave aside 
the question of whether this is indeed a ‘Pythagorean’ borrowing — considering that 
Diogenes reports that Alexander reports that it was a Pythagorean tenet, we are not on 
unshakably firm ground in claiming that this is the case. At any rate, the question of 
borrowings from and within the Hippocratic corpus is a fitting subject for an entirely 
different work. Whichever way the influence went, these passages are of interest for 
anyone wishing to explore the archaic doctrine of harmonia.  
 The logoi of harmonia described in Diogenes’ text must be the ratios of the 
fourth and the fifth; the development of the foetus takes place in accordance with these 
ratios. We are now left to understand how the sequence of 14, 28, and 42 is in 
accordance with the ‘ratios of harmonia’ and part of a perfect number system.  Even 
without the aid of the passages from Diogenes and Censorinus, we can see that these 
numbers are all multiples of seven. Recall that the ratios of harmonia are supposed to 
make up the artiphyēs and perfect number system. Now, for many of the 
mathematicians of ancient Greece, a complete or perfect (teleios) number was the sum 
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of its parts or, rather its factors54 — 28 is a perfect number (1+2+4+7+14) as is 6 (1+2+3), 
and so on; however, 42 is not, at least according to this definition, a perfect number 
(the sum of its factors is 54).  
However, 42 is the product of six (whose zoogonic significance should be 
evident from the discussion of Censorinus above) and seven. Leaving aside all 
considerations of a possibly mystical significance possessed by the number seven, I 
follow Delatte in using the last few sentences of the passage as the key to understanding 
the significance of seven.  
Recall that the days are all joined in triads and that tetrads are used to join the 
days in pairs. The special nature of these tetrads leads Delatte to speculate that the 
middle term was shared — in other words, the first tetrad is 1-4 and the second tetrad 
is 4-7; the ratio here is 1:4:7, which is one of the kinds of ratios recognized by the 
ancient Greek mathematicians55. If the first set of joint tetrads goes from one to seven, 
the second goes from eight to fourteen, the third from fifteen to twenty-one, the fourth 
from twenty-two to twenty-eight, the fifth from twenty-nine to thirty-five, and the 
sixth from thirty-six to forty-two. Six groups of seven numbers (pairs of joint tetrads) 
                                              
54 While this is definition well attested in Euclid (VII Def. 22), it is not explicitly defined as such in Plato 
or in any extant pre-Platonic text.  
55 Ratios could consist of four discrete numbers (1:2::4:8) or they could share a middle term as is the case 
in our example above. This second kind of ratio was called “analogia synēmmēnē”. The triads, on the 
other hand, are another kind of ratio — to use Delatte’s (1930, p. 170) example, 4:7::8:11 and 11:14::15:18 
are examples of the ratios formed by triads, which join all numbers and not only pairs of four numbers. 
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make up the forty days critical for the growth of the embryo.  
In Vict., we learn more about harmonia and embryology, albeit in less 
mathematical terms. Hynek Bartoš (2015) has convincingly argued that the author of 
Vict. develops a remarkable philosophical framework for his dietetic account, reflecting 
upon and making use of some of the most important philosophical ideas of the fifth 
century, such as those of Empedocles, Heraclitus, and Anaxagoras — we find, in this 
text, a sophisticated elemental theory, an account of the analogy between microcosm 
and macrocosm and, according to Bartoš (2015), the most profoundly elaborated 
account of the body-soul relationship available in the extant pre-Platonic literature. 
Moreover, echoes of the account in Vict. can be seen in later philosophers, from Plato 
onwards56. Let us, then, turn to this text.  
 At the beginning of Vict. I, the author tells us that we must understand human 
nature before we say anything about dietetics. Understanding human nature requires 
us to (1) acquire 'a knowledge of man's primary constituents' and (2) 'discern[…]the 
components by which it is controlled.' Concerning the dietetic aims of the treatise, the 
author presupposes that anyone who wants to write about regimen must know the 
'powers' (dynameis) of all foods and drinks as well as of the exercises, because 'food and 
exercise, while possessing opposite dynameis, work together to produce health.'   
                                              




He goes on to claim that all living entities are made up of fire and water (Vict. 
I.3)57— together, these account for everything even though, by themselves, neither of 
these suffices (I.3). According to the author, all apparent generation and corruption is, 
in fact, the mingling and separation of immortal parts of living entities and we are 
offered an ex nihilo nihil fit argument that echoes, almost verbatim, Empedocles and 
Anaxagoras. Since fire and water are the basic constituents, dietetics requires us to 
maintain some kind of a balance between these opposites both within the body and 
with respect to the environment. In I.32, we are given a typology of human 
constitutions based on fire, water and properties associated with them (cold, moist, dry, 
warm)— at the beginning of I.4 fire is described as hot and dry and water as cold and 
moist58.  
For the author, the human soul is made up out of fire and water but so are 
embryos. Digestive procedures, too, are explained in terms of fire and water. These 
opposites make up the immortal seeds that enter men and women and separate into 
sperm and the female counterpart of sperm. An embryo only begins to grow when the 
two kinds of seeds mingle at the right time and in the right way. In I.8, the author 
describes this mingling as a harmoniē of male and female seeds, using language that 
                                              
57 It might be worth pointing out that this goes strongly against the humor-dynamis theory of VM. 
58  Τούτων δὲ προσκέεται ἑκατέρῳ τάδε· τῷ μὲν πυρὶ τὸ θερμὸν  καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν, τῷ δὲ ὕδατι τὸ ψυχρὸν 
καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν· ἔχει δὲ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὸ μὲν πῦρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ ὑγρόν· ἔνι γὰρ ἐν πυρὶ ὑγρότης· 




strongly echoes Philolaus’ description of musical harmoniē in DK44 B6a (discussed 
above)59. We already know that certain parts of fire and water are nourished in an 
embryo and that parts of the embryo receive nourishment until they are sufficiently 
large. At this point, these parts move into a larger place by force and necessity, and the 
portions start to separate off and commingle by changing position. We are then told: 
 
χώρην δὲ ἀμείψαντα καὶ τυχόντα ἁρμονίης ὀρθῆς ἐχούσης συμφωνίας 
τρεῖς, ξυλλήβδην διεξὸν διὰ πασέων, ζώει καὶ αὔξεται τοῖσιν 
αὐτοῖσιν οἷσι καὶ πρόσθεν· ἢν δὲ μὴ τύχῃ τῆς ἁρμονίης, μηδὲ ξύμφωνα 
τὰ βαρέα τοῖσιν ὀξέσι γένηται, ἢν ἡ πρώτη συμφωνίη, ἢν ἡ δευτέρη 
γεννηθῇ ἢ τὸ διὰ παντὸς, ἑνὸς ἀπογενομένου πᾶς ὁ τόνος μάταιος· 
οὐ γὰρ ἂν προσαείσειεν· ἀλλ' ἀμείβει ἐκ τοῦ μέζονος ἐς τὸ μεῖον πρὸ 
μοίρης· διότι οὐ γινώσκουσιν ὅ τι ποιέουσιν.  
 
And if, on changing position, they achieve a correct harmoniē, which has 
three harmonic proportionals, covering altogether the octave, they live 
and grow by the same things as they did before. But if they do not 
achieve the harmoniē, and the low harmonize not with the high in the 
interval of the fourth, of the fifth, or in the octave, then the failure of 
one makes the whole scale of no value as there can be no consonance, 
but they change from the greater to the less before their destiny. The 
reason is that they know not what they do. 
Vict. I.8 
 
Barker (2007, p. 283) claims that the use of “harmonia” here can be seen as a parallel of 
Philolaus’ use of it in fragments B6 and B6a. For instance, the Hippocratic author’s use 
of syllaba and di’ oxeion instead of the usual dia tessaron, dia pente recalls Philolaus. 
                                              
59 See Barker (2007:280-1) for a discussion of the parallels between Philolaus’ Fragment 6a and this 
passage from Vict.   
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According to Delatte (1930), the chord lengths that produce the tuning of musical 
instruments (harmoniai) in this passage are the numbers of days that comprise the 
diverse periods of development of the foetus — we have here a theory that certainly 
has some affinities to the one found in Septim.60. However, we are told a little more 
about the material constituents of the foetus in Vict. and we also learn more about 
harmonia in other domains.  
As far as its material constituents are concerned, the opposites that make up the 
fetus are male and female seeds, which are themselves made up of fire and water. These 
seeds must be arranged according to the ratios of harmoniē in order for the eventual 
creation of a viable foetus61. However, if they change in an untimely fashion, they 
become small and invisible (they cannot cease to exist since the author has already 
argued that generation and destruction is impossible) — as Bartoš (2015, p. 228) has 
noted, this passage implies that, from the earliest stages of development, parts of the 
body have a tendency to harmonize and, further, they have some consciousness of this 
harmonization (“διότι οὐ γινώσκουσιν ὅ τι ποιέουσιν.”). We must also note that this 
harmonie is attained by fire kata physin — so harmonia is, perhaps, something natural 
                                              
60 See discussion above. The theory described by Censorinus seems to be in play here. The intervals of 
the fourth, fifth, and octave can be seen to correspond to the number of days in the four periods of 
development of the foetus.  
 
61 The idea that various elements must be properly mixed (miscere) in order for an embryo to be a viable 
infant can be seen as early as Parmenides B18 — he seems to think that males and females contribute 
seeds with opposing powers and that these oppositions need to be put into the right proportion in order 
for unity to come about.  
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that underlies the development of the human body and much else besides, as we will 
learn from the physis-technē analogies to which I now turn. We need to the physis-
technē analogies in order to better understand the role of harmonia and we need to look 
at the dichotomy between the invisible and visible in order to make better sense of the 
analogies. So let us proceed in this order.  
Following Anaxagoras DK59 B59, perhaps, the Hippocratic author laments, in 
I.11, that people fail to understand how to understand the invisible through the 
visible62. 
The following chapter begins: 
Ἐγὼ δὲ δηλώσω τέχνας φανερὰς ἀνθρώπου παθήμασιν ὁμοίας 
ἐούσας καὶ φανεροῖσι καὶ ἀφανέσι. Μαντικὴ τοιόνδε· τοῖσι 
φανεροῖσι μὲν τὰ ἀφανέα γινώσκειν, καὶ τοῖσιν ἀφανέσι τὰ φανερὰ, 
καὶ τοῖσιν ἐοῦσι τὰ μέλλοντα, καὶ τοῖσιν ἀποθανοῦσι τὰ ζῶντα, καὶ 
τῶν ἀσυνέτων ξυνίασιν, ὁ μὲν εἰδὼς ἀεὶ ὀρθῶς, ὁ δὲ μὴ εἰδὼς ἄλλοτε 
ἄλλως. Φύσιν ἀνθρώπου καὶ βίον ταῦτα μιμέεται·  
 
But I will show that arts are visibly like to the affections of man, both 
visible and invisible. Seercraft is after this fashion. By the visible it gets 
knowledge of the invisible, by the invisible knowledge of the visible, 
by the present knowledge of the future, by the dead knowledge of the 
living, and by means of that which understands not men have 
understanding— he who knows, right understanding always, he who 
knows not, sometimes right understanding, sometimes wrong. 
Seercraft herein copies the nature and life of man. Vict. I.12.1-6 
                                              
62  Οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι ἐκ τῶν φανερῶν τὰ ἀφανέα σκέπτεσθαι οὐκ ἐπίστανται· τέχνῃσι γὰρ χρεόμενοι 
ὁμοίῃσιν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει οὐ γινώσκουσιν· θεῶν γὰρ νόος ἐδίδαξε μιμέεσθαι τὰ ἑωυτῶν, 
γινώσκοντας ἃ ποιέουσι, καὶ οὐ γινώσκοντας ἃ μιμέονται. Πάντα γὰρ ὅμοια, ἀνόμοια ἐόντα· καὶ 




 The technai are visible and the human physis is invisible; yet we can use one to 
understand the other since the technai are a kind of copy of the human physis. So let’s 
turn to some examples of these technai. First, we have cobblers (I.15) whose task is to 
make wholes into parts and parts into wholes; house-builders (I.17), too, use diverse 
parts to create some kind of whole, and this whole mimics the ideal diet for a human; 
cooks mix together ingredients that agree (συμφέρω) while disagreeing (διαφέρω) — 
they neither make things alike, nor would it be right if they mixed up everything into 
one dish (I.18). Thus the cook, like the builder, is supposed to fashion harmonious 
blends of different ingredients so as both to provide pleasure and ensure health63.  In 
Ancient Medicine we are also told that it is important to choose food that “harmonizes” 
(harmozousan) with our constitutions rather than choosing food that overpowers them 
(VM iii.34-5) because food, too, is composed of the same components or opposites as 
                                              
63 There is an interesting parallel to this in Confucian texts that compare the task of the cook to that of 
the musician, with respect to harmony (he). Yan-Zi (who died around 500 BCE) is reported to have said 
(according to the Zuo zhan): 
“Sounds are like flavors. Different elements complete with one other: one breath, two styles, three types, 
four instruments, five sounds, six measures, seven notes, eight winds, and nine songs. Different sounds 
complement one another: the pure and the impure, the big and the small, the short and the long, the 
fast and the slow, the sorrowful and the joyful, the strong and the tender, the late and the quick, the 
high and the low, the in and the out, and the inclusive and the exclusive.” Tr. Li (2006)  
  
Harmony (he) is contrasted with conformity or sameness (tong) — the latter involves a single note or a 
single flavor or, in other words, complete agreement whereas the former involves a balancing of a range 
of different elements. It is, of course, beyond my scope to explore how the he/tong contrast maps on to 
the harmonia/isonomia contrast, but it is nonetheless worth noting the similarities.  
  
Confucius also remarks, in Analects XIII.23, that the good person harmonizes but does not seek sameness 
(again, something like the equality and homogeneity implied by isonomia) whereas the petty person 
seeks sameness but does not harmonize. 
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the body (i.e. sweet, bitter, acid, salt, etc.) — so the harmonious blending of food is 
necessary for health perhaps because it aids the harmonious blending of elements 
within us. The musical analogy can explain all of these — the best musical compositions 
are harmoniai of the most diverse musical entities: 
ἁρμονίης συντάξιες ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐχ αἱ αὐταὶ, ἐκ τοῦ ὀξέος, ἐκ τοῦ 
βαρέος, ὀνόματι μὲν ὁμοίων, φθόγγῳ δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίων· τὰ πλεῖστα 
διάφορα μάλιστα ξυμφέρει, καὶ τὰ ἐλάχιστα διάφορα ἥκιστα 
ξυμφέρει· εἰ δὲ ὅμοια πάντα ποιήσει τις, οὐκ ἔνι τέρψις· αἱ πλεῖσται 
μεταβολαὶ καὶ πολυειδέσταται μάλιστα τέρπουσιν. 
 
From the same note come harmonious compositions that are not the 
same, from the high and the low, which are alike in name but not in 
sound. Those that are the most diverse make the best agreement; those 
that are least diverse make the worst. If a musician composed a piece all 
on one ?[note], it would fail to please. It is the greatest changes and the 
most varied that delight the most. Vict. I.18.2-7 
 
What these visible technai have in common with human physis is that they all 
involve the harmonious mixing of diverse entities. The human is made up of discrete 
parts that must be made up into harmonious wholes; further, since fire and water are 
the most basic of these parts, the human is made up of diverse discrete parts. In I.2, the 
author told us that knowledge of human physis entails analysis of its primary merea; I. 
6 begins by claiming that the individual is made up out of “parts of parts and wholes 
of wholes containing a mixture of fire and water”. The unity of opposites is central 
both to all these aforementioned technai and to the human body and soul. 
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We have yet another passage that contains echoes of Heraclitus and Philolaus:64 
Οἰκοδόμοι ἐκ διαφόρων σύμφορον ἐργάζονται, τὰ μὲν ξηρὰ 
ὑγραίνοντες, τὰ δὲ ὑγρὰ ξηραίνοντες, τὰ μὲν ὅλα διαιρέοντες, τὰ δὲ 
διῃρημένα συντιθέντες· μὴ οὕτω δὲ ἐχόντων οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι ᾗ δεῖ. Δίαιταν 
ἀνθρωπίνην μιμέεται, τὰ μὲν ξηρὰ ὑγραίνοντες, τὰ δὲ ὑγρὰ 
ξηραίνοντες, τὰ μὲν ὅλα διαιρέουσι, τὰ δὲ διῃρημένα ξυντιθέασι, 
ταῦτα πάντα διάφορα ἐόντα ξυμφέρει τῇ φύσει. 
 
Architects make a concordant [construction] out of diverse materials, 
moistening what is dry, drying what is moist, dividing wholes and 
putting together what is divided. Were this not so, [the construction] 
would not be what it should. For it mimics the diet of man; moistening 
the dry, drying the moist, they divide wholes and put together what is 
divided. All these being diverse are concordant. Vict. I.17.1-5 
 
 Recall that the author emphasizes that diversity is a prerequisite for harmony 
– “τὰ πλεισ͂τα διάφορα μάλιστα ξυμφέρει, και ̀ τα ̀ ελ̓αχ́ιστα διάφορα ἥκιστα 
ξυμφέρει […].” Heraclitus’ fragment B8 tells us what opposes brings together and out 
of diverging things comes the finest harmony.  Similarly, Philolaus’ Fragment B1065:  
ἁρμονία δὲ πάντως ἐξ ἐναντίων γίνεται· <ἔστι> γὰρ <ἁρμονία 
πολυμιγέων ἕνωσις καὶ δίχα φρονεόντων συμφρόνησις 
 
Harmonia in all ways comes to be from the opposites; for harmonia is a 
unification of what is a mixture of many ingredients and agreement of 
the disagreeing.   
 
 We have at least some evidence, pace Vlastos (1953), that the Hippocratics 
                                              
64 See Joly (1967, p. 23 ff.) for a discussion of Heracliteanism and Pythagoreanism in Vict.  
65 I should note, though, that some doubt has been cast on the authenticity of Philolaus’ Fragment B10 
as well as Heraclitus’ Fragment B8.  
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regarded a positive somatic state as consisting of a harmonic proportion, i.e. one that 
allows an entity or set of entities to dominate. The surviving fragment of Alcamaeon 
does, indeed, describe the norm of health as equipoise or isonomia but this does not 
give us reason to believe that the Hippocratic writers held the same views. While 
mixture (krēsis) and measure (metron) are important for the sake of somatic health, there 
is nothing inherent to these concepts that leads us to believe that the mixture would be 
in a 1:1 ratio and that measure requires equipoise.  
 I am not trying to claim that the Hippocratics conceived of health as consisting 
solely in harmonic balance. For instance, in De Nat. Hom., we are told that the humors 
(αἷμα καὶ φλέγμα καὶ χολὴν ξανθήν τε καὶ μέλαιναν) must be duly proportioned 
(metriōs) to one another in respect of compounding, power and bulk, and that pain 
comes about when any one of these elements is in excess (I.8). Presumably, pain is a 
negative somatic state and it comes about when the humors are not in a state of 
isonomic proportion. However, in certain other cases — embryology and dietetics, for 
instance — a positive somatic state involves a harmonic proportion. Due proportion and 
harmonia are of use in discussions of proper functioning of living entities and the proper 
arrangement of their parts and harmonia always represents, in these cases, a positive 
somatic state.  
 One of my goals in this section was to point out that Hippocratic medicine did 
not conceive only of isonomic proportion as a positive somatic state, as was presumably 
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the case for Alcmaeon. Even though there is no token of “isonomia” in the Hippocratic 
corpus, I concede that, in some cases, an isonomic proportion best captures a 
description of health. However, as Vict., clearly illustrates, harmonia was also used to 
convey a state of balance that was conducive to health. The Hippocratic conception of 
harmonia evident in Vict. is very similar to other pre-Platonic conceptions of harmonia 
and echoes of this can be seen in Plato’s Phaedo (See Chapter 3)  as well as in Aristotle’s 
de Anima. Like Plato after him, the writer of Vict. seems to have recognizes that 
harmonia can be (and, indeed, is) at play in a range of different domains in a manner 
analogical to the human body.  
A final remarkable feature of harmonia in the Hippocratic corpus is the 
connection of harmonia to number — Empedocles connected harmonia to ratios as well 
and Philolaus clearly thought that all things had number and we have good reason to 
believe that harmonia was the key to understanding how and why this was the case.  
*** 
The power, perhaps, of a notion like harmonia lies in the fact that it cuts across 
domains that concern all of human thought and activity. Kosmos and metron, for 
instance, often cover much of the same conceptual or semantic field as harmonia; 
however, harmonia is even more remarkable because it operates within the same 
domains as these notions in addition to other domains, such as music. Historically, one 
could argue that harmonia developed from more primitive concepts of order and 
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arrangement; however, during the early stages of Greek thought in the fifth century, 
harmonia could already cover the conceptual field that kosmos and metron jointly 
covered. This evolution is evident in the growing use of it by the early natural 
philosophers and then by Plato. With this in mind, let us turn, next, to the uses of 

















Chapter 2:  Order in the Gorgias 
 
There are two primary ways in which harmonia and related concepts of order play a 
role in the pre-metaphysical dialogues of Plato, the first of which is relatively 
straightforward: there are a few scattered mentions of the role of harmonia (as scale or 
mode) in education as part of discussions that prefigure those of the Republic and Laws 
and, perhaps, reflect Damonian views; I will defer my discussion of these until Chapter 
4. Second, Plato argues for a strong connection between order (kosmos, taxis, metron, 
and, of course, harmonia) and goodness. The Gorgias is of particular interest in this 
regard – even though there is no token of the noun ‘harmonia’ in the dialogue – since 
we are told here, for the first time, that the good the soul consists in order (kosmos, 
taxis) and that there is a kind of isomorphism between the human soul and the kosmos 
– these are ideas that play an exceedingly important role in Plato’s later works. I hope 
to show, through my analysis of the role of order in this dialogue, that there are 
remarkable continuities between the Gorgias, Phaedo, Republic, and Timaeus.  
 Like the Gorgias, the Phaedo shows us that a good soul is one that possesses order; 
the word for his order is “harmonia” in the Phaedo even though the Gorgias uses other 
terms in the same semantic field. There are also many parallels between the Gorgias 
and the Republic: in both dialogues, Socrates offers an account of the virtuous soul and 
the good and this is, at least in part, a response to his ‘amoralist’ interlocutors – Callicles 
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and Thrasymachus – both of whom who happen to embody the kind of excess that 
marks disorder, disharmony and, ultimately, injustice and immoderation66; both 
dialogues describe justice as an orderly state. Finally, towards the end of the Gorgias, 
Socrates talks about the “geometrikē isotēs” that governs both men and gods – we will 
learn much more about the power of different kinds of equality in the Timaeus. I will 
begin with a discussion of disorder and excess in the Gorgias before turning to justice 
and order. 
 
I. Disorder and tyrannical justice 
 
One of the bases of Sophistic argumentation is the use of the notion of physis as the 
principle justifying disproportionality and injustice. This is the clearly established 
position of Callicles in the Gorgias, and is revisited in a new form by Thrasymachus in 
Book I of the Republic. The argument of Callicles is based on the distinction between 
physis and nomos, a distinction he introduces from the outset to criticize Socrates' 
‘sophisms’ and to establish his reasoning. He first reproaches Socrates for using this 
distinction in order to refute Gorgias and Polos and then uses them in his own account 
by defining them and relating the excesses and pleonexia to nature (Grg. 483 d). 
                                              
66 Paul Friedländer (1964) has claimed that even the structures of the Gorgias and Republic I seem parallel 




 When Callicles invokes physis, he is referring to a principle that is at the origin 
of relations among humans and also governs the contents of these relations. For 
Callicles, this principle is based on the distinction between the strongest (kreittōn), the 
most powerful (dynatōterōn), the most valiant (ameinō) and the weakest (heittōn), the 
most impotent (adynatōterōn) and valueless (cheirōn). We observe that what happens in 
nature, among animals, among men, and among societies, is the domination of the 
strong over the weak. Paradoxically, what is done in nature is then set up as a norm: 
Callicles defines "the just according to nature". The foundation of law is none other 
than what is being done. Callicles’ thesis is that there is a justification for the law of the 
strongest and pleonexia of those who are considered superior: 
ἡ δέ γε οἶμαι φύσις αὐτὴ ἀποφαίνει αὐτό, ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστιν τὸν ἀμείνω 
τοῦ χείρονος πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου. δηλοῖ 
δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν,  ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον 
κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν.[…] ἐὰν δέ γε 
οἶμαι φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνήρ, πάντα ταῦτα ἀποσεισάμενος 
καὶ διαρρήξας καὶ διαφυγών, καταπατήσας τὰ ἡμέτερα γράμματα καὶ 
μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐπῳδὰς καὶ νόμους τοὺς παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας, 
ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα 
ἐξέλαμψεν τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον. 
 
But I think nature itself shows this, that it is just for the better man to have 
more than the worse, and the more powerful than the less powerful. Nature 
shows that this is so in many areas among other animals, and in whole cities 
and races of men, that the just stands decided in this way the superior rules 
over the weaker and has more. […]I think that if a man is born with a 
strong enough nature, he will shake off and smash and escape all this. He 
will trample on all our writings, charms, incantations, all the rules contrary 
to nature. He rises up and shows himself master, this slave of ours, and there 
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the justice of nature suddenly bursts into light. Gorgias, 483d 1-5; 484 a3-
b167 
 
Callicles’ reasoning rests on a series of predications: what is shameful and ugly by 
nature is to suffer disadvantage; and what is shameful and ugly is identified with 
impotence in the face of injustice. This condition therefore belongs to the weak and 
the slaves and leads to the inverse predication: what is fine and beautiful according to 
nature, the domination of the strongest, is identified with what is right.  
"To have more" or "have superiority over" often translates terms with the base 
“pleon,” such as pleonektein, pleon echein and pleonexia. The meaning of this term retains 
the ambiguity with which Callicles, ever the sophist, plays: "to have more" and "to be 
superior" as if the superior were always the one with more and vice versa. In the mind 
of the sophist, it is evident that the legitimacy of abundance, wealth and power 
originates in the superiority of nature of the individual. Conversely, those who suffer 
injustice, without rectifying or avenging it, show their weakness and inferiority: hence 
the reference to the slave whose condition is to suffer injustice.  
Callicles openly links superiority to virtue, arētē, taken here in its primary and 
epic sense of "excellence" and mingled with the new face of the tyrant. This leads us 
to a hybrid notion of arētē. The primary function of man is power, and its finality, 
happiness, is understood as the satisfaction of desires and passions. Excellence is none 
                                              
67 All Gorgias translations are after Zeyl (1987).  
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other than this ability to hold power in order to achieve its happiness. Excess can be 
found in two dimensions: power is not shared, but individual, hence the praise of the 
tyrant; desire is, so to speak, unlimited, its very nature is to lead to excess when it is not 
mastered. Thus, excess of desire is claimed by Callicles as a good, a view that is 
antithetical to the ones expressed by Plato in various dialogues. Socrates responds to 
this eulogy of power and excess by defining justice and the good in terms of measure 
and order, and it is to this discussion that I now turn.  
II. Taxis, Kosmos, and Justice 
 
The conversation between Callicles and Socrates from Grg. 488 b to 507 a represents, 
quite starkly, the opposition between the measured sage and the disproportionate 
figure of the tyrant. The excesses of the tyrant are exercised not only with regard to 
politics and laws, but also in the insatiable realization of desires and pleasures. Plato, 
ever the ironist, goes so far as to have Callicles speak of “metron”  (484 c 6) when he 
says that philosophy which must be practiced "with measure." In his response to 
Callicles, Socrates offers arguments that revolve around “taxis” and “kosmos”. 
 The criticism rests in part on the idea of order and proportion: not only are order 
and proportion preferable from a moral point of view, but above all the fields of human 
thought, nature, city, technique, body and soul, are founded on these notions. I will 
not discuss Socrates’ general refutation of Callicles, but will focus rather on these 
central points about order. Using a method that is certainly not unique to the Gorgias, 
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the controlling idea of Socrates' refutation is introduced through a technical paradigm: 
 
Ἴδωμεν δὴ οὑτωσὶ ἀτρέμα σκοπούμενοι εἴ τις τούτων τοιοῦτος 
γέγονεν· φέρε γάρ, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων, ἃ ἂν 
λέγῃ ἄλλο τι οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐρεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων πρός τι; ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ 
ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ [βλέποντες] πρὸς τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον ἕκαστος 
οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει [πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὑτῶν,] ἀλλ' 
ὅπως ἂν εἶδός τι αὐτῷ σχῇ τοῦτο ὃ ἐργάζεται. οἷον εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν 
τοὺς ζωγράφους, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυπηγούς, τοὺς ἄλλους 
πάντας δημιουργούς, ὅντινα βούλει αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰς τάξιν τινὰ ἕκαστος 
ἕκαστον τίθησιν ὃ ἂν τιθῇ, καὶ προσαναγκάζει τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ 
πρέπον τε εἶναι καὶ ἁρμόττειν, ἕως ἂν τὸ ἅπαν συστήσηται 
τεταγμένον τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον πρᾶγμα· καὶ οἵ τε δὴ ἄλλοι 
δημιουργοὶ καὶ οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, οἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, παιδοτρίβαι τε 
καὶ ἰατροί, κοσμοῦσί που τὸ σῶμα καὶ συντάττουσιν. ὁμολογοῦμεν 
οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχειν ἢ οὔ;  
 
Then let's see, considering calmly this way, whether any of these men 
proved to be virtuous. Come now, the good man who speaks with a 
view to the best, surely he won't speak at random, but will look to 
something? He will be like all other craftsmen; each of them selects and 
applies his efforts with a view to his own work, not at random, but so 
that what he produces will acquire some form. Look for instance if you 
like at painters, builders, shipwrights, all other craftsmen whichever one 
you like; see how each of them arranges in a structure whatever he 
arranges, and compels one thing to be fitting and suitable to another, 
until he composes the whole thing arranged in a structure and order. All 
craftsmen, including those we were talking of just now, gymnastic-
trainers, and doctors form the body into order and structure, don't they? 
Do we agree that this is so, or not? Grg. 503d-504a 
 
Callicles refuses to consider order as a principle that has a value in itself. The praise of 
excess is correlative to the devaluation of everything that represents order understood 
as an organization based on rules, measures and on the notion of equality. By elevating 
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pleonexia, he lowers equality to an arbitrary and artificial notion which has no 
foundation or positive significance. Now, order (kosmos) finds its origin precisely in 
the correct composition (taxis) of the elements and in the existence of rules or measures. 
That is why part of Socratic criticism will focus on the idea that a regulated and 
measured life is preferable to the excesses of the passions. Thus Socrates describes two 
kinds of opposed lives, that of the temperate and that of the intemperate by showing 
the superiority of the first over the second. 
 Then he must show the superiority of notions of harmonious order over the 
notions of disorder, which Socrates likens to excesses and pleonexia. To advance his 
argument, Socrates takes, as usual, a technical detour (Grg. 464-466). The aim is to 
show that any technique is based on the knowledge of order and proposes as a goal the 
right composition or proportion. Harmony consists in putting together the elements 
and the parts to form an orderly and properly adjusted totality: beauty does not reside 
in disproportion, as Callicles pointed out concerning the excess of desires, but in the 
measured and proportioned adjustment of parts. The works of art of the painter, the 
architect, and so on, all obey this rule; the beauty of art is thus a kosmos.  
 In the passage quoted above (Grg. 503 ff.), Socrates is arguing, from analogy, that 
a good soul is a well-ordered one just as a good house is an orderly one and a healthy 
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body is an orderly one68. As other passages in the Gorgias elaborate, the excellence or 
virtue (aretē) of each thing is something ordered by a structure (taxis).  A good and 
ordered, i.e. healthy, body would be one that is well-conditioned as a result of 
gymnastic training; a good and ordered house would one in which has been well 
designed and well built. Socrates goes on to argue that an orderly soul is sophrōn, and 
that a sophrōn soul is good (agathos). By transitivity, perhaps, we could infer that an 
orderly (kosmiōs) soul is good (Grg. 506b-508c).  
 In his commentary on this passage (504d 1-3), the Neoplatonist Olympiodorus 
suggests that temperance (sophrosynē) is the ‘order’ (kosmos) of the parts of the soul and 
justice the ‘arrangement’ (taxis).  Olympiodorus assumes that ‘ordering of the soul’ 
indicates the virtues as they are described in Republic IV. This is especially interesting 
because Plato uses the term “harmonia” to refer to the state of the just and moderate 
soul in Republic IV (e.g. at 444); this observation of Olympiodorus lends some support 
to my contention that “kosmos,” “taxis,” and “harmonia” all belong to the same semantic 
field and, at least in terms of basic meaning, are often used interchangeably in similar 
contexts.  
 In the Gorgias, Socrates often recommends a life of self-control as preferable to a 
life of the limitless pursuit of desires (e.g. at 491d). This claim depends upon a purely 
                                              
68 This is somewhat reminiscent of the account in Vict. discussed in Chapter 1. There, however, we were 
told that the builder harmonizes components to build a house and, similarly, particles must harmonize 
within a human body or embryo.  
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formal argument: something’s good depends upon its orderliness and its being 
arranged according to the craft appropriate to it. Callicles has himself already agreed 
that since there are some bad pleasures, some technē is required to sort out the beneficial 
ones from their opposites (Grg. 499d-e). The argument does not tell us what this good 
is for a human being, only that a life in pursuit of limitless pleasure could not be it. It 
could not tell us what this good is without identifying whose good exactly we are 
talking about. In later dialogues, harmonia provides us with a similarly formal 
understanding of what the good is. 
 Socrates’ characterization of virtue as psychic order (kosmos) is also striking 
because it introduces some ideas that are prominent in later dialogues, such as the idea 
that kosmos is a function of the universe and human society as well as the virtuous 
psychē and that mathematical proportion (later to be understood as harmonia) can serve 
as an ethical norm. This connection is made even clearer when Socrates claims that the 
order and self-control required for justice and for happiness in the individual soul is 
somehow akin to the cosmic order with its geometrical proportion (507d).  
 Anton (1980, p. 51) has also argued that the Gorgias presents us with a developed 
medical theory and there is: 
[a] presupposition that there is a deep relationship between the art of 
medicine, the moral quest, philosophical ethics and the art of statesmanship, 
and also, an ontological presupposition regarding an unbreakable 




I contend that the Gorgias gives us ample evidence that the goodness of the body, the 
soul, as well as the kosmos, consists in a state of order and, importantly, that there is a 
relationship between these different domains. As we will see, this idea plays an 
important role in the later dialogues.  
 Socrates is aware that it might not be enough to show that the good and the 
beautiful in crafts or even in medicine requires good order since a successful refutation 
of the Calliclean idea of the good would require the exclusion of excess in nature as 
well as artifice. This is why Socrates' final argument generalizes the function of 
proportion and order in all areas of thought: ethics, politics, and physics (or, rather, 
cosmology). 
 
φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ 
ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ 
σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιότητα, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον 
καλοῦσιν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν. σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ 
προςέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὤν, ἀλλὰ λέληθέν σε ὅτι ἡ 
ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται, σὺ δὲ 
πλεονεξίαν οἴει δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς. 
 
Now the wise men say, Callicles, that heaven and earth, gods and men are 
bound by community and friendship and order and temperance and justice; 
and that is why they call this whole universe the 'world order'69, not 
                                              
69 According to Jaeger (1986) the Gorgias is the first time that “kosmos” was used to mean an orderly 
system within the soul — the corresponding adverb “kosmiōs” had been used to signify orderly behavior, 
but never the noun. Dodds (1990) relates this passage to the Pythagoreans and argues that the use of 
“kosmos” is distinctively Pythagorean. However, I am in agreement with Kahn (2001, p. 54) that Dodds 
(and Jaeger) are guilty of overstatement since this sense of “world-order” is alluded to in Heraclitus and 
Parmenides and is used literally by Anaxagoras and Empedocles; Kahn contends, in addition, that the 
word might go back to the Milesians and, at any rate, the notion of cosmic order most certainly does. 
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'disorder' or 'intemperance', my friend. But I think you don't heed them, 
though you're wise yourself. You haven't noticed that geometrical 
equality70 has great power among gods and men; you think you should 
practice taking more, because you are heedless of geometry. Grg. 508a 
 
The most important – and novel – notion is that of geometrical equality; the science 
of geometry makes a somewhat abrupt appearance here. These two indications, allusive 
in the dialogue, are nevertheless at the center of the Platonic conception of the good. 
First, geometry is considered as an epistemological model: it makes it possible to 
establish the objectivity of knowledge and the notion of measurement. Then Plato 
promotes the notion of geometric equality. Excess rests fundamentally on inequality, 
inequality of nature and fact that would legitimize pleonexia. The negation of the 
principle of equality has major consequences not only on the city but also on the arts 
in general and on cosmology. Indeed, the principle of equality is at the origin of the 
conception of order according to Plato. This is the very meaning of the reference to 
geometrical equality, whose precisely determined nature can ground the notion of 
order. 
 While I will discuss the different kinds of means – geometrical, arithmetic, and 
harmonic – later in this dissertation, it is worth mentioning that “geometric equality” 
is best understood in relation to the geometric mean and proportion and refers to 
                                              
 
70 I discuss the different kinds of equality in more detail in the last two chapters of this dissertation.  
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equality between two ratios. The geometric mean designates a number that is the 
intermediate between two extremes; the proportion is an equality of ratios and not an 
equality of quantities taken in isolation. The "ratio" is called logos and the act of 
knowledge incarnated by the logos is how to organize the elements according to rules 
and determined measures that are often mathematical or dialectical for Plato. The 
power of these proportions consists in their ability to unify elements that are inherently 
multiple.  
 A final important aspect of order in the Gorgias has been noted by Macé (2007) 
who compares the Gorgias with Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen in order to show that 
ordered speech is able to impart order to the soul because taxis in logos is something 
that souls are able to participate in. He points out that there is an analogy – recurring 
throughout the Gorgias – between arts that have the soul as their object and arts that 
have the body as their object (Macé, 2007, p. 87). The passage quoted earlier (503-504) 
offers the clearest instance of this analogy since we learn there that what these different 
kinds of arts have in common is the fact that they produce order in their objects, 
whatever these objects might be. Let us revisit the first few lines: 
Ἴδωμεν δὴ οὑτωσὶ ἀτρέμα σκοπούμενοι εἴ τις τούτων τοιοῦτος γέγονεν· 
φέρε γάρ, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων, ἃ ἂν λέγῃ ἄλλο 
τι οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐρεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων πρός τι; ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες 
δημιουργοὶ [βλέποντες] πρὸς τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον ἕκαστος οὐκ εἰκῇ 
ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει [πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὑτῶν,] ἀλλ' ὅπως ἂν εἶδός 




Then let's see, considering calmly this way, whether any of these men 
proved to be virtuous. Come now, the good man who speaks with a view 
to the best, surely he won't speak at random, but will look to something? 
He will be like all other craftsmen; each of them selects and applies his 
efforts with a view to his own work, not at random, but so that what he 
produces will acquire some form. Gorgias, 503 e1-5 
 
Macé (2007), in his discussion, contends plausibly that the “eidos” (form) in the passage 
above is the internal unity that is proper to the ordered entity. Verity Harte (2002) has 
noted that it is often the case, for Plato, that normative terms of value are concomitant 
upon the presence of structure; while this idea is fully developed in late dialogues such 
as the Philebus, we can also see evidence of it in the Gorgias when, at 504a-b, the  
ordered state is described as worthy and the lack of order is described as wretched.
 First, it is established that justice is something that belongs to the soul. Next, the 
soul is compared to the body and to other entities and we learn that, in every case, the 
good state is an orderly one. Finally, these ordered states are given their proper names:  
 {ΣΩ.} Τί οὖν ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ 
κόσμου γιγνομένῳ; / {ΚΑΛ.} Ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν ἴσως λέγεις. / {ΣΩ.} 
Ἔγωγε. τί δὲ αὖ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγιγνομένῳ ἐκ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τοῦ 
κόσμου; πειρῶ εὑρεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ τὸ ὄνομα. / {ΚΑΛ.} Τί δὲ 
οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; / {ΣΩ.} Ἀλλ' εἴ σοι ἥδιόν ἐστιν, ἐγὼ 
ἐρῶ· σὺ δέ, ἂν μέν σοι δοκῶ ἐγὼ καλῶς λέγειν, φάθι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔλεγχε 
καὶ μὴ  ἐπίτρεπε. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν  ὄνομα 
εἶναι ὑγιεινόν, ἐξ οὗ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ὑγίεια γίγνεται καὶ ἡ  ἄλλη ἀρετὴ τοῦ 
σώματος. […] {ΣΩ.} Ταῖς δέ γε τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσι καὶ κοσμήσεσιν 
νόμιμόν τε καὶ νόμος, ὅθεν καὶ νόμιμοι γίγνονται καὶ κόσμιοι· ταῦτα δ' 
ἔστιν δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη.  
 
Socrates: Then what’s the name for what comes to be in the body from 
structure and order?/Callicles: I supposed you are speaking of health and 
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strength./S: I am. And what’s the name for what comes to be in the soul 
from structure and order? Try to find the name for this as for the body./C: 
And why don’t you say it yourself, Socrates?/S: Well, if it pleases you 
more, I’ll say it myself. But you, if you think I speak well, agree, and if 
you don’t, question me, and don’t give in to me. I think that the name for 
the structures of the body is healthy (hygieinon) from which health and the 
rest of the bodily excellence (aretē) come to be in the body. […] And for 
the structures and orderings of the soul the name is ‘lawful’ and ‘law’ from 
which people become lawful and orderly; and these are justice and 
temperance. 504 b7 -d2 
 
Thus an ordered body is healthy and possesses all bodily aretai and an ordered soul is 
lawful and possesses psychic aretai which here are described as justice and temperance 
(dikaiosynē and sophrosynē).  
 Let us also recall that the Gorgias has two primary tasks, which are not obviously 
connected: exploring the nature of justice and offering a criticism of rhetoric. The 
discussion of order unites these two. The doctor is responsible for restoring bodily 
order and the house builder imposes structure on the material constituents of a house 
– all that remains to be established is the craftsman who is responsible for bringing 
about this orderly state in the human soul. According to the Gorgias, it seems that the 
speech of the good man is that which brings about order in the soul – and it is here 
that the discussion about rhetoric and the discussion about justice are clearly connected 
for someone who makes bad speeches will harm the soul and lead it away from justice 




Οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκεῖνος, ὁ τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγαθός, 
καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει ταῖς ψυχαῖς οὓς ἂν λέγῃ, καὶ τὰς πράξεις 
ἁπάσας, καὶ δῶρον ἐάν τι διδῷ, δώσει, καὶ ἐάν τι ἀφαιρῆται, 
ἀφαιρήσεται, πρὸς τοῦτο ἀεὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως ἂν αὐτοῦ τοῖς 
πολίταις δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίγνηται, ἀδικία δὲ 
ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ σωφροσύνη μὲν ἐγγίγνηται, ἀκολασία δὲ 
ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνηται, κακία δὲ ἀπίῃ. 
 
It is by having in view those things that the orator, he who is skilled and 
good (technikos te ka agathos), will present his speeches to the souls he 
addresses, and in all his actions, when he gives what he gives and when he 
carries away what he carries away, he’ll always have his mind directed 
towards this, to bring justice into the souls of citizens (tois…gignetai) and to 
rid them of injustice, to bring about temperance and to rid them of 
intemperance and to generate other virtues and get rid of vice. Gorgias, 
504d 4 – e 3   
 
In these passages, there is a causal link between the order present in the speech of the 
good orator and the order present in the souls that he addresses. The idea that 
something external, possessing order, can bring about order in another entity that 
perceives it recurs, as we will see, in later dialogues with the order being specified as 
harmonia.  
 The Gorgias presents us with early Platonic views of justice, moderation, and 
virtue in general and we learn that these consist in a proper ordering that is opposed 
to the pleonexia – in deed as well as speech – of a tyrannical figure such as Callicles. 
Second, we learn that there is an isomorphism between the soul, the body, and the 
kosmos. Third, we can see that this ordering has mathematical underpinnings, although 
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this is discussed very briefly. Finally, order is something that can be instilled in entities 
by other entities possessing it.  
 We have, in this dialogue, a discussion of order that is not harmonia but that, 
nonetheless, shares many characteristics with it. It is possible that one of the reasons 
that psychic order in the Gorgias could not be described as a harmonia is that harmonia 
requires the existence of a mereologically complex entity and we have not, at this stage, 
been introduced to the idea of a mereologically complex soul. The Phaedo, however, 
does introduce the idea that the soul is composed out of various elements and it is here 
that we are presented with the hypothesis that the soul could be a harmonia. Let us, 












Chapter 3: Harmonia in the Phaedo 
 
In terms of mere frequency, the Phaedo is the first Platonic dialogue where harmonia 
plays a prominent role. The context, though, is Socrates’ rejection of Simmias’ claim 
that the soul is a harmonia. The Phaedo is, nonetheless, of great importance to anyone 
attempting to reconstruct Plato’s positive doctrine of harmonia because it tells us what 
Platonic harmonia is not and, further, through Socrates’ refutation of Simmias, we learn 
something about what Platonic harmonia might be.  
In this chapter, I will discuss Simmias’ soul-harmonia thesis as well as Socrates’ 
refutation of it. I begin with Simmias’ thesis that the soul is a harmonia and attempt to 
explain what he could have meant by it. Following this, I will discuss the three 
arguments that Socrates offers against Simmias; this should help us better understand 
Simmias’ thesis and should also give us some indication of Plato’s positive views. I will 
conclude this chapter with some observations on Platonic harmonia.   
 
I. Simmias’ Soul-Harmonia Thesis 
 
 
 The Phaedo addresses the question of the immortality of the soul and in the 
course of the dialogue, Socrates presents his interlocutors — Simmias, Cebes, and later 
Echecrates — with at least four different arguments for the immortality of the soul. The 
discussion of harmonia begins after Socrates has already presented three arguments for 
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the immortality of the soul and follows immediately after an argument for the 
immortality of the soul that is commonly known as the “Affinity Argument”. 
According to the Affinity Argument, an argument from analogy, the soul is akin to 
the divine Forms since it is immutable, invisible, and divine and, consequently, 
imperishable. Simmias offers a counter-argument: 
Ταύύτῃ ἔμοιγε, ἦ δ'ʹ ὅς, ᾗ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἄν τις καὶ λύρας τε 
καὶ χορδῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον εἴποι, ὡς ἡ μὲν ἁρμονία ἀόρατον 
καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλόν τι καὶ θεῖόόν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡρμοσμένῃ 
λύρᾳ, αὐτὴ δ'ʹ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ 
σύύνθετα καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ συγγενῆ. 
 
I think in this way,” he said; “one could surely use the same argument 
about the harmonia of a lyre and its strings, and say that the harmonia  is 
something unseen and incorporeal and very lovely and divine in the 
tuned lyre while the lyre itself and its strings are corporeal bodies and 
composite and earthy and akin to the mortal. Phd. 85e 3 — 86a 371,  
 
Simmias goes on to say that we could claim that the harmonia continues to exist 
somewhere even when the lyre is thoroughly destroyed because the harmonia is akin 
to the immortal. This is supposed to be an absurd conclusion because Simmias takes it 
to be commonly believed that the harmonia of the lyre is destroyed before the lyre is.  
 However, he follows up this counter-argument by saying that this is actually 
what ‘we’ take the soul to be72. So Simmias’ counter-example to the Affinity Argument 
                                              
71 Phaedo translation are mine unless otherwise indicated. 
 
72 “οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτόν σε τοῦτο ἐντεθυμῆσθαι, ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὴν 
ψυχὴν εἶναι…”, Phd. 85b 5-6. 
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paves the road for Simmias’ own theory of the soul and it is a theory which seeks to 
establish, pace Socrates, that the soul is mortal:  
[…]ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν καὶ συνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ 
ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν, κρᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ 
ἁρμονίαν αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ 
μετρίως κραθῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα – εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει ἡ ψυχὴ οὖσα ἁρμονία 
τις, δῆλον ὅτι, ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἀμέτρως ἢ ἐπιταθῇ ὑπὸ 
νόσων καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει 
ἀπολωλέναι, καίπερ οὖσαν θειοτάτην, ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἁρμονίαι 
αἵ τ' ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις πᾶσι, τὰ δὲ 
λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἑκάστου πολὺν χρόνον παραμένειν, ἕως ἂν ἢ 
κατακαυθῇ ἢ κατασαπῇ – ὅρα οὖν πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τί 
φήσομεν, ἐάν τις ἀξιοῖ κρᾶσιν οὖσαν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐν 
τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ πρώτην ἀπόλλυσθαι.  
 
[...]our body is kept in tension, as it were, and held together by hot and 
cold, dry and wet, and the like, and our soul is a blending and harmonia 
of these same things when they’re blended with each other in due 
proportion. If, then, the soul proves to be some kind of harmonia, it’s 
clear that when our body is unduly relaxed or tautened by illness and 
other troubles, then the soul must perish at once no matter how divine 
it may be, just like the other harmoniai, those in musical notes and in all 
the products of craftsmen; whereas the remains of each body will last for 
a long time, until they’re burnt up or rot away. Consider what we shall 
say in answer to one who considers the soul to be a mixture of bodily 
elements and to be the first to perish in the process we call death. Phd. 86 
b5-d3 
 
The problem here lies in reading this and the previous passage together. Simmias 
begins by offering an analogy of sorts between the harmonia and lyre and the soul and 
body, but his subsequent claim seems to be stronger: he moves from merely comparing 




the soul to a harmonia to identifying the soul with a harmonia. In order to make sense 
of the argument we must begin by asking what exactly is meant by harmonia here and 
whether Simmias is using harmonia in the same way throughout.  
 Recall that harmonia is not identical to the English cognate harmony since its 
primary meaning is not musical; it can be understood to a fitting together of disparate 
elements, whether in music, universe, the body politic, or the body of man. As 
discussed in Chapter I, harmonia could mean physical fitting together, fitting together 
of notes, ratio or some structure of objective relations, octave, tetrachord, agreement, 
a metaphysical principle of union.   
 Now since Simmias is talking about the harmonia of the lyre and its strings, 
“fitting together of notes” seems like a good first stab at what he means; the fact that 
Simmias refers to the harmonia in a fitted or well-tuned (ἡρμοσμένῃ) lyre lends support 
to this. If this is what he means by harmonia, we can take Simmias to be saying that the 
soul is a structure just as a musical harmonia is — incorporeal, all-beautiful etc. Simmias’ 
later description of the soul provides us with more hints — he describes the soul as a 
blending (krasis) and harmonia. Thus, the notion of harmonia here involves the blending 
of some entities; this is still consistent with the “musical harmonia” interpretation. 
However, Simmias mentions the harmoniai in musical notes as well as the other 
harmoniai, and that seems to imply that — in this passage at least — he is using harmonia 
in a broader sense. He moves from comparing the soul to a beautiful (presumably) 
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musical harmonia of a lyre to speaking of it as a kind of harmonia comparable to the 
many harmoniai, not only those in music but also in other crafts.  
 The initial claim seems to be that the soul is to the body what the harmonia is to 
the lyre. By this, Simmias means that the soul and the harmonia (understood as the 
music of the lyre) are ontologically dependent on the body and the lyre respectively. 
However it seems we are given more details about the precise way in which the soul 
is dependent on the body in the second passage — our soul is a krasis (blending) of 
qualitative opposites and, because of this dependence, it is destroyed when the 
corporeal things that constitute it are destroyed. Since the harmonia of a lyre is supposed 
to be analogous to the soul and the body, the same should hold true of it, but it is hard 
to see how a structure or a melody could be destroyed when a lyre is, if this is what is 
meant by harmonia. For one, they are not dependent on any particular lyre. The only 
thing that we know with certainty is that the harmonia in question is in some way 
ontologically dependent on the lyre in question and so too is the soul on the body.  
 Here is a summary of the problems so far: first, Simmias describes the body, in 
contrast to the soul, as a composite (syntheton); the same is subsequently said of the soul 
(it is a krasis); second, Simmias moves from a narrower sense of harmonia to a broader 
one: first, he talks about the harmonia of the lyre, but then he mentions the harmoniai 
(in the plural); third, Simmias begins by comparing the soul to something eternal and 
incorporeal but then describes it as a harmonia (in the sense of mixing) of qualitative 
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opposites. Can we take Simmias to be espousing materialism about the soul? If so, then 
what are we to make of his earlier claim that the soul is divine and incorporeal?  
 The analogy of the earlier passage leads one to think that the relationship 
between the soul and the body will be a relationship between an immaterial and 
material entity wherein the immaterial entity is ontologically dependent on the 
material one. However, we have the evidence of the later passage that the soul is a 
krasis of qualitative opposites — and krasis was a term used most frequently by the 
medical writers to refer to a compounding of material entities73. The primary sense of 
it in Plato’s time was literal mixing74. The LSJ cites a “metaphorical” use of the term 
but the only passage mentioned in support of that is the passage quoted above.  
 In response to these problems, CCW Taylor (2008, 74-5) and David Gallop 
(1990, 148-9) follow Aristotle in distinguishing distinct possibilities for what Simmias’ 
thesis might be. He could be claiming that  
1) the soul is identical with the ratio or formula according to which the elements are 
combined to form the living man, or that  
2) the soul is identical with the mixture or combination of elements according to that 
formula, or that  
                                              
73 I discuss this briefly in Chapter 1, Section VII. 
74 See Montanari (1979: 93ff.) for more on krasis and kerannumi.  
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3) the soul is identical with a state of the bodily elements, viz. the state of being 
combined according to that formula.  
Scholarly consensus veers towards the third option — the soul is a tuned state of the 
body just as a harmonia is a tuned state of the lyre. Such a reading takes the soul to be 
ontologically dependent on the body without being made out of the same material 
constituents as the body. Such a reading does not attribute materialism to Simmias.  
However, all these interpretations assume that the “harmonia” as used in the 
counter-argument to the Affinity Argument is the same as the “harmonia” that Simmias 
ascribes to the soul because these readings respond to the problems that arise when we 
read the passages together. I contend, though, that there is little reason to favor such 
an approach and we do not, in fact, have to read the two passages together.  
First, not only is it the case that there are many kinds of harmonia (see Chapter 
1), Simmias explicitly talks about the various harmoniai. Plato also makes an ironic 
reference to Kadmos’ wife, Harmonia and then makes a pun on “harmonia” when he 
says that the different claims made by Simmias should “harmonize” – he was clearly 
aware of the many possible uses of our word. Second, Simmias refers to the harmonia 
of the soul as “harmonia tis” – a kind of harmonia – while he makes no such concession 
when talking about the harmonia of the lyre. Once we recognize that “harmonia” can 
be used in different senses in different passages, one of our puzzles stands resolved, 
namely that of reading the two apparently inconsistent passages together. This will also 
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have an influence on what we take Simmias’ soul-harmonia thesis to be. If we stop 
trying to show, contrary to textual evidence, that Simmias takes the soul to be 
immaterial, the second possibility — that the soul is identical to the mixture of the 
elements — is the most natural reading. On this reading, Simmias is espousing a 
straightforwardly materialist thesis that Socrates then goes on to refute. In the first 
passage, “harmonia” is used in an attempt to trip up Socrates’ Affinity Argument; the 
second, however, is a legitimate theory in its own right.   
An important piece of evidence is Simmias’ statement that “we take” the soul to 
be such a thing. As commentators, both ancient and modern, have realized, there is 
some ambiguity about who is included when Simmias says “ὑπολαμβάνομεν”. The 
ancient commentators were more or less unanimous is their attribution of this doctrine 
to the Pythagoreans. Olympiodorus (In Phd. 10.2), Plotinus (IV 7.8) and Philoponus 
(in de An. 70) refer to the Pythagoreans, and Macrobius (DK 44A23) refers specifically 
to Philolaus of Croton. However, as Gottschalk (1971) has pointed out, while they all 
ascribe the thesis that the soul is a harmonia to the Pythagoreans, Philoponus and 
Plotinus do not identify Simmias’ version of it with that of the Pythagoreans. 
Nonetheless, this is a view that has prevailed with many modern commentators, and 
there are good reasons for this.  
The fragments of Philolaus are our only evidence for the doctrines of early 
Pythagoreanism and, as I discussed in Chapter 1, harmonia plays an important role in 
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his cosmology — it unites opposites in the guise of unlimited things and limited things 
in order to create the world-order (DK44 B 1, 2, 6). Simmias and Cebes are even 
described as students of Philolaus (Phd. 61 d). Further, Echecrates, who was supposedly 
a Pythagorean (DL VIII, 46), says that he is drawn to the view that the soul is a ἁρμονία 
(Phd. 88 d) and always has been. All of these can readily be taken as evidence that 
Simmias’ thesis is Pythagorean in origin.   
However, an immediate problem with this possibility is that we tend to 
associate Pythagoreanism with the doctrine of transmigration of souls on the evidence 
of early testimonia and, if the soul were truly a material harmonia, it surely could not 
transmigrate. The Pythagoreans probably believed in the immortality of the soul 
whereas Simmias offers the description of the soul as a harmonia in order to disprove its 
immortality. Philolaus may have believed that the soul was a harmonia — even though 
he there is no explicit mention of this in his extant fragments — but we have little 
reason to believe that he regarded the soul as mortal and perishable and that his account 
of the soul as harmonia is what Simmias is reporting.  
Iwata (2015, 56-9) offers a further argument that problematizes the attribution 
of this thesis to the Pythagoreans. One could respond to my initial worry by claiming 
that, based on the extant fragments of Philolaus, we do not have sufficient grounds to 
claim that he endorsed the so-called Pythagorean doctrine of transmigration. 
However, Socrates’ remarks at 61 d-e suggest that a belief in immortality and 
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transmigration was indeed shared by Philolaus. Iwata (2015) agrees with Archer-Hind 
(1894), Gallop (1975), and Hackforth (1955) that Simmias is referring to the general 
public when he claims that this is what “we” take the soul to be. Huffman (1993) thinks 
that it refers to Simmias and Cebes, and Rowe (1993) that it refers to the Platonic circle. 
Burnet suggests that “we” could refer to either people in general or a heterodox 
Pythagorean circle, and there is, of course, the prevailing orthodoxy that “we” refers 
to Pythagoreans. I contend that the most likely candidate for “we” is “we materialists” 
– it is highly likely that Simmias is referring to a common-sense idea shared by the 
general public.   
Dixsaut (1991, p. 359), in her commentary on this passage, reminds the reader 
of the fragment of Alcmaeon of Croton where he describes health as an equilibrium 
(isonomia) of opposites such as hot/cold and wet/dry. The most obvious problem with 
connecting Alcmaeon to this passage is the fact that he describes health as isonomia. 
First, Simmias is not claiming that a healthy soul has a harmonia — indeed, as we will 
see in the following sections, that is something that Plato himself agreed with — but 
rather that a soul is a harmonia. Second, isonomia entails a 1:1 ratio unlike harmonia, 
which entails that one or more of the relata dominate over the others. The octave, 
which is the ratio 2:1, is a paradigmatic instance of a harmonia. Simmias uses “ harmonia” 
to describe the condition of the soul and this term shouldn’t be understood loosely or 
conflated with other terms.  
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Even though Alcmaeon is unlikely to have been a direct influence, this view 
certainly carries echoes of other pre-Platonic natural philosophers. Bernhardt (1971, 
pp. 76-93) and Dixsaut (1999, p. 116) both point out the similarity between Simmias’ 
thesis and Heraclitus’ doctrine of the harmony of opposites (see Chapter 1). Again, this 
is a fair supposition. Dixsaut (1999, p. 114) also points out the possible influence of 
Empedocles and Parmenides.  Given the scope of this section, I cannot 
comprehensively refute any of these possibilities or establish the ‘true’ source of such a 
view. Indeed, such a task might not even be worth pursuing.  I would, however, would 
like to suggest yet another alternative that could even serve as a complement to the 
existing ones.  
The author of the Hippocratic treatise On Regimen reports a view of soul that 
bears strong resemblances to Simmias’ account75. As I showed in Chapter 1, he 
describes the soul as a mixture of fire and water: “ἐσέρπει δὲ ἐς ἄνθρωπον ψυχὴ πυρὸς 
καὶ ὕδατος σύγκρησιν ἔχουσα, μοίρην σώματος ἀνθρώπου·” (Vict., 7.2)76. The soul 
has parts and the character of the soul depends on these parts attaining the “ἁρμονίης 
                                              
75 Scholars have detected the influence of On Regimen in other works within the Platonic corpus as well. 
Bury (1932) thinks that Aristophanes’ speech in the Sympsosium parofies the kind of theory of the sexes 
that can been seen in On Regimen; Craik (2001) suggests that Plato used ideas from On Regimen in the 
speech of Erixymachus. Joly (1983, 1961) has compared the methodological passage from the Phaedrus 
(270) with On Regimen. For a detailed account of the philosophical legacy of On Regimen, see Bartos 
(2015, 237-280) 
76 Simmias speaks of wet and dry rather than fire or water, but the author of this Hippocratic treatise 
makes explicit the connection between fire and dryness and water and moistness when he refers to them 




ὀρθῆς” (Vict., 8.11). I will not go into the details that I have already discussed – I showed 
how, in the case of embryology, the opposites are male and female seeds, which are 
themselves made up of fire and water, and they must be arranged according to the 
principle of harmonia in order for the eventual creation of a viable embryo. The embryo 
is more or less identified with the proper harmonia of its constituents. Similarly, in the 
Phaedo, Simmias identifies the soul with a harmonia. While we have evidence that earlier 
thinkers viewed harmonia as a positive state, somatic, psychic, or otherwise, this is the 
only passage where an organism is more or less identified with a harmonia. For Simmias, 
a soul would cease to be a soul if it weren’t a harmonia of its constituents whereas other 
pre-Platonic thinkers would claim that a soul would cease to be a good soul if it lost its 
harmonia. In the Hippocratic passage, too, the embryo would cease to be an embryo 
without harmonia.    
 On Regimen is also contains many ideas that are familiar to us from earlier pre-
Platonic thinkers. The passage on embryology brings to mind not only Philolaus but 
also Parmenides (B17); later in the treatise, author echoes Heraclitus (B8) when he 
claims that the finest harmony comes from diversity. My contention that On Regimen 
is a likely source for Simmias’ thesis need not, then, be in necessarily in tension with 
those who have detected Pythagorean, Heraclitean, or other pre-Platonic influences. I 
suggest that it is this syncretic account from the Hippocratic tradition, containing 
elements of Heracliteanism and Philoaic metaphysics, that is evident in Simmias’ 
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contention that the soul is a harmonia of its physical constituents. This suggestion also 
lends credence to the view that Simmias’ thesis is a materialist one — the soul is simply 
made out of material opposites and, when these opposites are no longer in a harmonia, 
it ceases to be. We will find that there is yet more evidence for this reading when we 
consider Socrates’ refutation of Simmias’ thesis – I argue, in the next section, that 
Socrates’ counter-arguments could only purport to be successful if they were directed 
at a materialist thesis. 
 
III. Socrates’ refutation of Simmias’ soul-harmonia thesis 
 
 
There is some disagreement about the precise number of counter-arguments to 
Simmias offered by Socrates. The ancient tradition, represented by Philoponus, 
identifies four arguments whereas contemporary commentators usually identify two 
main arguments and a third subsidiary one. To get into all the textual problems in these 
passages and to lay out the responses of all the commentators is beyond my scope at 
present; I will just offer what I take to be a plausible and commonly accepted 
interpretation.  
 Socrates begins by reminding Simmias that he agreed to the premises and 
conclusion of the earlier argument from recollection (Phd. 72e-78b). According to this, 
the soul acquires knowledge of the Forms before it is incarnated in a mortal body and 
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we obtain knowledge when we recollect this pre-natal knowledge. This argument 
establishes that the soul pre-exists the body.  Now, it seems fairly obvious that a 
composite cannot pre-exist its components and, if the soul is a harmonia, it follows that 
it is a composite of some kind. If that is the case, it cannot pre-exist the bodily elements. 
However, the recollection argument only makes sense if the soul does pre-exist the 
body and, if Simmias is to stand by his earlier acceptance of the recollection argument, 
he must let go of the claim that the soul is a harmonia. This is perhaps the most 
straightforward counter-argument and can be represented as follows (Phd. 91e-92e): 
1) The soul is a composite harmonia. (Assume for reductio) 
2) A composite can’t pre-exist its components. (Premise) 
3) The soul can’t preexist its components. (1,2) 
4) The soul pre-exists the body, i.e. its components, because learning is recollection. 
(Premise) 
5) Therefore, the soul is not a composite harmonia. (2,4, by reductio) 
 Let’s turn, now, to the following two arguments. The rest of Socrates’ response 
takes place between 92e 4 and 95a 3, and the argument has been recognized to have 
an ABBA structure. I follow Gallop (1975) and Bostock (1986) in calling them 
Argument A and Argument B. In the text, we are first presented with some premises 
for Argument A, then some premises for Argument B, then Argument B itself, and 
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finally Argument A. Let’s begin with Argument A (Phd. 92e4-93a10; 94b4-95a3), 
which is slightly more straightforward. The argument can be represented as follows: 
1) The soul is a harmonia. (Assume for reductio) 
2) The soul can control and oppose the body. (Premise) 
3) A harmonia cannot control or oppose its own components because it cannot 
be in a state different than its components and cannot act or be acted on in 
a way different from its components. (Premise) 
4) A soul cannot control and oppose the body. (1,3) 
5) Therefore, the soul is not a harmonia. (2,4, by reductio) 
In this argument, Socrates tries to show Simmias that the relationship between the soul 
and the body is not the same as that between a harmonia and its components. He 
describes how we don’t always follow our bodily affections — there are cases when 
something opposes the hungry and thirsty body; this opposing and ruling part is the 
soul. There are a “thousand examples of the soul opposing the affections of the body” 
(Phd. 94c 2). However, the same is not true of a harmonia — it is clearly created by its 
components and cannot act in a way contrary to the way it is directed to by its 
components. Therefore, we either accept that the soul cannot control the body or we 
give up the idea that the soul is a harmonia. Let us turn, now, to the next argument.  
 We can read Argument B (93a11-c10; 93d1-94b3) as structured around a 
central dilemma: either harmoniai admit of degrees or they don’t. If they do admit of 
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degrees, the soul couldn’t be a harmonia since souls don’t admit of degrees. From there 
the argument proceeds by disjunction elimination. If harmoniai don’t admit of degrees, 
the moral differences between souls couldn’t be accounted for. So on either horn, it 
turns out that the soul cannot be a harmonia. Let us now turn to the details of this 
difficult argument. The argument can be divided into two sub-arguments. The first of 
these is: 
1) The soul is a harmonia.  (Assume for reductio) 
2) If a harmonia has been more or less harmonized, it will be more or less a 
harmonia. (Premise) 
3) If it is a soul, it is not more or less a soul than another.(Premise) 
4) The soul is more or less a soul, if it is a harmonia. (1,2) 
5)   Therefore, the soul is not a harmonia (1-4). 
The argument then continues: 
1) The soul is a harmonia. (Assume for reductio) 
2) Some souls are good souls while others are bad souls. (Premise) 
3) Good souls contain harmonia whereas bad souls lack harmonia. (Premise) 
4) If it is a harmonia it will not be more or less a harmonia than another. (Premise) 
5) That which is not more or less a harmonia participates in harmonia to an equal 
degree. (Premise) 
6) The soul has not been more or less harmonized. (Premise) 
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7) The soul does not participate in harmonia or a lack of harmonia. (4,5, 6) 
8) One soul does not participate more in goodness or badness than another. 
(2,3,7) 
9) A soul could never participate in badness. (2,3,7) 
10) All souls are equally good. (8,9) 
11)  Therefore, the soul is not a harmonia. (2, 10, by reductio) 
The basic idea is that moral differences exist and that morally better souls contain a 
harmonia. Now if all souls were identical with this harmonia, none would be bad and 
this, clearly, is not the case. Here, Socrates seems to be pointing out that Simmias’ claim 
rests on a category mistake — harmonia is not something that a soul is but something 
that a (virtuous) soul has.  
One thing that all the counterarguments have in common is the assumption 
that Simmias is identifying the soul with a harmonia and not that the soul resembles a 
harmonia or some similar weaker claim. The counter-arguments would not succeed if 
Simmias’ claim was weaker. According to the first argument, from recollection, the 
soul is a composite made from the body (in a certain state, presumably). If Socrates 
wasn’t refuting a position that held the soul to be a composite (as would be the case if 
the view held the soul to be ontologically dependent, like a musical structure, but not 
necessarily a compound), then this argument would have no chance of succeeding. 
Argument A also assumes that the soul has bodily components as its constituents. Thus, 
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it seems that Simmias’ thesis is that the soul is a harmonia and krasis of material opposites 
and this is the claim that Plato, via Socrates, argues against. There is also strong textual 
evidence for this reading: 
 Ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη σοι, ἔφη, ὦ ξένε Θηβαῖε, ἄλλα δόξαι, ἐάνπερ μείνῃ ἥδε 
ἡ οἴησις, τὸ ἁρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι σύνθετον πρᾶγμα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν 
τινὰ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐντεταμένων συγκεῖσθαι· ... 
 
But you’ll have to think otherwise, my Theban friend, if you stick to this 
idea that harmonia is a composite thing, and that soul is a kind of harmonia 
composed of the bodily elements held in tension; … (Phd. 92 a) 
 
 At the very least, Socrates takes Simmias to be making the strong claim that the 
soul is identical to a composite made up of bodily components.  Therefore, in the 
Phaedo, all Socrates has done is refute the idea that the soul is identical to a material 
composite. So Platonic harmonia will not be a material harmonia and it will not be 
identified with any entity since its presence  makes entities good. Already with the 
pre-Socratics we had the notion that harmonia was mostly axiologically positive or, in 
some cases, axiologically neutral (in Homer, for instance). Here, we are told in no 
uncertain terms that harmonia is axiologically positive.  
 We have also seen that there is more than one kind of harmonia being discussed 
in the Phaedo. Musical harmonia is spoken of as immortal, incorporeal, and divine. We 
learned that the other harmoniai are composites or syntheses of some kind and are 
ontologically dependent on their components. Argument B can be taken as the most 
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significant source of information for Plato’s views on the moral significance of 
harmonia. There, Socrates tries to show Simmias that he was making a category mistake 
— a harmonia is not something that a soul is but something that a soul has. A virtuous 
soul is one whose parts are harmonized; however, a soul is still a soul even if it lacks 
harmonia. Harmonia is an earned unity, not just any unity.  
 The link between harmonia and goodness resurfaces in various later dialogues 
and was also discussed in the previous chapter on the Gorgias, where we were told that 
the goodness of the human soul consisted in it being in an orderly state. While the 
term used in the Gorgias is kosmos, it is a similar concept of order that is explained in 
terms of harmonia in the Phaedo. The role of harmonia in the psychē is fully developed 











Chapter 4: Harmonia in the Republic 
 
Books I and II of the Republic introduce us to its central question: what is justice? 
Glaucon challenges Socrates to define justice and to show that justice is a good that is 
desired for its own sake as well as for the sake of something beyond it. Books III and 
IV constitute Socrates’ response to this challenge. In these books, Socrates considers 
justice ‘writ large and small’ – first in the ideal city, his kallipolis, and then in the human 
soul. Ultimately, he argues that justice consists in a harmonious soul and that it is, thus, 
desired for its own sake and for the sake of happiness, since a disharmonious soul could 
never be happy. While harmonia figures prominently in his discussion of virtuous and 
vicious souls and constitutions, Socrates also spends considerable time on musical 
harmonia in his discussions of the educational program in the kallipolis. 
 Harmonia plays an important role in at least three different contexts in the 
Republic, and the last of these provides a link between all three :  true harmonics must 
be related to abstract number and it is the presence of this abstract principle that makes 
harmonious entities good. The relationship between mathematics and the good laid 
out in Republic VII will help us see the connections between the different harmoniai. I 
will examine each of the contexts in which harmonia appears before turning to an 
explanation that links all these.  
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I. Harmonia and paideia                         
  
Plato places great emphasis on the proper education of the guardians in his ideal city 
since virtues such as courage, piety, wisdom, and moderation are instilled by means of 
education (395c, 402b, 405a inter alia)77. Mousikē, broadly construed, plays an essential 
role in this educational program and Plato’s censorship of certain harmoniai is, perhaps, 
the first thing that comes to mind when one mentions the role of harmonia in Plato’s 
thought78. My goal here is to explain how, on Plato’s account, audible harmoniai are 
capable of making impressions on the soul. We will begin with what he says about 
different kinds of modes and the characters they possess. However, we will supplement 
this with an account of Platonic mimēsis that should help us see us how these harmoniai 
act on the soul. As Lippmann (1964, p. 55) notes, “the imitative nature of music, its 
unified concreteness, and its ethical force are all importantly interrelated” and it is only 
by paying attention to this interrelation that we can attain any real insight into Plato’s 
views on the role of harmonia in paideia.  
In Book III of the Republic, Socrates and Glaucon discuss the technical aspects 
of the education that is to be imparted to the future guardians of the kallipolis. These 
                                              
77 For an overview of the educational program of the Republic, see Jaeger (1947, pp. 198-365). Detailed 
discussions of the musical programme in the Republic can be found in Moutsopoulous (1959), and 
Ioannides (1985). 
 
78 Mousikē includes not only harmonia and rhythmos but also logos – it refers to anything that is within 
the domain of the Muses. Given the scope of this chapter, I focus mostly on harmonia but I should clarify 
that I am not conflating ‘mousikē’ and ‘music’. Jaeger (ibid.) offers a comprehensive discussion of mousikē 
in the Republic.  
114 
 
future guardians are to be educated in mousikē and gymnastikē, and it is worth bearing 
in mind that “mousikē” includes not only harmonia (musical harmony) but also rhythmoi 
(rhythms) and logoi (discourses, words). In this section, I am interested specifically in 
how harmoniai influence the human soul.  
There is a long history of describing the effects of music on humans, animals, 
and indeed all of nature, from the influence of Orpheus to the strange power of the 
Sirens and the abilities of Amphion, music has been seen to have a direct and strong 
effect on all those who hear it. In the Platonic corpus, musical harmonies serve an 
important pedagogical purpose because external musical harmoniai help in molding the 
human soul. In the Protagoras, for instance, we are told that a musical education allows 
the speech and movements of children to become more harmonious: 
[…] καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς τε καὶ τὰς ἁρμονίας ἀναγκάζουσιν 
οἰκειοῦσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν παίδων, ἵνα ἡμερώτεροί τε ὦσιν, καὶ 
εὐρυθμότεροι καὶ εὐαρμοστότεροι γιγνόμενοι χρήσιμοι ὦσιν εἰς τὸ 
λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν· πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε 
καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται. 
 
Protagoras: The teachers arrange the scores and drill the rhythms and 
scales into the children's souls, so that they become gentler, and their 
speech and movements become more rhythmical and harmonious. For 
all of human life requires a high degree of rhythm and harmonia. 
Protagoras, 326b 1-479 
 
 
                                              
79 Translations mine unless otherwise noted. Republic translations after the French of Leroux (2016). 
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This passage is part of a longer exposition by Protagoras on the standard educational 
program (Prt. 325c-327a). We learn that children were expected to memorize epic 
poetry’s encomia of famous men so that they, too, could become like them. The 
passage quoted above describes how children learn lyric poetry, which was 
traditionally accompanied by the lyre – the harmoniai of the lyre and the rhythmoi of 
the poems reach the very souls of these pupils.  
The importance of musical harmonia is also touched upon in the Crito (50 d5-
e1) when the personified Laws of Athens ask Socrates whether he is grateful for the 
musical and physical education (mousikē kai gymnastikē) that his father gave to him. In 
the Alcibiades, too, the components of a good education are described as reading and 
writing, wrestling, and playing the kithara (106e 4-6). These views are all probably 
representative of earlier Greek views on education. In fact, Damon of Athens, a 
renowned authority on music from the Periclean age, is mentioned at least eight times 
by name in the Platonic corpus.  Some of these instances are in the early dialogues. In 
the Laches, Damon is portrayed as a teacher of music, but not merely that: 
Καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ μοι ἔναγχος ἄνδρα προυξένησε τῷ ὑεῖ διδάσκαλον 
μουσικῆς, Ἀγαθοκλέους μαθητὴν Δάμωνα, ἀνδρῶν χαριέστατον οὐ 
μόνον τὴν μουσικήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τἆλλα ὁπόσου βούλει ἄξιον 
συνδιατρίβειν τηλικούτοις νεανίσκοις. 
  
For he [Socrates] recently introduced to myself a teacher of music for my 
son: Damon, the pupil of Agathocles, the most accomplished of all men not 
only so far as music is concerned, but also in every other respect as worthy 





The fact that Socrates and Damon knew each other and that Socrates appreciated 
Damon’s skills to the extent of recommending him as a teacher is presented as a fairly 
unremarkable detail of the historical context of the dialogue. Such a characterization 
would not be as coherent were this not a rather well-known piece of information. It 
could, perhaps, be regarded as evidence in favor of the claim that Plato’s early views on 
musical education at the very least owed something to Damon. Given that, it might 
be helpful to lay out what we know about Damon’s own views – this will allow us to 
better understand Plato’s views and will also help us recognize the points of departure, 
since Plato rarely takes over the views of his predecessors without modifying and 
extending them in some way to fit within his own system.  
 Damon was apparently a pupil of Prodicus, the Sophist (who is also mentioned 
elsewhere in the Platonic corpus), a teacher of Socrates and, famously, an adviser to 
Pericles. We unfortunately do not have much evidence besides one fragment from 
Damon’s Areopagatica that was supposedly preserved in the second book of Aristides 
Quintilianus’ De Musica. The Areopagatica was an oration that sought to show that the 
guardianship of good order ought to be the responsibility of the Areopagus and, 
further, that music was the best medium for the council to use if they wished to 
influence the souls of humans and the character of the city. The extant fragment gives 
117 
 
us some more detail on how music is able to have this effect: 
 
ὅτι γὰρ δι' ὁμοιότητος οἱ φθόγγοι συνεχοῦς μελωιδίας πλάττουσί τε 
οὐκ ὂν ἦθος ἔν τε παισὶ καὶ τοῖς ἤδη προβεβηκόσι καὶ ἐνδομυχοῦν 
ἐξάγουσιν, ἐδήλουν καὶ οἱ περὶ Δάμωνα· ἐν γοῦν ταῖς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ 
παραδεδομέναις ἁρμονίαις τῶν φερομένων φθόγγων ὁτὲ μὲν τοὺς 
θήλεις ὁτὲ δὲ τοὺς ἄρρενας ἔστιν εὑρεῖν ἤτοι πλεονάζοντας ἢ ἐπ' 
ἔλαττον ἢ οὐδ' ὅλως παρειλημμένους, δῆλον ὡς κατὰ τὸ ἦθος ψυχῆς 
ἑκάστης καὶ ἁρμονίας χρησιμευούσης. 
 
For the tones (φθόγγοι) resemble, as I said, their dominant intervals and 
limiting notes, and these resemble the movements and passions of the 
soul. That the notes even of a continuous melody form by similarity a 
character that did not exist previously both in the young and in those 
already advanced in years and develop one that is latent was made clear 
by Damon and his school as well. In the harmoniai handed down by him, 
at any rate, one will find that of the notes employed, the female and the 
male at one time or another either dominate or are used more sparingly 
or not at all — clearly because a harmonia too is beneficial according to 
the character of each kind of soul.  DK B7 
 
The context within which this fragment is found is a broader discussion (by Aristides) 
of the character of individual notes. Aristides takes it as uncontroversial that some notes 
are male and others female and yet others neutral or mixed and seeks to establish, with 
the aid of Damon, that intervals and harmonies also possess characters. This has great 
pedagogical potential since we can apply harmonies with certain characters to souls 
much in the manner that a doctor would apply medicine to the body — the soul can 
be affected either by similarity (homeopathy) or opposition (allopathy), and the 
character of the subject’s soul will determine whether it is to be moved by similarity or 
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by opposition.  
 There are two salient points in the Aristidean description of Damon’s views, as 
Lord (1978) has observed. First, Damon thought that musical harmonia was to be used 
on the souls of both the young and the old. Second, the character can be moved by 
similarity or by opposition. On Damon’s purported view, one could use, for instance, a 
soft harmonia on a harsh soul in order to make the soul less harsh. Aristides considers 
that a therapeutic character education functions by means of opposition (kat’ 
enantiotēta) and an opheletic education, on the other hand, functions by means of 
similarity (kath’ homoiotēta, di’ homoiotētos).  Musical education for Plato, however, 
seems to be opheletic – children learn to be brave by listening to courageous melodies, 
for instance.  
 The other fragments of Damon tell us that he believed that song and dance 
necessarily arose when the soul was moved in some way, and that this happened when 
a beautiful melody created a similarly beautiful soul and the reverse another kind (B6). 
We also learn that, through similarity, music can create a character that did not exist 
in the young and bring out the latent character of those more advanced in years (B7), 
and that it is important for a boy to reveal not only courage (andreia) but also 
moderation (sophrosynē) and justice (dikaiosynē) when playing the lyre (B4). We find 
very similar ideas in Book III of Plato’s Republic. 
 I agree with Anderson (1955) that Plato probably saw Damon as an ally, albeit 
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a dangerous one. He was dangerous because he was not like the man described in the 
Laches whose very life embodies the finest harmonia and because Damon’s views on 
musical innovation did not fit well with Plato’s educational program — after all, Plato 
believed that musical styles never changed without modifying the most important 
political laws (Resp. 424b). One could assume that Plato would not advocate musical 
neoterismos because it would threaten the stability of his ideal city.  
The harmoniai in Book III represent particular types of behavior by means of 
musical constructions. Employing the same standards used to select the appropriate 
themes to be treated in poetic mythoi, Socrates begins his analysis by detailing the kinds 
of behavior that will not be appropriate for future guardians — this includes indulging 
in dirges and laments as well as in drunkenness, softness and laziness (398a ff.). Since 
education is to be opheletic rather than therapeutic, any modes that do not represent 
positive ethical qualities, such as the Lydian, Mixo-Lydian, and Ionian modes, are to 
be banned from the kallipolis80. 
Socrates attempts to identify the proper ethical traits that should be expressed 
by the harmoniai81 allowed in the kallipolis for the purpose of stimulating the young 
                                              
80 For a discussion of Plato’s use of musical modes, see Barker (1989, pp. 137-140). 
 
81 “Harmonia” here translates “mode”. Mode can best be described as “essentially a question of the internal 
relationships of notes within a scale, especially of the predominance of one of them over the others as a 
tonic, its predominance being established in any or all of a number of ways: e.g. frequent recurrence, its 
appearance in a prominent position as the first note or the last, the delaying of its expected occurrence 
by some kind of embellishment. [It is] the epitome of stylized song, of song stylized in a particular 
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citizens to imitate them: this form of repeated mimēsis, as Socrates emphasizes, will help 
them to internalize these dispositions in their souls because of the extra-rational  (or, 
perhaps, pre-rational) power that music exerts, particularly on young and 
impressionable individuals. We were told, at the beginning of Book III, that young 
people are particularly susceptible to being molded by music: 
Οὐκοῦν οἶσθ' ὅτι ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον, ἄλλως τε δὴ καὶ νέῳ 
καὶ ἁπαλῷ ὁτῳοῦν; μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τότε πλάττεται, καὶ ἐνδύεται 
τύπος ὃν ἄν τις βούληται ἐνσημήνασθαι ἑκάστῳ. 
 
Now, you know, don’t you, that the beginning of any job is the most 
important part, especially when we are dealing with anything young 
and tender? For that is when it is especially malleable and best takes on 
whatever pattern one wishes to impress on it. Resp., 377a11-b4 
 
An immediate question to ask ourselves is what the locus of this imprinting happens to 
be and obvious answer is: the soul. As Woerther (2008) has emphasized, Plato rarely 
uses the Damonian (and, later, Aristotelian) term “ēthos” in connection with musical 
education; this is indicative of his concern with the direct effects of music on the soul—
recall that already in the Protagoras teachers were supposed to instill certain harmoniai 
in the souls (psychai) of their students.  
Socrates calls upon Damon (400b) to make distinctions among different kinds 
of rhythms because this is supposedly a ‘technical’ task which is somewhat beyond his 
                                              
district or people or occupation; and it draws its character partly from associations contracted in its native 




expertise. Damon, unlike Socrates and Glaucon, was an expert who was capable of 
identifying the correspondences between specific ethical dispositions (such as servility, 
violence, madness, as well as their opposites) and the rhythms and harmoniai that could 
adequately represent them in musical contexts. Following Damon, Socrates argues that 
choosing appropriate rhythms and harmonies will be of the utmost importance in the 
kallipolis since these can corrupt or enrich the soul of one who hears them. The claim 
seems to be that good individuals possess certain harmoniai and rhythmoi in their actions 
which can then be imitated in music and transmitted into the souls of malleable young 
people. Having stated that a given harmonia and rhythmos must match a style of 
speaking and a good and fine character (400d), Socrates goes on to provide arguments 
in support of the necessity of a proper musical education: 
Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, τούτων ἕνεκα κυριωτάτη ἐν μουσικῇ 
τροφή, ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς  ψυχῆς ὅ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ 
ἁρμονία, καὶ ἐρρωμενέστατα ἅπτεται αὐτῆς φέροντα τὴν 
εὐσχημοσύνην, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐσχήμονα, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς τραφῇ, εἰ δὲ μή, 
τοὐναντίον; καὶ ὅτι αὖ τῶν παραλειπομένων καὶ μὴ καλῶς 
δημιουργηθέντων ἢ μὴ καλῶς φύντων ὀξύτατ' ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο ὁ ἐκεῖ 
τραφεὶς ὡς ἔδει, καὶ ὀρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ καὶ 
χαίρων καὶ καταδεχόμενος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ 
γίγνοιτο καλός τε κἀγαθός, τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ψέγοι τ' ἂν ὀρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ 
ἔτι νέος ὤν, πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου 
ἀσπάζοιτ' ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι' οἰκειότητα μάλιστα ὁ οὕτω 
τραφείς; 
 
First, because rhythm and harmonia permeate the innermost element of 
the soul, affect it more powerfully than anything else, and bring it grace 
(euschēmosunē), such education makes one graceful if one is properly 
trained, and the opposite if one is not. Second, because anyone who has 
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been properly trained will quickly notice if something has been omitted 
from a thing, or if that thing has not been well crafted or well grown. 
And so, since he feels distaste correctly, he will praise fine things, be 
pleased by them, take them into his soul, and, through being nourished 
by them, become fine and good (kalos te kagathos). Resp. 401d — 402a 
 
 There are a few remarkable points in this passage and the ones quoted above. First, as 
mentioned earlier, harmonia permeates the human soul and molds it in a certain way. 
Second, it is clearly stated that harmonia is capable of imitating certain human virtues. 
Socrates explicitly states that he would like only those harmoniai which imitate the 
tones of moderate and courageous people: 
 Οὐκ οἶδα, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὰς ἁρμονίας, ἀλλὰ κατάλειπε ἐκείνην τὴν 
ἁρμονίαν, ἣ ἔν τε πολεμικῇ πράξει ὄντος ἀνδρείου  καὶ ἐν πάσῃ βιαίῳ 
ἐργασίᾳ πρεπόντως ἂν μιμήσαιτο φθόγγους  τε καὶ προσῳδίας, καὶ 
ἀποτυχόντος ἢ εἰς τραύματα ἢ εἰς  θανάτους ἰόντος ἢ εἴς τινα ἄλλην 
συμφορὰν πεσόντος, ἐν πᾶσιf τούτοις παρατεταγμένως καὶ 
καρτερούντως ἀμυνομένου  τὴν τύχην· καὶ ἄλλην αὖ ἐν εἰρηνικῇ τε καὶ 
μὴ βιαίῳ ἀλλ' ἐν ἑκουσίᾳ πράξει ὄντος, ἢ τινά τι πείθοντός τε καὶ 
δεομένου,  ἢ εὐχῇ θεὸν ἢ διδαχῇ καὶ νουθετήσει ἄνθρωπον, ἢ τοὐναντίον  
ἄλλῳ δεομένῳ ἢ διδάσκοντι ἢ μεταπείθοντι ἑαυτὸν ἐπέχοντα,  καὶ ἐκ 
τούτων πράξαντα κατὰ νοῦν, καὶ μὴ ὑπερηφάνως  ἔχοντα, ἀλλὰ 
σωφρόνως τε καὶ μετρίως ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις πράττοντά τε καὶ τὰ 
ἀποβαίνοντα ἀγαπῶντα. ταύτας δύο ἁρμονίας, βίαιον, ἑκούσιον, 
δυστυχούντων, εὐτυχούντων, σωφρόνων, ἀνδρείων [ἁρμονίας] αἵτινες 
φθόγγους μιμήσονται κάλλιστα, ταύτας λεῖπε. 
 
I do not know the harmoniai, so just leave me that harmonia that would 
appropriately imitate the vocal sounds and tones (pthoggoi te kai prosōdias) 
of a courageous person engaged in battle or in other work that he is forced 
to do, and who —even when he fails and faces wounds or death or some 
other misfortune — always grapples with what chances to occur, in a 
disciplined and resolute way. And also leave me another harmonia for when 
he is engaged in peaceful enterprises, or in those he is not forced to do but 
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does willingly; or for when he is trying to persuade someone of something, 
or entreating a god though prayer, or a human being through instruction 
and advice; or for when he is doing the opposite—patiently listening to 
someone else, who is entreating or instructing him, or trying to change his 
mind through persuasion. Leave me the harmonia that will imitate him, 
when he does not behave arrogantly when these things turn out as he 
intends; but, on the contrary, is temperate and moderate in all these 
enterprises, and satisfied with their outcomes. Leave me these two 
harmoniai, then—the forced and the willing—that will best imitate the 
voices of temperate and courageous men in good fortune and in bad. Resp. 
399a5-c4, tr. Reeve, emphases mine 
 
In this passage, Socrates’ choice of particular harmoniai is thus explicitly connected with 
the concept of Platonic mimēsis. The basic idea is that musical modes can imitate the 
character of a virtuous individual; these modes derive their value from the fact that they 
imitate the right kind of behavior. However, it doesn’t end there — these modes can 
then be used in order to shape malleable souls into having the right kind of structure.   
Else (1958) has shown that there are at least three distinct uses of “mimēsis” or 
“mimēisthai” in early Greek philosophy — 1) direct representation of looks, actions, or 
utterances of animals or humans through dramatic enactment in song, dance, and 
speech (Homer, Aeschylus, Pindar); 2) a mimicking or imitation of the actions of one 
person by another in an ethical rather than dramatic way (Theognis); 3) replication in 
the form of an image or effigy in material form (Aeschylus, Pindar). There are several 
examples in the 5th century tragedians of the second kind of mimēsis — a wife imitates 
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the behavior of her husband (Electra, 1037), the fairest renown for children is to imitate 
the manner (tropos) of their righteous father (Helen, 940-1) etc.  
 Now, in Book III of the Republic, Plato seems to be dealing with at least two 
kinds of mimēsis. The first is the imitation in poetry of the appearance and actions of 
individuals and the second is the musical representation by imitation of the states of 
the soul; the passages quoted above show his awareness of both. My primary concern 
here is the second kind of mimēsis, which can perhaps be traced back to Damon. It is 
by virtue of resemblance or similarity (homoiotēs) that music is able to imitate certain 
human qualities, such as courage and moderation.  
According to Plato’s account, a person’s sounds (phtoggoi) and vocal 
modulations (prosōdiai) in respect to a certain practical activity become the object of a 
musical mimēsis which consists of harmonia, rhythmos, and logos. The musically mimetic 
elements of harmonia, rhythmos, and logos are then absorbed by soul, and more 
particularly and when they are heard, they stimulate the virtues that are conveyed by 
the imitative harmonia, rhythmos, and logos in question.  We can thus see the didactic 
potential of harmonia. As Socrates tells Adeimantus, mimēseis practiced from childhood 
or youth become part of ethē and settle down into habits of gesture, voice, and 
— perhaps most importantly — thought (dianoia). A man who is practiced these 
harmoniai is, perhaps, the virtuous man of the Laches who demonstrates harmonia not 
on a lyre but in his very life. Repeatedly listening to harmoniai that imitate brave and 
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moderate characters and trying to acquire these characteristics by assimilating one’s 
soul to the heard harmoniai would both presumably play a crucial role in the acquisition 
of virtues. 
  Plato seems to think, further, that it is the nature of each soul that defines both 
the nature of the movements of the individual, and the nature of those harmoniai with 
which each soul will finally feel affinity (Barker 1984, pp. 169; cf. Resp. 396d). Once 
the soul has been properly cultivated will be naturally drawn to things that are good 
and beautiful because like calls to like: 
… καὶ ὀρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ καὶ χαίρων 
καταδεχόμενος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ γίγνοιτο καλός 
τε κἀγαθός, τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ψέγοι τ' ἂν ὀρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ ἔτι νέος ὤν, πρὶν 
λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ' ἂν αὐτὸν 
γνωρίζων δι' οἰκειότητα μάλιστα ὁ οὕτω τραφείς;  
 
… And so, since he feels distaste correctly, he will praise fine things, be 
pleased by them, take them into his soul, and, through being nourished by 
them, become fine and good. What is ugly or shameful, on the other hand, 
he will correctly condemn and hate while he is still young, before he is able 
to grasp the reason. And, because he has been so trained, he will welcome 
the reason when it comes and recognize it easily because of its kinship with 
himself. 401e5 — 402a4, tr. Reeve 
 
Since the harmoniai are capable of affecting souls in such a powerful way, it is 
essential that only certain kinds of harmoniai be allowed into the ideal city. Once the 
lamenting harmoniai (mixo-Lydian, syntono Lydian) and the soft harmoniai (Ionian) 
are eliminated, we are left with only two: the Dorian and the Phrygian. The others 
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have to be eliminated from the education of young guardians because they cause 
drunkenness, idleness, and softness. The idea is that only certain kinds of attitudes and 
actions ought to be represented in music and thus manifested in individuals: the first, 
the Dorian, involves the actions and words of a person who, when at war or in other 
painful circumstances, faces these situations bravely and with self-control; the second, 
the Phrygian, will comprehend the actions of a person who, in peaceful times, is 
capable both of entertaining significant and pleasant relationships with other citizens 
and of maintaining a well-balanced relationship with himself, being calm and self-
controlled. The Dorian harmonia will give musical shape to the virtue of courage 
(andreia) and the Phrygian harmonia to moderation (sophrosynē).  
While the account sketched above gives us a basic idea about the effects of 
harmoniai on the soul, there are still a few lingering questions. We know that audible 
harmonia has this power but we do not know why it has this power nor do we know 
the ways in which it can move and mold the human psychē. We could also ask why 
certain characters might feel affiliated with particular types of harmoniai. Finally, we 
might wonder how entities as different as souls, bodily movements and musical 
melodies can share the same basic nature. While these questions are not all answered 
in the Republic, we can find (at least partial) answers in the Timaeus; I will, then, return 
to them in next chapter.  
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In the Gorgias we learned that the most wretched state of the soul was injustice 
just as the most wretched state of the body was disease. Plato is committed to a similar 
view in Republic III, but he goes beyond this to argue for the importance of a body 
that is commensurate to the soul. Proper training in mousikē will have left the future 
guardians aware of virtues to be embraced and vices to be avoided (402c) but the most 
beautiful thing of all is a person whose fine soul is housed in an equally fine body: 
Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτου ἂν συμπίπτῃ ἔν τε τῇ ψυχῇ  καλὰ ἤθη ἐνόντα 
καὶ ἐν τῷ εἴδει ὁμολογοῦντα ἐκείνοις καὶ συμφωνοῦντα, τοῦ αὐτοῦ 
μετέχοντα τύπου, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη κάλλιστον θέαμα τῷ δυναμένῳ θεᾶσθαι; 
/Πολύ γε./ Καὶ μὴν τό γε κάλλιστον ἐρασμιώτατον;/ Πῶς δ' οὔ; /Τῶν δὴ 
ὅτι μάλιστα τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ὅ γε μουσικὸς ἐρῴη ἄν· εἰ δὲ 
ἀσύμφωνος εἴη, οὐκ ἂν ἐρῴη.  
 
SOCRATES: Then, if the fine habits in someone’s soul and those in his 
physical form agree (homologounta) and are in concord (symphōnounta) with 
one another, so that both share the same pattern, wouldn’t that be the most 
beautiful sight for anyone capable of seeing it?/GLAUCON: By far./S: And 
surely the most beautiful is also the most loveable, isn’t it?/G: Of course./S: 
A really musical person, then, would passionately love people who are most 
like that. But a disharmonious (asymphōnos) person, he would not 
passionately love. 402d, tr. Reeve 
  
However, it is quickly clarified that even this ‘passion’ is not something unchecked —
passion is felt only for entities that are orderly (kosmios) and beautiful (kalon) (403a 6). 
The guardians are to follow a strict regimen, avoiding excessive alcohol and rich 
foods(404 c-e); in justifying this regimented life, Socrates compares a dissolute regimen 
to dissolute music while also likening a moderate soul to a healthy body: 
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 Ὅλην γὰρ οἶμαι τὴν τοιαύτην σίτησιν καὶ δίαιταν τῇ μελοποιίᾳ τε καὶ 
ᾠδῇ τῇ ἐν τῷ παναρμονίῳ καὶ ἐν πᾶσι ῥυθμοῖς πεποιημένῃ 
ἀπεικάζοντες ὀρθῶς ἂν ἀπεικάζοιμεν. […]  Οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖ μὲν ἀκολασίαν 
ἡ ποικιλία ἐνέτικτεν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ νόσον, ἡ δὲ ἁπλότης κατὰ μὲν μουσικὴν 
ἐν ψυχαῖς σωφροσύνην, κατὰ δὲ γυμναστικὴν ἐν σώμασιν ὑγίειαν;    
 
And the reason for that, I take it, is that we would be right to compare this 
sort of diet, and this lifestyle, to the polyharmonic (panharmoniō) songs and 
lyric odes that make use of every sort of rhythm. […] There complexity 
engendered intemperance, didn’t it, and here it engenders illness; whereas 
simplicity in musical training engenders temperance in the soul, and in 
physical training health in the body? 404e, tr. Reeve 
 
While the guardians must care for their body, this care must not be excessive. In the 
first place, they will not attempt to artificially prolong their lives if their bodies are 
diseased (410a). Furthermore, the guardians will not forget that all physical regimen is 
chiefly for the care of the soul (410c). Excessive care of the body is detrimental to the 
well-being of the soul and results in a savage and brutish individual (411a ff.). The 
relationship between health and harmonia and the importance of a soul-body harmonia 
are articulated even more clearly later in the Republic.   
 
II. The tripartite city and the tripartite soul82 
 
 
Thus far we have seen how harmoniai — understood as ‘modes’ — play an indispensable 
role in the proper rearing of future guardians; we also saw the need for a harmonia 
                                              
82 See Brisson (2005) on ‘functional tri-partition’ and its pre-Platonic Indo-European origins. He draws 
also on the work of Dumézil (1968) and Yoshida (1964). 
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between the soul and the body, reinforcing ideas that are also present in the Symposium 
and the Gorgias. In Book IV, however, Plato uses yet another aspect of harmonia. 
 
II.1 The virtuous city 
 
 
Let us first remind ourselves of the central question of the Republic: what is justice? As 
mentioned above, Socrates’ response is to first examine justice ‘writ large’ in the polis 
and then turn to the analogous justice in the individual soul. Socrates’ kallipolis will                                                                                                 
“completely good,” which he parses as “wise, courageous, moderate, and just” (427e 
10). The kallipolis is made up of three classes of people – the ‘wage-earners’ or laborers 
and craftsmen, the auxiliary guardians who protect the city, and ruler-guardians or 
“complete guardians” (414a-b, 428d 7) who govern the city. Wisdom belongs to the 
ruler-guardians and courage to the auxiliary-guardians; this leaves us with moderation 
and, most importantly, justice.  
 Unlike the other two virtues, neither of these belongs to a particular part of the 
city; rather, they are spread out throughout the three classes. Moderation resembles a 
kind of harmonia: 
καὶ ὥς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν, συμφωνίᾳ τινὶ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ προσέοικεν μᾶλλον 
ἢ τὰ πρότερον.  /Πῶς; / Κόσμος πού τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶν 
καὶ ἡδονῶν τινων καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια, ὥς φασι κρείττω δὴ αὑτοῦ 
ἀποφαίνοντες οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινα τρόπον, καὶ ἄλλα ἄττα τοιαῦτα  ὥσπερ 




Seen from here, [moderation] is more like a kind of concord and harmonia 
than the previous two./ How so?/ Moderation is surely a sort of order, the 
master of certain kinds of pleasures and appetites. People indicate as much 
when they use the term “self-mastery” although I do not know how. This 
and other similar things are like footprints that moderation has left, aren’t 
they? 430e  
 
Socrates clarifies that this mastery does not involve one part of the city simply 
dominating the other; rather, the subjects agree to be mastered and the rulers agree to 
master. The relationship between the rulers and the subjects is not an egalitarian one, 
but the inegalitarianism is not the source of any kind of conflict. Having made this 
clarification, he explains in more detail what it means for moderation to be “a kind of 
concord and harmonia”: 
 Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἐπιεικῶς ἐμαντευόμεθα ἄρτι ὡς  ἁρμονίᾳ τινὶ 
ἡ σωφροσύνη ὡμοίωται; / Τί δή; /  Ὅτι οὐχ ὥσπερ ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἡ 
σοφία ἐν μέρει τινὶ ἑκατέρα ἐνοῦσα ἡ μὲν σοφήν, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρείαν τὴν πόλιν  
παρείχετο, οὐχ οὕτω ποιεῖ αὕτη, ἀλλὰ δι' ὅλης ἀτεχνῶς τέταται διὰ 
πασῶν παρεχομένη συνᾴδοντας τούς τε ἀσθενεστάτους ταὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς 
ἰσχυροτάτους καὶ τοὺς μέσους, εἰ μὲν βούλει, φρονήσει, εἰ δὲ βούλει, 
ἰσχύι, εἰ δέ, καὶ πλήθει ἢ χρήμασιν ἢ ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν τῶν τοιούτων· ὥστε 
ὀρθότατ' ἂν  φαῖμεν ταύτην τὴν ὁμόνοιαν σωφροσύνην εἶναι, χείρονός 
τε καὶ ἀμείνονος κατὰ φύσιν συμφωνίαν ὁπότερον δεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἐν 
πόλει καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ.   
 
Do you see then, I said, that we had just now correctly guessed that 
moderation resembles a kind of harmonia?/ How so?/ Because it is unlike 
courage and wisdom, each of which resides in one part and makes the city 
either courageous or wise. Moderation does not work in that way but has 
indeed been extended throughout the whole, making the weakest, the 
strongest, and all those in between sing the same song together – whether 
in wisdom, if you like, or in strength or if you prefer in numbers, wealth, 
or anything else. Thus we would be absolutely right to say that this 
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unanimity (homonoia) is moderation – the concord (symphōnia) between the 
naturally better and the naturally worse, about which of the two should rule 
in the city-state and in the individual. Resp. 431e 7 – 432a 10 
 
The first thing to note is that Plato uses not only “harmonia” to explain 
sophrosynē but a range of words that belong to the domain of music as well as politics: 
synaidō, homonoia, dia pasōn, and symphōnia.  “Homonoia” is relatively uncommon in 
the Platonic corpus,83 as Leroux (2004, p. 607) also notes; it is, however, a word found 
with some frequency in the works of fifth-century Attic orators, and is very close in 
meaning to “harmonia” – it is often translated as “unanimity” but this is does not capture 
all that the word meant by Plato’s time. The primary sense of homonoia is something 
like ‘reconciliation of factions in a single city’ and it acquires this meaning in the fifth 
and fourth centuries, most notably in the works of Isocrates84; it is a description of the 
sophrōn city in which three classes, the ‘stronger, weaker, and those in between’ – 
presumably a reference to the rational guardians (phronēsei, 432a 5), the warrior 
auxiliaries (ischui, 432a 5), and the many (plēthei, 432a 7) – are stretched together to 
sing a single song.  
                                              
83 With the exception of two tokens in the Symposium (186e2, 187c4) and five tokens in the spurious 
Alcbiades I.  
 




The use of teinō (tetatai, 432a 3), especially in conjunction with all the other 
musical vocabulary, brings to mind the strings of a lyre being stretched together to 
create one sound. In case the reader has managed to miss the musical metaphor, Plato 
also uses “dia pasōn,” which means “octave”85 and “synaidō,” “to sing together” – while 
the former was a common musical term, although more so in post-Platonic texts, 
“synaidō” was a somewhat uncommon word86. The last musico-political term is 
symphōnia, which, like homonoia and harmonia, signifies a concord of disparate entities. 
Thus, sophrosynē resembles harmonia inasmuch as brings together three discrete and 
unequal entities in order to produce a common sound. On the basis of this comparison, 
at least, Plato does not appear to think of harmonia as a product but rather as an 
organizing principle.  
Having spent some time establishing what sophrosynē is, Socrates seems to give 
short shrift to justice in the city, which is somewhat surprising considering that it is, 
after all, the goal of the entire inquiry. He describes it as each person doing what is 
proper to them and not meddling with the others (433-5): 
                                              
85 According to Nicomachus (Enchiridion 9), hoi palaiotatoi used “syllaba,” for the fourth, di’oxeia for the 
fifth, and harmonia for the octave and these terms were later abandoned for dia tessaron (fourth), dia pente 
(fifth), and dia pasōn (octave).   
 
86 This is, however, Plato’s only use of “dia pasōn” and synaidō only has three other tokens in the Platonic 
corpus. We do find “dia pasōn” at Tht. 197d 8 but we have no reason to believe, given the context, that 
he is using it in its technical, musical sense. Plato uses “synaidō” twice in Prt (333a) and once in Grg. 




 Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν 
δικαιοσύνη ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλων τε πολλῶν ἀκηκόαμεν καὶ αὐτοὶ 
πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν. ….χρηματιστικοῦ, ἐπικουρικοῦ, φυλακικοῦ 
γένους οἰκειοπραγία, ἑκάστου τούτων τὸ αὑτοῦ πράττοντος ἐν πόλει, 
τοὐναντίον ἐκείνου …δικαιοσύνη τ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τὴν πόλιν δικαίαν 
παρέχοι;  
 
And we have heard many people say and have said ourselves that justice is 
doing one’s own and not being meddlesome…When the money making, 
auxiliary, and guardian genē each do their own work in the city, it is justice 
is it not? 433a1-b 2; 434c 7-9 
 
The first thing, perhaps, to note is that justice is here described as “τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν,” 
(doing one’s own)87 which was one of the proposed definitions of sophrosynē in the 
Charmides.  Justice also requires one not to meddle – drawing on evidence from fifth 
century tragedians, comedians, and orators, Adkins (1976, pp. 310ff.) shows that 
anyone who presumed to possess aretē, would use “polypragmosynē” to chastise the 
activities of anyone acting outside of their own sphere of influence.  
  While ‘meddling’ is clearly something negative, ‘doing one’s own’ is a little 
more complicated. Adkins (1976, pp. 302-306) offers an excellent discussion of the 
valence of the phrase – it was, he argues, opposed to the traditional political aretē of 
Athens wherein ‘doing one’s own’ was opposed to the political virtue of philia (in the 
pseudo-Platonic Alcibiades I for instance) and also meant leaving one’s city 
undefended. This is not unsurprising considering that Plato’s political program does 
                                              
87 Cf. Timaeus 72a. i 
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not exactly entail a defense of democratic Athens and its socio-political norms. The 
very notion of ‘doing one’s own’ implies a strict hierarchy that is proper to an 
aristocracy or an oligarchy where politics is the domain of a very small group of people. 
All this is to say that we shouldn’t mistake Plato’s definition of justice for a 
commonplace one since it would probably have seemed bizarre to his contemporaries. 
We also cannot definitely establish that this is justice until we have also considered 
justice in the soul, to which he turns next.  
 
II. 2 Virtue in the soul 
 
 
 Socrates first touches upon virtuous souls in Book III of the Republic when he 
is discussing the educational program for future guardians. As I mentioned in Section 
I, he seems to think that musical harmoniai are able to permeate souls and affect them 
very powerfully (402a). He also describes the nature of the guardians as being neither 
savage nor over-cultivated, but rather a harmony of these extremes that then results in 
virtue: 
Δεῖν δέ γέ φαμεν τοὺς φύλακας ἀμφοτέρα ἔχειν τούτω  
τὼ φύσει./  Δεῖ γάρ. / Οὐκοῦν ἡρμόσθαι δεῖ αὐτὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλας;/  
 Πῶς δ' οὔ; / Καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἡρμοσμένου σώφρων τε καὶ ἀνδρεία ἡ  
ψυχή; /  Πάνυ γε. 
 
Now we said that our guardians must have both these natures./ Indeed/ 
And must not the two be harmonized with one another?/ How could they 
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not?/ And isn’t the soul of the harmonized person moderate and 
courageous?/ Most certainly. 410e 5 – 411a 2 
 
 
This is the first time that we are given some notion of what exactly a harmonized soul 
would harmonize. Recall that already in the Gorgias and Simmias’ refutation in the 
Phaedo, we were presented with the idea that virtue in the soul is a kind of order or 
harmony; however, we were not given any notion as to what the relata of this harmony 
might be. In the passage quoted above, it seems that harmonia could obtain between 
different ‘natures’ within a person’s soul. Book IV, however, gives us an even fuller 
picture of the relata of psychic harmonia.   
Plato contends, in Republic IV, that the soul is not mereologically simple but 
that, just as a city is made up of three genē, so, too, is the human soul. The argument, 
however, isn’t merely from analogy – or, at least, Plato offers an argument besides that 
from analogy88. The core premise of the argument is what Lorenz (2006, p. 22) calls 
the ‘Principle of Opposites’: 
Δῆλον ὅτι ταὐτὸν τἀναντία ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν κατὰ ταὐτόν γε καὶ πρὸς 
ταὐτὸν οὐκ ἐθελήσει ἅμα, ὥστε ἄν που εὑρίσκωμεν ἐν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα 
γιγνόμενα, εἰσόμεθα ὅτι οὐ ταὐτὸν ἦν ἀλλὰ πλείω.  
 
It is clear that the same [thing] will not consent to do and suffer contrary 
things at the same time in the same part of the soul and in relation to the 
                                              
88 For various discussions of Plato’s city-soul analogy see Williams (1973), Brown (1983), Cornford 
(1912), Lear (1992), Loraux (1987), and Neu (1971). Commentators such as Williams have argued that 
the analogy is, at its core, fallacious; this may well be the case but it is beyond my scope to discuss it 
further since I am concerned with what this analogy can tell us about the role of harmonia and its role 
in the microcosm and the macrocosm. 
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same thing, and thus if we find this happening in the soul, we will know 
that we are not dealing with one thing but with many. 436b 7 – c 1 
 
The first clause – that the same thing will not undergo and suffer contrary things – is 
the ‘Principle of Opposites’. Socrates then points out a range of opposing impulses 
within the soul and uses this to argue for the claim that these impulses and desires are 
felt in different parts of the soul89.  
The first, and most obvious, distinction is between reason and appetite. 
Assent/dissent and impulse/aversion are said to be opposite actions or states. Now, 
sometimes people are unwilling to eat or drink even at the same time that they have 
the impulse to do so, i.e. the same people have aversions. By the principle of opposites, 
they cannot feel the impulse and the aversion in the same part. Thus, on the one hand 
we have the appetite which drives the person to eat or drink and on the other hand, 
we have reason whence the aversion for food or drink arises. Reason and appetite are, 
further, distinct from yet another part — spirit (thymos). Socrates illustrates this 
distinction with the case of Leontius who was consumed with a desire to look at 
beautiful corpses and filled with anger and disgust by this at the same time; this shows 
how spirit or anger can “make war” with appetite. Since this is the case, again, by the 
principle of opposites, spirit and appetite must belong to different parts of the soul.  
                                              
89 Plato doesn’t really use the language of parthood here or elsewhere and I will deal with this problem 
in Section IV.  
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Spirit is also distinct from reason — Socrates gives us an example from Homer’s Odyssey 
when Odysseus instructs his heart to endure in the face of difficulty. This is interpreted 
as a case of Odysseus’ reason rebuking his spirit, which is the irrationally angry part of 
his soul. Since reason can rebuke spirit, Socrates concludes that the two must be 
distinct. The soul is, thus, a complex entity composed of three parts, each of which has 
a distinct way of acting and being affected.  
Having established the structure of the soul, Socrates then turns to the question 
of the good of the soul. Now the soul comprises three parts just as the kallipolis is made 
up of three classes of people – guardians, auxiliaries, and moneymakers. He argues, 
first, that the soul will be courageous, wise, and moderate in the same ways that the 
city is (442-443) – courage belongs to the spirited part, wisdom to the rational part, 
and moderation is spread throughout the soul such that each part recognizes its place 
and function.  
Socrates then turns, finally, to the central question of justice. In the case of the 
city, justice consists in making the entire city happy; for this to happen, each of the 
three classes must do what they are best suited to (434a). Justice in the soul, too, will 
consist in each part doing what it is best suited to. The three parts will not ‘meddle’ 
with each other’s functioning and they will each do what is proper to them: 
Τὸ δέ γε ἀληθές, τοιοῦτόν τι ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη  ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ 
τὴν ἔξω πρᾶξιν τῶν αὑτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐντός, ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑαυτὸν 
καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, μὴ ἐάσαντα τἀλλότρια πράττειν ἕκαστον ἐν αὑτῷ μηδὲ 
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πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὰ 
οἰκεῖα εὖ θέμενον καὶ ἄρξαντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ καὶ κοσμήσαντα καὶ φίλον 
γενόμενον ἑαυτῷ καὶ συναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα, ὥσπερ ὅρους τρεῖς 
ἁρμονίας ἀτεχνῶς, νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης, καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἄττα 
μεταξὺ τυγχάνει ὄντα, πάντα ταῦτα συνδήσαντα καὶ παντάπασιν ἕνα 
γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον... 
 
And in truth, justice is, it seems, something of this sort. Yet it is not 
concerned with someone’s doing his own on the outside. On the contrary, 
it is concerned with what is inside; with himself, really, and the things that 
are his own. It means that he does not allow the elements in him each to do 
the job of some other, or the three sorts of elements in his soul to meddle 
with one another. Instead, he regulates well what is really his own, rules 
himself, puts himself in order, becomes his own friend, and harmonizes the 
three elements together, just as if they were the three defining notes of an 
octave90—lowest, highest, and middle—as well as any others that may be in 
between. He binds together all of these and, from having been many, 
becomes entirely one, temperate and harmonious...  443c 8 - e 2 
 
We learn, from this passage, that justice is a harmonia of the three parts of the 
soul (and, consequently, the city); it’s not merely the case that harmonia brings about 
justice or that justice brings about harmonia or some such weaker formulation. We also 
learn that harmonia requires that the relata of the harmonia do what is proper to them 
and stay within their limits, as it were. On this definition, psychic justice it is a state in 
which the logistikon, epithymetikon, and thymoeides each does its own task and does not 
meddle with the work of the other; this guarantees, as does sophrosynē, that there are 
no warring factions within the soul and the soul has a beautiful inner order. The 
                                              
90 “Harmonia” is used for “octave” here and not “dia pasōn,” in contrast to the passage on sophrosynē.  
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consensus arrived in a sophrōn soul and city is necessary for the individual and the city 
to act justly.  
We must also be wary of conflating sōphrosynē and dikaiosynē even if they are 
very closely related. For one, temperance is described as a kind of harmonia (harmonia 
tini) whereas, in the case of justice, the three parts of the soul are put into a harmonia 
(without any qualifications) and the terminology used is explicitly musical. One might 
distinguish between temperance and justice by saying that the harmonia of moderation 
is passive since different parts are required to accept their functions while the harmonia 
of justice is active since each part must perform a particular function – this is the option 
taken by, for instance, Grube (1992). I do not disagree with this reading, but hope to 
supplement it. As we’ve discussed earlier, harmonia has many aspects and perhaps the 
different virtues entail imitating different aspects of it. Unity is important in both cases 
but, with temperance, the focus is on ‘sounding together’ (symphōnia) whereas the 
focus in the case of justice is on the proper ordering of a mereologically complex entity. 
In both cases, however, there is ‘psychic harmony’ which, in Vlastos’ (1969, p. 2) words 
refers to a “condition in which the soul is healthy, beautiful, and in the ontologically 
correct, hierarchic, inner order.”  
Following his definition of psychic justice, Socrates moves from identifying 
justice with a harmonious state to identifying virtue in general with it and then, in an 
echo of the Gorgias, likes virtue to a health and harmonia, in the case of the soul, the 
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body, and the polis. I will discuss psychic and political injustice as well as the 
significance of the musical terminology deployed in Socrates’ definition of justice in 
the next section. Before we turn to this, though, there is one issue that we need to 
consider : what exactly are the relata of psychic harmonia? This is somewhat clear in 
the case of the polis – the three classes – but the status of the ‘parts’ of the soul is 
somewhat ambiguous.    
 We can be certain that the ‘psychic harmony’ of the Republic has nothing to do 
with the harmonia of the soul described by Simmias in the Phaedo; psychic harmonia in 
this part of the Republic is not a relative harmonia, dependent on the body and, whatever 
the three parts of the soul are, they are not material entities. Plato often doesn’t use a 
separate noun when referring to these parts, preferring, instead, “τὸ λογιστικόν” (the 
rational), “τό ἐπιθυμητικὸν” (the appetitive), and “τὸ θυμοειδές” (the spirited). When 
he does use a separate noun, it is usually “εἶδος,” (form; shape; figure; literally, that 
which is seen) which is as ambiguous as the English ‘parts’ or ‘elements’ and, much less 
frequently, “μέρος” (part) or γένη (kind, species). Ferrari (2007, p. 119) points out, the 
three parts of the soul sound like faculties of the soul in Book IV but later, in Books 
VIII and IX, seem more like drives. However, Guthrie (1971, p. 232) maintains that 
we cannot “water down this doctrine by speaking loosely of "aspects" of an essentially 
unitary soul, instead of "parts" of a composite one.” In his discussion of this question, 
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Lorenz (2007, pp. 13-17) responds to another set of interpreters who claim that that 
the kinds or parts of the souls are merely different desires; he argues, instead: 
The Republic’s psychological theory amounts to significantly more than the 
claim that there are a number of different kinds or forms of human 
motivation. It also involves the further claims, first, that in order to account 
for the fact that motivations of these different kinds or forms can (and 
frequently do) conflict with one another, it is necessary to accept that the 
embodied human soul is not, as one might think it is, a single 
undifferentiated thing, but is in fact a composite of a number of distinct and 
specifiable items…Socrates is not only offering an analysis of human 
motivation and of human desire. He is also adopting a substantial and 
problematic position on the nature and constitution of the soul in its 
embodied state. Lorenz (2007, p. 15) 
 
Lorenz’s statement anticipates the motivation for the ‘watered down’ readings since he 
specifies that Plato is talking about soul in its embodied state. One might contend that 
Plato’s stance in Republic IV is, prima facie, at odds both with Plato’s stance in the Phaedo 
and, more troublingly, with his claims in Republic X (611 a ff.) where he claims that 
something composite could not be eternal whereas the soul is eternal. This seems to be 
the primary reason that some interpreters have taken the claim in Book IV to be only 
about psychology and not the structure of the soul. However Plato claims only that 
that the soul as it really is  is simple – this doesn’t rule out the possibility of an embodied 
soul that is not simple. Similarly, the Phaedo is about the disembodied soul and not the 
embodied one. In the Timaeus, too, only the rational part of the soul is immortal 
whereas the embodied tripartite soul is not.   
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It is beyond my scope to enter into these arguments in any more detail, but I 
remain convinced by the arguments of Guthrie (1971) and Lorenz (2007) and suggest 
that we provisionally accept that the relata of psychic harmonia, as characterized in the 
Republic, are three distinct parts and, when these three parts function harmoniously, 
the soul is a virtuous one or, in the language of contemporary metaethics, harmonia 
functions as a ‘good-making feature’ of the soul.   
 
III. Vicious constitutions, vicious souls 
 
 
III.1 From justice/injustice to virtue/vice 
 
 
After having defined justice as a harmonic ordering within the soul wherein each part 
performs the function proper to it, Socrates identifies injustice as a kind of stasis (444b), 
moving from musical to political terminology and, perhaps, emphasizing the link 
between the two.  We are also told that just actions preserve and help us attain harmonia 
and, further, that wisdom (sophia) is the knowledge that allows the just person to 
institute this inner order whereas injustice is the destruction of the harmonia because it 
is a kind of ignorance (amathia). This reinforces earlier Platonic views about the nature 
of akrasia, namely that those do act wrongly do so from ignorance; however, it is 
unclear why he repeats this here, especially since he does not dwell on it much more 
at this stage. He also relates injustice to ignorance without providing any justification 
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for this claim. I will return to this when I discuss Book VII in the next section; I argue 
that injustice entails the ignorance of the proper harmonic proportion that ought to 
obtain in the soul of a just individual. Even more importantly, perhaps, Plato relates 
the virtue of wisdom to the virtue of justice.  
 He continues to unify the virtues, as it were, when he moves from speaking of 
justice and injustice to vice and virtue in general: 
Οὐκοῦν στάσιν τινὰ αὖ τριῶν ὄντων τούτων δεῖ αὐτὴν εἶναι καὶ 
πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἀλλοτριοπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἐπανάστασιν 
μέρους τινὸς τῷ ὅλῳ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἵν' ἄρχῃ ἐν αὐτῇ οὐ προσῆκον, ἀλλὰ 
τοιούτου ὄντος φύσει οἵου πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύειν, τῷ δ' οὐ δουλεύειν 
ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι; τοιαῦτ' ἄττα οἶμαι φήσομεν καὶ τὴν τούτων 
ταραχὴν καὶ πλάνην εἶναι τήν τε ἀδικίαν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ 
ἀμαθίαν καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶσαν κακίαν. 
  
Must it [injustice] then not be some kind of internal stasis between the 
three, meddling and interfering in the tasks of the others and the 
insurrection (epanastasis) of one part of the soul against the whole in order 
to rule it without it being seemly, its nature being such that it is to be slave 
to the class (genos) that rules? It is this, I think, but also the upheaval and 
wandering that attaches to it that is injustice, intemperance, cowardice, 
ignorance and, in short, all kinds of vice. 444b 1-10 
 
Plato gives us the definition of justice after having defined the three other so-called 
cardinal virtues, and this gives us reason to believe that they are, in some sense at least, 
distinct and that they, together, constitute virtue and yet, here, we have a clear 
conflation of vice (and presumably its counterpart, virtue) with injustice (and its 
counterpart, justice). Injustice entails all kinds of evil and, in particular, cowardice (the 
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absence of courage) and intemperance (the absence of moderation). The reasons for 
this conflation, perhaps, have to do with the fact that both justice and virtue are seen 
as healthy states of the soul and of the city – they are similar insofar as they stem from 
the soul being in a particular harmonic order. Socrates states, quite unambiguously, 
that health is to the body what justice is to the soul (444c). Health is then defined as an 
order wherein the naturally worse elements are mastered by the naturally better 
elements: 
Ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιεῖν τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι κατὰ φύσιν καθιστάναι 
κρατεῖν τε καὶ κρατεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ νόσον παρὰ φύσιν ἄρχειν 
τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλου.[…] Οὐκοῦν αὖ, ἔφην, τὸ δικαιοσύνην 
ἐμποιεῖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κατὰ φύσιν καθιστάναι κρατεῖν τε καὶ κρατεῖσθαι 
ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ ἀδικίαν παρὰ φύσιν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι 
ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλου; 
 
Indeed to produce health is to place the bodily [elements] in their natural 
relationship of mastering and being mastered one by the other, whereas [to 
produce] sickness is [to place the elements] in an unnatural relationship of 
ruling and being ruled one by the other. […] Doesn’t it follow then that to 
produce justice is to place [the elements] of the soul in the natural 
relationship of ruling and being ruled. one by the other whereas injustice 
is [to place the elements] in an unnatural relationship of ruling and being 
ruled. one by the other. 444d 3-11 
 
We have, here, a clear statement that neither justice nor health consist in a kind of 
brute egalitarianism – the kind which is attributed often to Alcmaeon, for instance – 
and with good reason since he describes health as an isonomic state with no one 
element having mastery over the other. As I discussed in Chapter 1, Vlastos attributes 
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a similar, isonomic model of health to the Hippocratics but, as I also pointed out there, 
such a reading ignores some important Hippocratic texts, such as On Regimen that do, 
in fact, give us a model for health as a harmonic, i.e. inegalitarian, balance.  While the 
analogy between virtue or virtues to health is unsurprising since this is hardly the first 
time we see such an analogy in the Platonic corpus, it is worth noting the emphasis on 
physis. The hierarchical harmonic order isn’t just the correct or the beautiful one, but 
it is the natural one91. Even though the analogy is not unexpected, the fact that Plato 
seems to deduce that virtue is a kind of health from the fact that justice is does seem 
unexpected: 
Ἀρετὴ μὲν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὑγίειά τέ τις ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία 
ψυχῆς, κακία δὲ νόσος τε καὶ αἶσχος καὶ ἀσθένεια.  (emphasis mine) 
 
So virtue, it seems to me, is a kind of health and beauty and the good state 
of the soul; vice would be sickness, ugly and weak. 444a 1-2 
 
He gives no reason for the fact that virtue is a kind of health other than the fact that 
justice is a kind of health. In this passage as well as the ones quoted above, Plato blurs 
the distinctions between the virtues, casting doubt on their cardinality, and appears, at 
least prima facie, to assign a central role to justice since the other virtues are defined in 
terms of it.  
                                              
91 This is a notion that will be fully developed in the Timaeus. 
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Carr (1988, pp. 189 ff.) claims that there is only “partial interdefinition” between 
the virtues in the Republic and they are not reducible to one another. While this may 
be true, it does seem as though the virtues could be explained in terms of a single 
principle: harmonia. Since health is a kind of harmonia and virtue is health of the soul, 
we have reason, then, to understand virtue as a kind of harmonia. Justice, moderation, 
and courage are all, at different points, described as requiring a harmonic ordering of 
the parts of the soul; wisdom, too, presumably requires this, since it requires the rule of 
reason and reason cannot rule if the other parts are not obedient to it. We should also 
keep in mind the description of wisdom at 428d: 
ἔστι τις ἐπιστήμη ἐν τῇ ἄρτι ὑφ'ἡμῶν οἰκισθείσῃ παρά τισι τῶν πολιτῶν, 
ᾗ οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὸς βουλεύεται, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ αὑτῆς ὅλης, 
ὅντινα τρόπον αὐτή τε πρὸς αὑτὴν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἄριστα 
ὁμιλοῖ; 
 
Then does there exist in the city we have just now founded a certain 
wisdom unique to some of its citizens that does not deliberate about 
something in the city but about the city as a whole, in what manner it will 
be in best company with itself and with other cities? 
 
It is quite natural, then, to understand wisdom as entailing the knowledge of how to 
maintain a harmonic order in the city and in the soul. Thus, by the end of Book IV, 
Plato has argued, in some detail, that the good of the soul and the good of the city 
require the maintenance of harmonic order, which is understood as a relation between 
parts that are naturally better and naturally worse wherein the naturally better rule and 
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the naturally worse are ruled. His choice of harmonia is, then, not just a coincidence; 
there are a few different terms that connote ‘good order’ – symmetria and eukosmia to 
name two of the most prominent – but it alone connotes a good order that specifically 
requires the mastery of some elements and the subordination of others. The 
significance of this becomes even more apparent when we consider Plato’s accounts of 
vice and injustice in Book VIII.  
 
III.2 Degenerate souls and constitutions in Republic VIII 
 
 
Towards the end of Book IV Socrates claims that there is only one kind of virtue (the 
psychic harmonia described earlier, presumably) but there are many different kinds of 
vice of which he deems four to be significant. He defers the discussion of these five 
types of souls and constitutions until Book VIII, however. Books V-VII are largely 
taken up with his discussion of the three waves of paradox, the introduction of the 
theory of Forms and, finally, the description of the educational program for the 
guardians, the last of which I will return to in the next section. For now, let us turn to 
the four primary varieties of vice: 
εἰσὶ γὰρ ἃς λέγω, αἵπερ καὶ ὀνόματα ἔχουσιν, ἥ τε ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν 
ἐπαινουμένη, ἡ Κρητική τε καὶ Λακωνικὴ αὕτη· καὶ δευτέρα καὶ 
δευτέρως ἐπαινουμένη, καλουμένη δ' ὀλιγαρχία, συχνῶν γέμουσα 
κακῶν πολιτεία· ἥ τε ταύτῃ διάφορος καὶ ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένη δημοκρατία, 
καὶ ἡ γενναία δὴ τυραννὶς καὶ πασῶν τούτων διαφέρουσα, τέταρτόν τε 




For the ones of which I speak already have names – the one that is praised 
by the many, the Cretan or the Laconian one; and the second and second 
in order of praise is called the oligarchy, a constitution laden with vices; 
disagreeing with it and next in order is called democracy, and then the 
noble tyranny which is at odds with all of them, fourth and the most 
extreme in sickness of the cities.  544c 1-8 
 
We are then told that there are as many types of eidē  of human types or characters as 
there are types of constitutions because cities are made out of different kinds of 
people.92 Aristotle (Pol. V 1316a-b) interprets Plato as offering a historical account 
(much like his own albeit deficient, as is the case with most of Aristotle’s predecessors!) 
but this seems rather unlikely, especially since Plato himself acknowledges that 
enumerating all the types of existent constitutions would be an impossible task93. The 
five constitutions and souls are, I contend, best understood as types. The good and just 
soul described in the earlier books corresponds to an aristocratic constitution where 
only the best men rule; the kallipolis thus is an instance of the aristocratic type. This 
                                              
92 This argument is somewhat problematic because it seems to imply that a virtuous city is mostly made 
up of virtuous people whereas a vicious one has vicious citizens whereas the argument in Book IV saw 
human souls and cities as analogous inasmuch as each had three parts and, in both cases, virtue consisted 
in the harmonic ordering of those parts. Thus a virtuous soul/city is not one that is made up of virtuous 
people for the most part but one where reason/the guardian class rules with the aid of spirit/auxiliary 
class and where appetite/the moneymaking class is appropriately subservient. At any rate, not a great 
deal hinges on this particular argument since in the very next step, Socrates compares cities and souls in 
the same way as in Book IV – cities and souls of the same kind will have the same kind of internal order 
(or lack thereof). 
  




ideal state is disturbed when there is any kind of faction – recall that the maintenance 
of psychic harmonia was a necessary condition for the possession of virtue. The moment 
any one part steps beyond its limits, the soul and the city ceases to be good. This is 
what happens, in different ways and to different degrees, in each of the degenerate 
states.  
The timocracy, which is how the Laconian constitution is classified, comes 
about when the spirited part or the auxiliary part becomes too strong (545d – 546b). 
In this state, the auxiliaries value gymnastikē over mousikē and chase honors and wealth 
instead of engaging in philosophical discussions (548 b) – in the ideal state the care of 
the body matters only insofar as it leads to a healthy and beautiful soul and a timocratic 
state fails to take this into account. However this is, as Glaucon points out, a mixture 
of good and bad since it is the second best element that rules and since there is still a 
strict separation between the functions of the moneymaking class/appetite and the 
auxiliary class/spirit even though the division between the auxiliaries/spirit and the 
guardians/reason is blurred. Such a person would be similarly harsh and less ‘musical’ 
who loves “physical training and hunting” to excess (549a); he would lack the best 
guide: logos mixed with mousikē (549b).  
While a timocracy still places value on physical prowess and honors, the 
oligarchy transfers this love of honor to a love of money, becoming much less good 
than the timocratic state. Timocracy degenerates into oligarchy when the rules in a 
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timocratic state conflate virtue and money; even though virtue doesn’t consist in 
honor, it is closer to virtue than money is. Indeed, Socrates goes as far as to say that 
virtue, if set on a balance, would be completely opposed to wealth (550e 5). 
Moneymaking, in the ideal state, would be the domain of a particular class alone and 
the same is true of brute desire in a human soul. The task of this lowest parts is to be 
obedient to the higher parts. However, in the oligarchic state and soul, this does not 
obtain and two higher parts are enslaved (553d) in service of the basest element. While 
the oligarchic state is still a vicious one because it lacks the single mindedness and 
harmony (ὁμονοητικῆς δὲ καὶ ἡρμοσμένης) of the virtuous state, it is not the worst 
because, even in an oligarchy, the better appetites master the worse ones (554e 3). The 
importance of a unified state is emphasized here when the oligarchic person is 
described as having a twofold (diploos) nature (554d 10). While the mixture in an 
oligarchic type tends more towards the bad than does the mixture in a timocracy, there 
is still some semblance of good.  
While it would be difficult to read the ideal city of the Republic as anything 
other than an attack on Athenian democracy, the discussion in Book VIII (556 ff.) 
offers the most direct attack on a democratic ideal.  The democratic state arises out of 
the sickness that oligarchy eventually results in; this sickness leaves it susceptible to 
outside influences, such as democracy (556-7). In modern parlance, democracy is a 
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nasty virus that is caught by a city or soul whose antibodies have been weakened by 
love of money.  
Plato does not, however, merely dismiss democracy – he certainly seems aware 
of its charm even though this charm is, as he claims, a superficial one. A democratic 
state is seen as a ‘pleasant’ one where anyone who wants to rule can rule and there is a 
great deal of complexity because of the multiplicity of constitutions. Since unity is the 
goal, according to Plato, this talk of multiplicity obviously has a negative valence even 
though it not presented as such.  
Socrates’ description of the democratic state as kallistē (most beautiful) can only 
be read as ironic, especially given the somewhat heavy handed repletion of the 
superlative kallistē (thrice in one sentence); and if there is any doubt in the mind of the 
reader, he also uses “kallistos” to describe the tyrannical state (562a 5). He describes a 
democracy as a convenient place to look for a constitution (557d 3), which is the 
epitome of backhanded praise since it’s a convenient ‘marketplace’ of constitutions 
because it lacks a unified and stable constitution.  Democracy also seems to involve a 
kind of anarchic libertarianism since everyone can do as they please, free of any kind 
of enforced rule or any kind of check whatsoever. It is a pleasant (hēdus) state with 
much forbearance and a complete absence of pettiness; again, this seems like a positive 
description until it is fleshed out as involving criminals strolling around like heroes 
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(558b) and anyone, irrespective of his nature or education, being allowed to rule if he 
claims to wish the majority well (558 c).  
The democratic person is similar in every way to the democratic state – all parts 
have equal say irrespective of their worth and such a person contains multitudes; he 
might over-indulge his appetite one day but practice politics and allow his spirit to rule 
another day and then spend yet another day studying what he takes to be philosophy 
(561 d). There are several “complex and beautiful” characters within this soul just as 
there are several constitutions contained in a democracy (562e 4).  
Importantly, for our purposes, a democratic man is described as being 
“isonomikos”, i.e. committed to isonomia (a strict 1:1 ratio). The crux of the problem is 
expressed briefly at 558 d: “…ἡδεῖα πολιτεία καὶ ἄναρχος καὶ ποικίλη, ἰσότητά τινα 
ὁμοίως ἴσοις τε καὶ ἀνίσοις διανέμουσα.” (…[democracy is] a pleasant and complex 
and ruler-less constitution with equality being distributed to equal and unequals 
alike.”). Plato takes issue with a model of equality that was long defended by apologists 
for democracy as being the ideal kind of distribution and by some medical writers as 
being the ideal state of the body. As I mentioned in the earlier section, Plato’s choice 
of “harmonia” is not coincidental; it is not just a stand-in for “order,” generally speaking, 
but it refers to a very particular kind of order.  I believe that we can turn to a few 
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fragments of Archytas94 in order to fully understand Plato’s argument against an 
egalitarian democracy95. Before I turn to these passages, however, I should note that 
scholars have invoked Isocrates’ earlier distinction between the two kinds of equality 
(Areopagiticus 21) as well as Aristotle’s later distinction between different kinds of 
justice in the Politics (1301a-b) in order to better explain Plato’s arguments against 
democracy. It is, of course, undeniable that he is somewhat in agreement with Isocrates 
(Areopagiticus 21-2): 
 
Μέγιστον δ᾿ αὐτοῖς συνεβάλετο πρὸς τὸ καλῶς οἰκεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ὅτι 
δυοῖν ἰσοτήτοιν νομιζομέναιν εἶναι, καὶ τῆς μὲν ταὐτὸν ἅπασιν 
ἀπονεμούσης τῆς δὲ τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστοις, οὐκ ἠγνόουν τὴν 
χρησιμωτέραν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν ἀξιοῦσαν τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ τοὺς 
πονηροὺς ἀπεδοκίμαζον ὡς οὐ δικαίαν οὖσαν, τὴν δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν 
ἕκαστον τιμῶσαν καὶ κολάζουσαν προῃροῦντο, καὶ διὰ ταύτης ᾤκουν 
τὴν πόλιν, οὐκ ἐξ ἁπάντων τὰς ἀρχὰς κληροῦντες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βελτίστους 
καὶ τοὺς ἱκανωτάτους ἐφ᾿ ἕκαστον τῶν ἔργων προκρίνοντες. τοιούτους 
γὰρ ἤλπιζον ἔσεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἷοί περ ἂν ὦσιν οἱ τῶν 
πραγμάτων ἐπιστατοῦντες. 
                                              
94 Morrison (1958) also draws attention to Archytas and the harmonic mean; however, he does not 
consider the passages quoted in Stobaeus in connection with this. Harvey (1965), on the other hand, 
does mention the Stobaeus passages but argues that they are spurious – on the question of authenticity, 
one might turn to Huffman (200_) who has shown that the evidence is balanced both for and against 
authenticity. Even if these fragments were not written by Archytas, Delatte (1932) has argued, through 
careful analysis that they were written in the Doric dialect of the fifth century so it is highly unlikely, at 
any rate, that these fragments are post-Platonic forgeries. Harvey remains unconvinced that Plato praises 
harmonic equality in the Republic and offers a range of arguments against Morrison. I follow Delatte 
(1932) and Ausland (2006) in taking the fragments to be genuine – or, at least not post-Platonic forgeries 
– and in taking Plato to be using the theory of harmonic means in the Republic.  
 
 
95 Barker (2000) tells us that Archytas was really the first Greek harmonic scientist. He was a 
contemporary of Plato’s and is mentioned by him in the Seventh Letter as having apparently saved his 




But what contributed most to their good government of the state was that 
of the two recognized kinds of equality—that which makes the same award 
to all alike and that which gives to each man his due—they did not fail to 
grasp which was the more serviceable; but, rejecting as unjust that which 
holds that the good and the bad are worthy of the same honours, and 
preferring rather that which rewards and punishes every man according to 
his deserts, they governed the city on this principle, not filling the offices by 
lot from all the citizens, but selecting the best and the ablest for each function 
of the state; for they believed that the rest of the people would reflect the 
character of those who were placed in charge of their affairs. 
 
 
However Plato’s distinctions in the Republic are yet more complex since he seems to be 
comparing not two but three kinds of structures of distribution – that found in an 
aristocracy, that found in oligarchies, tyrannies, and timocracies and, third, the one 
found in democracies. For this reason I believe that a comparison with Archytas might 
prove fruitful. 
The relevant passages are from a work entitled On Law and Justice (Περὶ νόμου 
καὶ δικαιοσύνης) that is attributed to Archytas on the basis of quotations by Stobaeus. 
I should note that the authenticity of these passages has been doubted, most recently 
by Huffman, but, as even he acknowledges, the evidence as to the authenticity of these 
passages is balanced more or less equally; I follow Delatte (1934) in taking these 
fragments to be authentic. Archytas first draws a comparison between harmonia and 
law: 
Νόμος ποτ' ἀνθρώπω ψυχάν τε καὶ βίον ὅπερ ἁρμονία ποτ' ἀκοάν τε 
καὶ φωνάν· ὅ τε γὰρ νόμος παιδεύει μὲν τὰν ψυχάν, συνίστησι δὲ τὸν 
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βίον, ἅ τε ἁρμονία ἐπιστάμονα μὲν ποιεῖ τὰν ἀκοάν, ὁμόλογον δὲ τὰν 
φωνάν. 
 
The law’s relation to the soul and way of life of a human being is the same 
as harmonia’s relation to hearing and vocal expression. For, whereas the law 
educates his soul, it also organizes his way of life; likewise, whereas harmonia 
makes his hearing prudent, it also makes his vocal expression agreeable. 
Stobaeus 4.1.135 
 
This puts us in mind of Plato’s arguments, in Book III of the Republic and in the earlier 
dialogues, about the power of harmonia. Archytas then describes a bipartite soul in 
which virtue is produced by the harmonizing (synarmogē) of reason and appetite such 
that the rational parts rules and the irrational parts is ruled (Stob. 4.1.135). The perfect 
law is one that is compliant with nature: 
ἀκόλουθος μὲν ὦν κα εἴη τᾷ φύσει, μιμεόμενος τὸ τᾶς φύσιος δίκαιον· 
τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν τὸ ἀνάλογον καὶ τὸ ἐπιβάλλον ἑκάστῳ κατὰ τὰν ἑκάστω 
ἀξίαν.  
 
It would, then, be compliant with nature if it were to imitate the justice of 
nature: this is what is proportionate, i.e. what falls to each in accordance 
with the worth of each. Stobaeus 4.1.135 
 
Compliance with nature requires a distribution that is in accordance with the worth of 
each entity – we can already begin to see echoes of this sentiment in Republic VIII since 
a democracy is presumably vicious because the distribution is arbitrary and has nothing 
do with the natural worth of the genē in the city and in the soul. However, Archytas 
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goes on to use explicitly musical/mathematical terminology in order to better explain 
his claims: 
καὶ τὸ ἀριστοκρατικὸν κατὰ τὰν ὑπεναντίαν μεσότατα· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ 
μέζοσι μέζονας τὼς [δὲ] λόγως, τοῖς δὲ μῄοσι μῄονας διανέμει ἁ 
ἀναλογία αὕτα· τὸ δὲ δαμοκρατικὸν κατὰ τὰν γεωμετρικάν· ἐν γὰρ 
ταύτᾳ τοὶ λόγοι ἶσοι τῶν μεζόνων καὶ μῃόνων μεγεθέων· τὸ δὲ 
ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ τυραννικὸν κατὰ τὰν ἀριθμητικάν· ἀντιάζει γὰρ αὕτα 
τᾷ ὑπεναντίᾳ· τοῖς γὰρ μῄοσι μέζονας τὼς λόγως, τοῖς δὲ μέζοσι μῄονας.  
ταὶ μὲν ὦν ἰδέαι τᾶς διανομᾶς τοσαῦται, ταὶ δὲ εἰκόνες ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις 
καὶ τοῖς οἴκοις θεωρέονται· τιμαί τε γὰρ καὶ κολάσιες καὶ ἀρχαὶ <ἢ> ἐξ 
ἴσω τοῖς μέζοσι καὶ μῄοσι διανέμονται, ἢ ἐξ ἀνίσω ἢ τῷ ἀρετᾷ ὑπερέχεν 
ἢ τῷ πλούτῳ ἢ καὶ δυνάμει. τὸ μὲν ὦν ἐξ ἴσω δαμοκρατικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐξ 
ἀνίσω ἀριστοκρατικὸν ἢ ὀλιγαρχικόν.  
 
Aristocracy is founded on the subcontrary mean, for this ratio distributes 
the greater proportion to the greater and the lesser to the lesser; democracy 
is established according to the geometric proportion, for in this case the 
ratios of magnitudes of the greater and lesser are equal; oligarchy and 
tyranny are founded according to the arithmetic proportion, for these are 
opposed to the subcontrary mean since a greater part of the ratio [is 
distributed] to the lesser and a lesser part to the greater.  Such are the forms 
of distribution, and we might observe their images in cities and in 
households; for honors and punishments and offices are there distributed 
between the greater and the lesser in the equal measure or in unequal 
measure to hold with respect to virtue or money or power. The first from 
equality is democracy, the second, from inequality is aristocracy or 
oligarchy. Stobaeus 4.1.137 
 
In this passage and elsewhere (Huffman fragments 1 and 2), Archytas explain that there 
are three different kinds of means: harmonic or subcontrary, geometric, and arithmetic. 
In contemporary mathematical notation, given the extremes ‘a’ and ‘c’, the arithmetic 
mean is a+c/2, the geometric mean is √ac and the harmonic or subcontrary mean is 
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2ac/a+c. So 4 is the arithmetic mean between 2 and 6, the geometric mean between 2 
and 8, and the harmonic mean between 3 and 6. The arithmetic mean represents the 
differences absolutely in terms of quantity – it exceeds the lesser term by as much as 
the greater term exceeds it (4-2 is 2 and so is 6-4; thus 4 is the arithmetic mean between 
2 and 6); the geometric mean, on the other hand, is prima facie more unequal but 
represents a more fundamental proportional equality since the mean subtracted from 
the higher extreme is to the extreme what the lower extreme subtracted from the mean 
is to the mean; in other words 4(8-4):8::2(4-2):4. In the arithmetic mean we have ratios 
2:6 and 2:4, which are not proportional, unlike the geometric 4:8 and 2:4 (which can 
both be reduced to the single ratio 1:2). According to Archytas, the arithmetic mean is 
found in oligarchies and tyrannies where more is given to less and less to more whereas 
the geometric mean is to be found in democracies where there is proportional equality.  
The harmonic or subcontrary mean is different from both these and offers a 
third model of equality – this is the model that is followed in an aristocracy, according 
to Archytas. With the model of 3 and 6 as extremes and 4 as the mean, we can see that 
the ratio of 6-4 (2) is a third of the higher extreme and 4-3 (1) is a third of the lower 
extreme.  As Ausland (2006, p. 109) puts it, “the arithmetic mean assigned equal 
amounts, but lesser ratios, and the geometric assigned unequal amounts but equal 
ratios, the harmonic assigns unequal ratios and unequal amounts, but these amounts 
are still equal if regarded as parts of the extremes.” The arithmetic mean assigns a 
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greater ratio to the lower extreme and a lower ratio to the higher extreme; the 
harmonic mean assigns a greater ratio to the greater extreme and a lower ratio to the 
lower extreme; the geometric mean assigns equal ratios to each of the extremes. We 
are now in a position to return to Plato’s narrative in Book VIII. 
Plato, too, speaks of different kinds of constitutions, but these are five in 
number: aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny; each of these is a 
structural type with a particular kind of ratio obtaining between the three parts of the 
city and the soul. Even though Plato doesn’t quantify this relationship between the 
parts of the soul, we could apply Archytas’ theory to his typology.  
In an aristocracy, the best kind of city, reason/the guardian class dominates with 
the aid of spirit/the auxiliary class, which gives more power to the greater and less to 
the lesser, as in a harmonic mean. Timocracies, oligarchies, and tyrannies all resemble 
arithmetic means in that the lesser parts are given more power and the greater part is 
given less power – although Plato’s more sophisticated psychology allows for sub-
distinctions between oligarchies and tyrannies (appetite-dominant) on the one hand 
and timocracies (spirit-dominant) on the other. Plato and Archytas both seem to agree, 
however, that the problem with democracy is that there is a strictly egalitarian 
distribution irrespective of the worth of the entities – equal proportions are given to 
the greater and to the lesser; both also lay emphasis on the notion that these inequalities 
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are natural, the full significance of which will become more apparent when we turn to 
the Timaeus.  
 This equation of a harmonic equality with political justice is made even more 
explicit in the Laws96 : 
ἀρίστην ἰσότητα οὐκέτι ῥᾴδιον παντὶ ἰδεῖν. Διὸς γὰρ δὴ κρίσις ἐστί, καὶ 
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀεὶ  σμικρὰ μὲν ἐπαρκεῖ, πᾶν δὲ ὅσον ἂν ἐπαρκέσῃ 
πόλεσιν ἢ καὶ ἰδιώταις, πάντ' ἀγαθὰ ἀπεργάζεται· τῷ μὲν γὰρ μείζονι 
πλείω, τῷ δ' ἐλάττονι σμικρότερα νέμει, μέτρια διδοῦσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν 
φύσιν ἑκατέρῳ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμὰς μείζοσι μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀεὶ μείζους, 
τοῖς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς τε καὶ παιδείας τὸ πρέπον ἑκατέροις 
ἀπονέμει κατὰ λόγον. ἔστιν γὰρ δήπου καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἡμῖν ἀεὶ τοῦτ' 
αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον·[…] ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς ὀλίγους τυράννους ἢ πρὸς ἕνα ἢ καὶ 
κράτος δήμου τι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ νυνδὴ λεχθέν, 
τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἴσον ἀνίσοις ἑκάστοτε δοθέν· 
 
For the best kind of equality is difficult for everyone to know. It is the 
judgment of Zeus and it does not aid men except in small measure, but 
insofar as it assists individuals or cities, it produces all things good; for it 
dispenses more to the greater and less to the smaller, giving due measure to 
each according to nature; and with regard to honors also, by granting the 
greater to those that are greater in goodness, and the less to those of the 
opposite character in respect of goodness and education, it assigns in 
proportion what is fitting to each. Indeed it is precisely this which is 
political justice to us […] not the advantage of a few tyrants, or of one, or 
of some form of democracy, but justice always; and this consists in what we 
                                              
96 This passage has more in common with the Isocrates passage quote above that does the discussion in 
Resp. VIII. Plato does not say anything about harmonic equality in this passage, of course, but it strongly 
resembles his views from Resp. VIII.  
 
I should also note that the geometric mean is mentioned in the Laws and that Plato invokes all three of 
the means in the Timaeus. Interestingly, Proclus, in his commentary on the Timaeus (III.2), claims that 
the geometric mean is embodied in Eunomia (good order), the harmonic in Dikē (justice), and the 
arithemetic in Eirēnē (peace). In Book VIII, the primary concern is with virtue and vice, specifically 
with respect to justice – so, even though the geometric mean, in particular, does not always have a 
negative valence in Plato’s political thought, it is not, perhaps, conducive to the kind of justice that Plato 
has in mind here.   
160 
 
have just stated, namely, the natural equality given on each occasion to 
things unequal.  Leg. 757b 8-c 6; 757d 2-5 tr. Saunders 
 
Thus the kallistē democracy described earlier in Republic VIII distributes in a manner 
that is prima facie equal but, at its core, unequal because it doesn’t take into account the 
differences that exist with respect to nature and rearing. A passage from the Iliad, 
quoted by Aristotle in the Politics (1267a) captures, to some extent, the sentiment 
behind Plato’s misgivings about democratic equality: 
 
οὔτ' ἔμεγ' Ἀτρεΐδην Ἀγαμέμνονα πεισέμεν οἴω 
οὔτ' ἄλλους Δαναούς, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἄρα τις χάρις ἦεν 
μάρνασθαι δηΐοισιν ἐπ' ἀνδράσι νωλεμὲς αἰεί.   
ἴση μοῖρα μένοντι καὶ εἰ μάλα τις πολεμίζοι· 
ἐν δὲ ἰῇ τιμῇ ἠμὲν κακὸς ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός· 
 
I don’t believe that Agamemnon, 
Atreus’ son, or any other Argive 
will persuade me, for no thanks are given 
to the man who always fights without rest 
against the enemy. Whether one fights 
or stays behind, the shares are still the same 
Coward and brave man both get equal honor. 
 
A democracy doesn’t value or compensate the honorable man any more than the man 
without honor; an aristocracy, however, does. For Plato, true political justice will 
involve a harmonic mean – and this is fitting, since justice in the city and justice in 
the soul were both described as states of harmonic order. Book VIII, then, gives us 
even more reason to be convinced that Plato did not just choose “harmonia” as a 
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convenient synonym for just any concept of order. Our final step now is to examine 
Plato’s remarks on ‘true’ harmonics before we turn to the culmination of his theories 
on harmonia in the Timaeus.  
 
IV. Mathematics and harmonics in Republic VII 
 
From the Protagoras onwards, Plato is committed to providing a model of knowledge 
and of measurement that is strictly opposed to Protagorean relativism. In Republic VII, 
he takes especial care to connect measure with truth and accuracy, offering a model 
for a theoretical rather than empirical standard of measure. Among the shared 
characteristics of truth and measure is accuracy (akribeia) which is set against anything 
imperfect or unfinished (ateles) (504c; 522 ff.). This accuracy is further linked to 
number and to mathematics for number contains the stability and objectivity that are 
shared by truth and by proper measure (525a). Nowhere is this more apparent than in 
his discussion of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and harmonics in Republic VII. 
However, before we look at the details of this account, it is necessary to briefly 
summarize the metaphysical epistemology introduced in Book VI of the Republic.  
 There, Plato famously argues that knowledge is of intelligible entities that are 
eternal, non-corporeal, and ontologically fundamental; these entities are the Forms 
(idea, eidon). He uses a range of different metaphors and allegories to explain his 
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metaphysics, and I will focus on the so-called ‘Divided Line’ analogy (510a). We are 
asked to imagine a line segment that is bisected into two unequal portions; each of 
these portions is further bisected into two97. The lower part of the line segment 
represents opinions and the world of becoming – the objects in question are sensible 
objects and their images (eikones) : we can only have belief (pistis) with respect to the 
former and imagination (phantasia) with respect to the latter; these are not the objects 
of knowledge and are grasped only by means of our fallible senses. Further, they have 
reality only insofar as they participate in the more ontologically fundamental entities 
represented by the upper part of the line, i.e. the Forms. In the higher part of the line 
segment we have the Forms themselves (culminating in the Form of the Good) at the 
very top and then other eidē in the lower part.  
The Forms and the other eidē can only be grasped by the intellect (510e). Plato 
also distinguishes between two epistemic states that we have with respect to the objects 
represented by the higher portion of the line: noesis and dianoia, both of which are 
species of contemplative thought; dianoia, however, requires sensible objects as images 
because it studies its objects by using the hypothetical method whereas noesis moves 
through the Forms directly (510-511). According to Mueller (1992, p. 184), these two 
                                              
97 Plato claims that the line is first to be divided into two unequal parts, one representing opinion and 
the other knowledge; then, each of the two parts is to be further subdivided, but the subdivisions will 
be proportionate to the original division of the line. So, if the line was divided in a ratio of, say, 2:1, the 
sub-divisions will also be in the ratio of 2:1.  
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kinds of knowing refers to two features of mathematics that are associated especially 
with geometry : “the use of diagrams in arguments and the derivation of conclusions 
from initial assumptions (synthesis).” The Divided Line shows that dialectic requires us 
to ascend from a state of imagination with respect to images to knowledge of the Forms 
via beliefs about sensibles and (perhaps) conjecture about the other Forms, which many 
have taken to be geometrical objects. At any rate, the intelligible Forms remain the 
ultimate objects of knowledge and, among these, the Form of the Good (523b) is 
undeniably the first principle. 
One major puzzle in this analogy is the status of the ‘other’ Forms, and the 
orthodoxy is to view mathematicals as this other class of objects that is distinct from – 
and obviously inferior to – the Forms proper. However, Cornford (1932), for example, 
argues that the only entities above the line are Forms and that the divided line 
represents only an epistemological division – the Forms are, he claims, divided into 
mathematical Forms and moral Forms. While we may indeed grasp them in different 
ways – since mathematics can use visible images – we are not speaking of different 
kinds of entities, he contends. Thesleff (2009, p. 455) remains agnostic, but suggests 
that the ‘other’ Forms could refer to mathematical objects as well as ‘ordinary’ Forms 
(the bed from Republic X, the shuttle from the Cratylus) that are within the grasp of 
some ordinary people as well whereas only the dialectician can ascend to knowledge 
of the Forms themselves. For the time being, however, we need not offer a definitive 
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answer to this rather knotty question – let us simply remind ourselves that the allegory 
of the cave and the analogy of the divided line both illustrate that knowledge is the 
result of a dialectical process and, further, that knowledge is only of intelligible objects; 
even within the realm of intelligibles, there is a hierarchy with the Form of the Good 
at the very top, the other Forms proper below, and other eidē, which may or may not 
include mathematicals, even further below.  
We can now turn to Plato’s remarks about the education of the guardians. The 
educational program described in Books II and III of the Republic did not distinguish 
between the future auxiliaries and the future guardians. However, at the age of 20, the 
best students are separated out and given a further education that requires them to 
study for a period of ten years all the disciplines that together make up the mathematical 
sciences, which are preparatory studies for dialectic (536d-e). After being educated in 
these sciences, the best of those students are to spend 5 years in dialectical questioning 
and then a few of those are to spend 15 years engaged in military and governmental 
affairs – the training of guardians, thus, will only be complete when they are 50 years 
old. Our focus in this section will be the ten years of mathematical education; let us 
first see what he has to see about each of the sciences –  arithmetic, geometry, 
stereometrics, astronomy, and harmonics – before we turn to the implication of his 
emphasis on such an education.  
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 In the order of presentation, arithmetic is discussed as the first science capable 
of raising the soul to the knowledge of Forms. Arithmetic is an art of measurement par 
excellence. In the Protagoras, arithmetic is clearly referred to as a metric, the object of 
which is arithmos, the number and the object of arithmetic is the number, the one and 
multiples. Arithmetic "leads to the truth,” we are told, because it is wholly concerned 
with number (525b 1).  
 It is important, however, not to confuse two kinds of arithmetic – there are 
practical arts that use number but these are not the numbers with which Plato is 
concerned: 
Τοῦτό γε, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὡς σφόδρα ἄνω ποι ἄγει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ 
περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἀναγκάζει διαλέγεσθαι, οὐδαμῇ 
ἀποδεχόμενον ἐάν τις αὐτῇ ὁρατὰ ἢ ἁπτὰ σώματα ἔχοντας ἀριθμοὺς 
προτεινόμενος διαλέγηται. 
 
[Arithmetic] gives the soul a strong lead upward and compels it to discuss 
the numbers themselves, never permitting anyone to propose for discussion 
numbers attached to visible or tangible bodies. 525d 5-8 
 
Philosophical arithmetic is founded on the knowledge of numbers whose nature is 
intelligible (νοητός), that is to say, in the language of the theory of Forms, "numbers 
in themselves". Numbers, according to Plato, are not, though, the first principles of the 
intelligible order. However important numbers might be, Plato does not represent 
intelligible order in the same way as the Pythagoreans supposedly did. The 
Pythagoreans are reported to have made numbers the very principles of reality. 
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Moreover, they gave a physical reality to the numbers that lead to puzzles over the very 
nature of the number. Plato considers that the nature of number is intelligible; yet he 
does not give numbers an ontological and metaphysical primacy. As the image of the 
line shows, number is an intermediate reality between sensible objects and Ideas. 
 Plato endorses a separation between the science of numbers and logistics: this 
separation is due to the very nature of the objects under consideration (525-526). The 
objects of science have an intelligible nature, and are in no way corporeal. On the other 
hand, empirical techniques constitute numerical units based on concrete things and 
bodies, which necessarily introduces approximation and inaccuracy. The main 
difference lies in the establishment of the unit of measurement: the arithmetic unit is 
intelligible, it participates in the One and is characterized by its completion, its identity 
and its indivisibility. All the numbers obey the determination of the unit of measure 
which is the One. On the other hand, "empirical" numbers are constituted from 
imperfect units that are divisible and changeable. It is impossible to grasp any real unity 
from the senses.  
 Geometry, which is discussed next, has the same characteristic. As with 
arithmetic, there are two different types of geometry: one is an "empirical" geometry, 
oriented towards practice and technique, the other is a real science (epistēmē). He finds 
the former category almost absurd: 
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 Λέγουσι μέν που μάλα γελοίως τε καὶ ἀναγκαίως· ὡς γὰρ πράττοντές 
τε καὶ πράξεως ἕνεκα πάντας τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι λέγουσιν 
τετραγωνίζειν τε καὶ παρατείνειν καὶ προστιθέναι καὶ πάντα οὕτω 
φθεγγόμενοι, τὸ δ' ἔστι που πᾶν τὸ μάθημα γνώσεως ἕνεκα 
ἐπιτηδευόμενον.  
 
Well, they say completely ridiculous things about it becausethey are so hard 
up. I mean, they talk as if they were practical people who make all their 
arguments for the sake of action. They talk of squaring, applying, adding, 
and the like; whereas, in fact, the entire subject is practiced for the sake of 
acquiring knowledge.  527a 6 – b 1 
 
Practitioners of geometry make it an applied and technical discipline. This has two 
main consequences: first, the finality in question is practical and not theoretical; second, 
the geometrical object is sensible and corporeal. Consequently, geometrical operations 
and geometrical measurement are empirical and imperfect. Plato advocates, on the 
contrary, a theoretical geometry which deals with geometrical objects in general and 
in an abstract way independently of their sensible manifestations. He therefore views 
geometry as a science with a theoretical end with a clearly identified object – 
“knowledge of what always is, not of something that comes to be and passes away” 
(527b 5).  
While one can see how arithmetic and plane and solid geometry can lead one 
away from sensibles towards intelligibles, it is not immediately obvious how the next 
two sciences that are discussed – astronomy and harmonics – are able to do the same. 
In order to understand this, we need to acknowledge that true astronomy and 
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harmonics, for Plato, will not be concerned with actual empirical observation. There 
is a distinction between the astronomy that has to do with sensibles and the astronomy 
that is theoretical and contemplative and whose objects are intelligible; true astronomy, 
like the other sciences, also compels the soul upwards (529 b) and the same will be true 
of its counterpart, harmonics.  
 The realm of sensibles does not offer sufficient stability to allow inductive 
science because it will always be insufficient and imperfect. Consequently, sensibilia 
are referred to as simple images which are not "true" contrary to the Forms which 
possess a real essence and are immutable. The methodological approach taken by Plato 
quite clear: it is a question of imposing on the phenomena a theoretical model which 
will account for it as far as possible. And if a difference between the two orders existed, 
the cause would be sensible and material imperfection and not intelligible measure. It 
is the intelligible measure which applies to phenomena and governs them. 
 While modern science judges the value of a measurement by its agreement or 
its effectiveness, Plato, on the other hand, judges the first intelligible measure, and it is 
up to the sensible to conform to it: there is a completely opposed direction of fit. In the 
first case, the measure is derived; in the second, it is first and the sensible is derived 
from it. The sensible measurements are then made in the image of the measurements.  
 Spatial movement is not, paradoxically, primarily sensible: it is, first, 
“intelligible" and this, perhaps, is why the intelligible measures of motion are possible 
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in astronomy. Plato claims to go directly from the intelligible to grasping the essence 
of time and space and the movement in space is considered itself as an intelligible reality 
which possesses measures in itself. The work of the philosopher is to be able to grasp 
these measures in themselves and this what the epistemological conception of 
astronomy in the Republic indicates. 
 The movement in astronomy is a spatial movement, the sensuous aspect of 
which is received by the eyes, but the scientific knowledge of movement reveals a 
second science of movement: harmonia. This second science corresponds to a second 
"species" (eidos) of movement defined once again by the sense organ that allows its 
sensible intuition, i.e. the ears. For Plato, harmonia reveals the measures of the 
"harmonic movement" (ἐναρμόνιος φορά): 
 Κινδυνεύει, ἔφην, ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν ὄμματα πέπηγεν,  ὣς πρὸς 
ἐναρμόνιον φορὰν ὦτα παγῆναι, καὶ αὗται ἀλλήλων  ἀδελφαί τινες αἱ 
ἐπιστῆμαι εἶναι, ὡς οἵ τε Πυθαγόρειοί  φασι καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὦ Γλαύκων, 
συγχωροῦμεν 
 
It is probable that as the eyes fasten on astronomical motions, so the ears 
fasten on harmonic ones, and that these two sciences are somehow akin, as 
the Pythagoreans say98. 530d 6-7 
 
Astronomy and harmonic science have in common the fact that they bear on objects 
in motion. However, this movement is not erratic and irregular, but one that obeys 
intelligible measures and proportions. These two sciences are sisters in that they 
                                              
98 This is, presumably, a reference to Fr. 1 of Archytas. 
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discover the measures and the proportions which govern the intelligible relations 
between their elements. Plato holds the harmonic practitioners, the ones whom 
Glaucon describes as “putting ears before understanding,” in as much contempt as he 
does the empirical mathematicians and astronomers: 
ἢ οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι καὶ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἕτερον τοιοῦτον ποιοῦσι; τὰς γὰρ 
ἀκουομένας αὖ συμφωνίας καὶ φθόγγους ἀλλήλοις ἀναμετροῦντες 
ἀνήνυτα, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀστρονόμοι, πονοῦσιν. […] Σὺ μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοὺς 
χρηστοὺς λέγεις τοὺς ταῖς χορδαῖς πράγματα παρέχοντας καὶ 
βασανίζοντας, ἐπὶ τῶν κολλόπων στρεβλοῦντας· ἵνα δὲ μὴ μακροτέρα ἡ 
εἰκὼν γίγνηται πλήκτρῳ τε πληγῶν γιγνομένων καὶ κατηγορίας πέρι 
καὶ ἐξαρνήσεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας χορδῶν, παύομαι τῆς εἰκόνος καὶ οὔ 
φημι τούτους λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνους οὓς ἔφαμεν νυνδὴ περὶ ἁρμονίας 
ἐρήσεσθαι. ταὐτὸν γὰρ ποιοῦσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἀστρονομίᾳ· τοὺς γὰρ ἐν 
ταύταις ταῖς συμφωνίαις ταῖς ἀκουομέναις ἀριθμοὺς ζητοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ 
εἰς προβλήματα ἀνίασιν, ἐπισκοπεῖν τίνες σύμφωνοι ἀριθμοὶ καὶ τίνες 
οὔ, καὶ διὰ τί ἑκάτεροι.   
 
Or don’t you know that people do something similar with harmonia, too? 
They measure audible concordances and sounds against one another, and 
so labor in vain, just like astronomers.[…] You mean those excellent fellows 
who vex their strings, torturing them and stretching them on pegs. I won’t 
draw out the analogy by speaking of blows with the pick, or the charges 
laid against strings that are too responsive or too unresponsive. Instead, I 
will drop the analogy and say that I do not mean these people, but the ones 
we just said we were going to question about harmonics. You see, they do 
the same as the astronomers do. I mean, it is in these audible concordances 
that they search for numbers, but they do not ascend to problems or 
investigate which numbers are in concord and which are not, or what the 
explanation is in each case. 531 a-c 
 
Both the ear and the eye have no value for Plato because theorizing does not 
consist in establishing empirical laws. The empirical method is once again relegated to 
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the status of non-science. This method is denounced as inefficient and by definition 
incomplete and imperfect (ateles) (530e 5). The object of the harmonic science is clearly 
identified: to measure (anametrountes) the relations between sounds (531a 2). Harmonia 
establishes the measurements and proportions (expressed by symphōnia) between the 
sounds in a theoretical and contemplative way independently of the sensations.  The 
question of the interval (diastēma) is fundamental since it determines the unit of 
measure from which the relations and proportions between the sounds will be 
established and the interval has nothing to do with empirical investigations99. This also 
reminds us of the Philolaic relationship between harmonia and number – even though 
Philolaus spoke of musical intervals to illustrate what he meant by harmonia, its musical 
instantiation was clearly just that, i.e. an instantiation of a principle that had little to do 
with audible consonances. 
 The difference between the method denounced by Plato and the one he 
advocates lies in the fact that the former does not relate to the numbers in themselves 
but to the sensible sounds themselves which are then expressed in numbers. Now, the 
sounds themselves cannot be the object of a perfect and exact science. Only a study of 
numbers in itself makes it possible to establish science. The harmonia in question, then, 
is not a harmonia of sounds, but a harmonia of numbers that audible harmonia imitates 
                                              
99 For more on Platonic intervals see Wersinger (2004) 
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to the best of its ability – but it is a mere imitation. Plato, introduces, therefore, into 
numbers the very notions of harmonia, consonance, and harmonious proportion.  
 We might, however, wonder about the rationale for his denunciation of 
empirical sciences and for the insistence on the guardians being educated for a very 
long period of time in these theoretical sciences. Although he says that none of these 
sciences will be useless for the auxiliaries (521d), practical application of these sciences 
is obviously not Plato’s primary concern. As Myles Burnyeat (2000) has argued, 
compellingly and at length, education in these sciences is important because they are 
somehow constitutive of the Good.  The first thing to note is that Plato groups all these 
as adelphai technai as early as the divided line analogy (511 d) – this idea is then 
reinforced through his treatment of them later in Book VII. As we’ve seen above, all 
these sciences are said to orient the soul upwards and throughout Book VII the goals 
of these are described variously as being as it really is (521d), truth (525b, 526c, 527e), 
and what is eternal (527b).  On the basis of the allegories of the sun and the cave and 
the analogy of the divided line, this movement upwards culminates in the Form of the 
Good. That, then, must be the end of the sciences that are to be a part of the guardians’ 
curriculum, since it is unqualified being that always is and that is ontologically 
fundamental.  
 Studying these disciplines is important because it prevents us from getting 
bogged down in the world of sensible entities and, worse, confusing sensibilia with 
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reality and opinion with knowledge. These mathematical sciences, of which harmonics 
is one, are, thus, the key to dialectic. With this in place, we are now in a position to 




 APPENDIX: The (in)famous Platonic number in Republic VIII 
 
In my discussions above, I did not discuss a passage in which Plato refers to harmoniai 
in the context of political degeneracy. I left this passage out since Plato does not use it 
in any way to explain his later claims about political degeneracy. However, it does 
offer us yet another token of harmonia even if its meaning is far from clear. The passage 
is as follows: 
 
ἔστι δὲ θείῳ μὲν γεννητῷ περίοδος ἣν ἀριθμὸς περιλαμβάνει τέλειος, 
ἀνθρωπείῳ δὲ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι, 
τρεῖς  ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὅρους λαβοῦσαι ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ 
ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων, πάντα προσήγορα καὶ 
ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναν· ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεὶς 
δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται τρὶς αὐξηθείς, τὴν μὲν ἴσην ἰσάκις, ἑκατὸν 
τοσαυτάκις, τὴν δὲ ἰσομήκη μὲν τῇ, προμήκη δέ, ἑκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν 
ἀπὸ διαμέτρων ῥητῶν πεμπάδος, δεομένων ἑνὸς ἑκάστων, ἀρρήτων δὲ 
δυοῖν, ἑκατὸν δὲ κύβων τριάδος.  
 
Now, for the birth of a divine creature there is a cycle comprehended by a 
perfect number; while for a human being, it is the first number in which 
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are found increases involving both roots and powers, comprehending three 
intervals and four terms, of factors that cause likeness and unlikeness, cause 
increase and decrease, and make all things mutually agreeable and rational 
in their relations to one another. Of these factors, the base ones—four in 
relation to three, together with five—give two harmoniai when thrice 
increased. One is a square, so many times a hundred. The other is of equal 
length one way, but oblong. One of its sides are 100 squares of the rational 
diameter of five each diminished by one, or alternatively 100 squares of the 
irrational diameter each diminished by two. The other side is 100 cubes of 
three. This whole geometrical number controls better and worse births. 
546b 4- c8 tr. Adam (1900) 
 
Cicero, in a letter to Atticus (VII.13a) tells him that he could not solve his riddle since 
“est enim numero Platonis obscurius” (referring, presumably, to the number discussed 
in this passage) and Adam (1902) describes this passage as “notoriously the most 
difficult in his writings”. While Adam’s claim is somewhat of an exaggeration (one can 
think of quite a few passages in his later works that give one pause), it is undeniable 
that the meaning is somewhat opaque100. We can begin with a straightforward 
explanation of the arithmetic before turning to more esoteric matters.  
Adam (1902: 264-9) begins his explication by reminding us of the Pythagorean 
right-angled triangle, which, according to Proclus was ‘life-giving’ and whose sides 
are 3 and 4. The hypoteneuse is, thus, 5 since its sides are 3 and 4 and its area will be 
six – (4X3) /2. The first number that Plato speaks of is the sum of 3 cubed, 4 cubed, 
                                              
100 There are a formidable number of commentaries on this passage; apart from Adam, whom I discuss, 
modern commentators include Dupuis (1881), Cousin (1834: 324 ff.), Diès (1926), Ahlvers (1952), 
Brumbaug (1954), Coumoundouros (2009), Mohr (1981), Allen (1994), Kayas (1972), Bremer (2000), 
and Švajdak (1988). Proclus and Marsilio Ficino also discuss this at length. 
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and 5 cubed : 216. Aristotle (Pol. V) speaks of 216 as the number in question as does 
Aristides Quintilianus; the latter adds the 216 is nearly the number of the gestation of 
the seven-month child. Evidence from Censorinus (discussed in Chapter 1) suggests 
that the gestation of a seven-month child was exactly 210. Adam offers extensive 
support for taking 216 to be the number in question and I see no problem with his 
arguments. The attributes of these numbers is more problematic but we will discuss 
that later.  
We can now turn to the next number. First, we are expected to take 3, 4, and 
5 together; their product is the number 60. 60, when “thrice increased” (60x60x60x60) 
gives us the number 12960000, which corresponds to one year in the life of the 
universe101. The number 12960000 is then said to provide us with two harmonia – the 
first must be the 3600, since 36 is “equal an equal number of times”  and this is then to 
be multiplied by 100;  12960000 can be resolved into 3600 (since it is 3600 squared). 
The other harmonia is the one represented by the oblong. First, we arrive at the number 
7 since the rational diameter of 5 is 7 – the diameter of a square with the side 5 would 
be square root 50 and square root 49 is the closest rational number to it since it yields 
7. He is thus talking about a hundred squares with the side 7; this gives us 7x7x100, 
which is 4900; each of the hundred squares, however, is diminished by 1, so we are 
then left with 4800. The other side is a hundred cubes of 3, namely 2700. 12960000 
                                              
101 Cf. the myth of the Statesman (269 c – 274 e).  
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obtains when we multiply 4800 and 2700. Thus the two harmonia that the second 
number yields will be represented by a square of the side 3600 and an oblong with the 
sides 4800 and 2700. So much for the mathematical explanations. We are now left with 
the more vexing problem of the significance of this passage, which includes the question 
of why these two solid figures are called harmoniai. 
The significance of 216 consists mostly in the fact that it is close to a seven-
month long gestation; it is thus fitting to be the number for human animals. 216 was 
also seen by the Pythagoreans as a ‘nuptial’ number since it was the cube of the number 
6 and the number 6 was the product of the first male number, 3, and the first female 
number, 2 as well as being a perfect number (it is the sum of its factors: 1,2, and 3).  
216 has many other properties, including the fact that it is produced by multiplying 6 
and 36, the latter of which is the sum of the Pythagorean tetraktys and is also an 
important number in embryology and the former of which has just been discussed102.   
In connection with this, we might also recall the discussion of the seven-month 
child in Chapter 1. There, I mentioned that the Pythagoreans, according to 
Censorinus, believed in four stages of fetal development: for the first six days, the seed 
turns into a milky humor; during the following eight days, this humor turns into blood; 
then after nine more days the blood is turned into hair; finally, after twelve days, the 
                                              
102 There are many aspects of so-called Pythagorean number mysticism that could be brought to bear 
upon this discussion but I would direct the reader to Adam (1900) for more details since that would lead 
us a little astray from the point at hand. 
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human form appears. The numbers in question are 6, 8, 9, and 12: the ratio of 8:6 is 
that of the fourth, of 9:6 that of the fifth, and 12:6 that of the octave. Furthermore, the 
sum of these numbers (6+8+9+12), i.e. 35, when multiplied by 6 gives us the number 
210, which is one of the two possible number of days of gestation. The number 35, 
according to Plutarch’s commentary on the Timaeus, is a “harmonia” since it contains 
all the harmoniai of a scale – 210, thus, contains six harmoniai and 216, our number, 
contains these harmoniai along with the nuptial number 6. 
Now for the second number and the two harmoniai that it contains. In order to 
make sense of this, I think that it is a good idea to follow Adam, who looks to the 
Statesman for some more elucidation. It is in famous myth (Pol. 268e ff.)  that we find 
our elusive numbers. At the end of the Gorgias, Socrates speaks of the age of Cronos 
being replaced by the age of Zeus; the former age consisted of unjust judges and 
entailed the living judging each other at the end of their lives whereas the latter age 
consisted of just judges and the souls of Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus would 
pronounce judgment on mortal souls. We have reason to read the Statesman myth 
against the backdrop of the earlier myth. In the Statesman, the young Socrates and the 
Eleatic Stranger are having a conversation about the definition of a true statesman; one 
of the definitions describes the statesman as a kind of shepherd or rearer and the myth’s 
purpose is to distinguish the statesman from other rearers. The Eleatic Stranger 
describes the cosmos as consisting of two circular movements that are in opposite 
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directions and succeed from one another and which give birth to the divine age as well 
as to things as they are (Pol. 270 b-d)103. We will discuss these circular movements in 
more detail when we turn to the Timaeus. In this myth, the first age (that of Cronos) 
is part of the reverse cycle, with people being born old and growing younger until 
they disappear; the second age, where we are “now” has the universe moving forwards, 
with people being born young and aging. The Stranger describes a continuous 
alteration between these two ages.  
Adam points out that the two ages in the Statesman myth are described as being 
very long periods or more or less equal length; the same is true of the two harmoniai in 
the Republic. They both (3600 squared and 4800x2700) are equivalent to the massive 
number 12960000. The first age, in which harmony and concord dominates, can be 
linked to the square (with its equal sides) and the second age, in which discord and 
disharmony prevails, can be linked to the unequal oblong. Thus the harmoniai here 
refer to immensely long cycles. Each of these numbers is also the product of the 
Pythagorean triangle (3x4x5) raised to the power of four; this triangle was, as I 
mentioned earlier, seen as zoogonic. Adam also, interestingly, sees in these numbers a 
faithful representation of the analogy between the microcosm and macrocosm. He cites 
                                              
103 Brisson (1976), Carone (2004), and Rowe (1995) all offer an alternative reading of the myth, in which 
there are three cycles rather than two – these debates, however, are beyond my scope and I retain the 




evidence from the Laws (758b) that Plato counted 360 days in an ordinary year and 
that the duration of the ages is 360 squared multiplied by 10 squared; 10 is, of course, 
the Pythagorean perfect number. 12960000 days is, on the basis of a 360-day year, 
36000 years – the duration of a human life was seen by Plato as being 100 years or 
36000 days; thus a day in the life a mortal corresponds to a year in the cosmic age. 
Finally, since 35 was a harmonia (on account of including all the intervals), 36 is a 
harmonia plus 1 (the number that is the ruler of all, according to a tradition of 
Pythagorean number mysticism); the cosmic age is then has 360000 harmoniai plus 



















 While the Republic and the Timaeus were most likely composed more than a 
decade (if not two) apart — the present orthodoxy being that the Republic is a middle-
period dialogue and the Timaeus a late one104 —  there are undeniable thematic and 
doctrinal similarities between the two. One could argue, pace Cornford, that Plato tries 
to reinforce the connection between the two dialogues by repeatedly invoking the 
discussions of the Republic and using the word “chthes” (yesterday) in connection with 
this — yesterday’s guests (17a 2), yesterday’s hospitality (17b 2), yesterday’s discussion 
(17c 1), what was said yesterday (19a 7), and yesterday’s request (20b 1) for an account 
of the constitution. This use of “yesterday” seems to indicate Plato’s intention to 
underscore the closeness of the contents of the Republic and the Timaeus – even though 
we have reason to believe that decades elapsed between the composition of the two 
dialogues, the dramatic date of the Timaeus is just the day after the that of the Republic.  
Even if we disregard the above, many of the problems and questions raised in 
the Republic are treated in the Timaeus. Plato had proposed an ideal city in the Republic 
                                              
104 While GEL Owen (1953) and others tried to argue that the Timaeus was a middle dialogue, I am 
convinced by the arguments offered by Cherniss (1957) and there seems to be little contemporary 
disagreement about the dating of the Timaeus.  
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and, from what we know, he tried and failed to educate a philosopher-king in Sicily 
after writing the Republic and most likely before writing the Timaeus. The beginning 
of the Timaeus — the ‘Myth of Atlantis’ — can be seen as an illustration of his ideal polis. 
His arguments for psychological dualism and his account of a tripartite soul in the 
Republic were not as fully fleshed out as they could have been, especially given how 
radical the latter probably was. These receive extensive treatment in the Timaeus (68e-
70a). Even Plato’s doctrine of forms resurfaces (explicitly) in the Timaeus and is 
explained in a clearer manner (27d-28a, 49a, 52a,d etc.). The doctrine of the Forms and 
the account of transmigration of souls seems to connect the Timaeus to the Phaedo as 
well.  
With the exception of the Philebus (which might have been written after the 
Timaeus), there is just about no discussion of harmonia in any dialogue composed after 
the Republic and before the Timaeus. I take the significance of harmonia in the Timaeus 
to be yet another piece of evidence that there is a strong doctrinal affinity between the 
Republic and the Timaeus. The treatment of psychological harmonia and cosmological 
harmonia in the Timaeus is also the most fully-fledged account that we encounter in 
the Platonic corpus. We finally see how harmonia functions at all levels from the 
universe down to the human body and also learn what the different harmoniai have in 




I. The cosmogonical account of the Timaeus 
 
 At the beginning of the Timaeus, we are presented with a likely story (eikos 
mythos)105 about the origins and structure of the universe. According to this picture, a 
Demiurge created the soul of the world (τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχήν) in accordance with 
harmonic ratios and then fitted it to the world body. The World Soul “shares in reason 
and harmonia [and] is the best of things brought into being by the most excellent of 
things intelligible and eternal” (37a 1-2). The Demiurge also crafted the human soul 
along the same lines as the World Soul (42a); the human soul, then, has the same 
harmonic order as the world soul. However, since the human soul is contained within 
an imperfect human body, it eventually becomes disorderly (41a–d). We are then told 
that audible harmonia functions as “an ally against the inward discord that has come 
into the revolution of the soul, for the sake of bringing it into order and consonance 
with itself” (47c 7–d 7). In this section, I will describe the cosmogonical account of the 
Timaeus, with particular emphasis on the harmonia of the world-soul. I will discuss the 
human soul in the following section.  
 The account begins with a distinction that will be immediately familiar to anyone 
who has read Books VI and VII of the Republic:  
Ἔστιν οὖν δὴ κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν πρῶτον διαιρετέον τάδε· τί τὸ ὂν ἀεί, 
γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν  ἀεί, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε; τὸ μὲν 
δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν, τὸ δ' αὖ δόξῃ μετ' 
                                              
105 See Cornford (1935, p. 30) on the pre-Platonic usages of eikōs.  
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αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστόν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ  
οὐδέποτε ὄν. 
 
We must then, in my judgment, first make this distinction: what is that 
which is always real and has no becoming and what is that which is always 
becoming and is never real? That which is apprehensible by thought with 
a rational account is the thing that is always unchangeably real; whereas 
that which is the object of belief together with unreasoning sensation is the 
thing that becomes and passes away but never has real being. 27d 5 – 28a 
3106 
 
This distinction between being and becoming is one of the fundamental postulates of 
Plato’s philosophy and maps onto the distinctions between the intelligible and the 
sensible and, correlatively, knowledge and opinion. I will go on to argue that harmonia, 
properly speaking, belongs to the first of these series of pairs, and this is made even 
clearer in the Philebus’ discussion of measure: measure is self-identical and introduces 
limit, equality, and commensurability into entities and it belongs to epistemē as opposed 
to sensation. As I hope to show, harmonia has an intelligible essence – even though 
there are many instantiations of harmoniai – and this intelligible essence allows it to 
realize its cosmic function.  
 According to Timaeus, the Demiurge, the intelligent creator-god, must look to 
the image of something stable and enduring in creating the world because something 
that is always becoming and changing will not be good – again, the idea that 
something stable and eternal is good, whereas something lacking stability is not, will 
                                              
106 All translations are after Cornford (1935) unless otherwise indicated.  
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not be an unfamiliar one for a reader of Plato. Furthermore, the description of creating 
something from a model puts one in mind of  a passage in the Sophist about image-
making:  
Μίαν μὲν τὴν εἰκαστικὴν ὁρῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τέχνην. ἔστι δ' αὕτη μάλιστα 
ὁπόταν κατὰ τὰς τοῦ παραδείγματος συμμετρίας τις ἐν μήκει καὶ πλάτει 
καὶ βάθει, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι χρώματα ἀποδιδοὺς τὰ προσήκοντα 
ἑκάστοις, τὴν τοῦ μιμήματος γένεσιν ἀπεργάζηται.    
 
One art that I see contained in it is the making of likenesses. The perfect 
example of this consists in creating a copy that conforms to the proportions 
(symmetria) of the original in length, breadth, and height and in giving 
moreover the appropriate color to every part. Sophist 235d 5- e1 
 
 
Thus, measure will be of great importance in creating a copy of something. Even 
though the discussion in the Sophist is about creating a sensible copy of a sensible entity, 
a similar principle will presumably be followed in creating a sensible copy of something 
intelligible. The key point to note is that it is the proportions that are copied since they 
are seen as an essential aspect of the original. The other point to note is that proportions 
have the ability to be transposed from one entity to another – something sensible could 
never come close to something intelligible in its content; it can, however, have the 
identical structure, where structure is understood as a system of proportions.  
 Plato returns to the questions of models at 30c where we are told that the model 
that the craftsman uses is the generic Form of the “intelligible living creature” which 
contains within it Forms of subordinate species. The defining features of this living 
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creature are its unity and its uniqueness (31a-b) which are, then, copied into the 
sensible world by the Demiurge; a unity that encompasses (periechein) many parts and 
in light of which the parts are organized is the principle and the measure of all things. 
There is a clear contrast between perfect/imperfect, one/many, and limited/unlimited, 
with the first member of these pairs always being given a positive valence and the 
second a negative one; it is clear that harmonia belongs to the former since it represents 
unification, limitation, and completeness.  
 In the early part of the dialogue, Plato also distances himself from a kind of 
Democritean cosmology when he argues that the world comes to be through the 
intervention of a rational divine intellect and not merely by chance. He acknowledges 
the existence of two kinds of causes, one of which is a final cause, to use Aristotelian 
terminology, and the other of which is necessity(47-48). Plato does not think that the 
universe comes to be the way it is by mere chance, but rather through a rational process 
in which notions of measure – specifically harmonia – play a crucial role. Nowhere is 
this more evidence than in his description of the creation of the world’s soul. The soul 
is described as the seat of intelligence (30b) and that which gives life to the ordered 
whole; the Demiurge creates a soul within the body and places reason within this soul 
(30b).  
 The world’s soul, which gives motion and rationality to the world as a whole, is 
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itself a mixture of intermediates107: 
τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ 
σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ 
συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταὐτοῦ φύσεως αὖ πέρι καὶ τῆς τοῦ  
ἑτέρου, καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ συνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ 
τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ· καὶ τρία λαβὼν αὐτὰ ὄντα 
συνεκεράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμεικτον 
οὖσαν εἰς ταὐτὸν συναρμόττων βίᾳ.  
 
Between the indivisible Being that is ever in the same state and the 
divisible Being that comes to be in bodies, he compounded a third form 
of Being composed of both. Again, in the case of Same and in that of 
Different, he also on the same principle made a compound intermediate 
between that kind of them which is indivisible and the kind that is 
divisible in bodies. Then taking the three, he blended them all into a 
unity forcing the nature of Different, hard as it was to mingle, into union 
with Same, and mixing them together with Being. Timaeus, 34c 4 – 35c 
10 
 
The passage tells us what the relata of world-soul’s harmonia are — three of the five 
                                              
107 As almost every modern commentator has noted, this passage is crucial for understanding the doctrine 
of the soul presented in the Timaeus, but, in the words of Plotinus (Enn. IV.ii.2), it is “to theiōs ēnigmēnon” 
and it has caused much scholarly dispute, beginning with Xenocrates and Crantor, and continuing until 
the present day. One of the main problems concerns the ingredients of the soul and, consequently, the 
number of mixtures that the Demiurge makes. Matters are further complicated because of grammatical 
difficulties and the use of highly metaphorical language. The primary problem concerns “au peri” in 35a 
4 and it seems to have divided commentators, ancient and modern. R.D. Archer-Hind (1888, pp. 106-
7) and A.E.  Taylor  (1932, pp.  107)  seem  to  think  that  “au peri”  is  “clearly”  to  be  omitted  even 
though  every  extant  manuscript  retains  it  as  do  the  commentaries  of  Proclus  and Plutarch. If we 
omit the words, we can see why Archer-Hind claimed that hē ameristos ousias is identical to tauton  
and peri ta…meristē  is identical to thateron;   he   doesn’t   recognize   tauton  and   thateron as   logically   
distinct   kinds, denying that each is combined into an intermediate form in the same way that ousia 
is.  Paul Shorey (1889, 52-3) objects to this reading, pointing out that we ought to avoid “rashly 
identifying apparent synonyms” since the Timaeus treats “different words as different entities”; to 
construe the passage as Archer-Hind does means that “some of the  meaning  escapes.” G.M.A.  Grube  
(1932)  echoes  this  view.  Archer-Hind  finds support in Sextus Empiricus and Cicero (in translation), 
who omit the words. However, as Luc Brisson (1974) points out, Cicero is hardly a reliable translator 
and Sextus also omits “gignomenēs” and “en mesō” for no obviously good reason. Grube (1932), F.M. 
Cornford  (1937),  and  Brisson  (1974),  inter  alia,  offer  excellent  arguments  for  retaining “au peri”. 
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megistē genē described in the Sophist, namely Being (ousia), Same (tauton), and Different 
(thateron). These three are distinct kinds and each of them has an indivisible, a divisible, 
and an intermediate form; the soul is constructed out of the intermediate forms of each 
of the three. On the one hand, we have eternal, noetic ‘Being,’ which is indivisible, 
and on the other hand we have phenomenal ‘Being,’ which is divisible. The first 
element of the soul is an intermediate between the two kinds of Being (ousia). The 
Demiurge then creates an intermediate Same and an intermediate Different in the same 
way as intermediate Being. He then takes these three mixtures — the intermediates, 
that is — and makes a single uniform mixture out of them.  
 The soul is an intermediate entity since it possesses the properties of the 
intelligible and is, at the same time, in motion. It is, thus, by means of the soul that the 
Demiurge will be able to apply spatio-temporal harmonic proportions as well as 
measures of movement to all entities; the world-soul is that which communicates 
proportion to all sensible things and allows a commensurability between the intelligible 
and the sensible. The order and regularity of things which lend themselves to 
measurement do not originate in material necessity, but only in the soul and in the 
intelligence (nous) which is found in it. The measured and measurable nature of the 
world, and the possibility of submitting this world to mathematical measurement as far 
as possible, do not come from a material principle but from a spiritual principle which 
is the soul and the intellect installed in it. The nous possessed by the soul allows it to 
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harmonically organize the entire cosmos: 
καὶ τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα ὁρατὸν οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἀόρατος μέν, 
λογισμοῦ δὲ μετέχουσα καὶ ἁρμονίας ψυχή, τῶν νοητῶν ἀεί τε ὄντων 
ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀρίστη γενομένη τῶν γεννηθέντων. 
 
Now the body of the heaven has been created visible; but [the soul] is 
invisible, and, as a soul having part in reason and harmonia, is the best of 
things brought into being by the most excellent of things intelligible and 
eternal.  36e 5 – 37a 2 
 
The soul, therefore, participates in both intelligible and sensible beings and it thus has 
a perfection that is linked to the rational capacity to reason and to calculate and it is 
also a harmonia that is a result of its inner measure and its orientation towards the Good. 
This passage is also significant in that it identifies harmonia (and logismos) as eternal 
intelligibles that the soul participates (metechein) in, if we follow the reading of Proclus 
who, in his commentary on this passage, takes “τῶν νοητῶν ἀεί” with “λογισμοῦ… 
καὶ ἁρμονίας”.  
 The Timaeus also spells out the harmonia of the soul in the language of 
mathematical harmonics for the first time in the Platonic corpus. We’ve encountered 
the idea of a good soul that possesses harmonia in the Republic as well as the Phaedo and 
the Republic gave us reason to believe that the harmonia with which Plato was 
concerned was not merely a sensible harmonia; however, we were not told a great deal 
about what this harmonia entailed other than a particular manner of structuring a 




 Harmonic structure is introduced into the soul in different stages (35-37). In 
keeping with the metallurgical metaphor (cf. Brisson 1974, pp. 36-41), the demiurge 
takes the amalgam of the soul stuff and divides it according to intervals, begin with the 
monad (1), the double of this (2), then three times the monad (3), then double the 
second (4), then three times the third (9), then eight times the first (8), and finally 
twenty seventh times the first (27). 1 2 4 8 have double intervals between them whereas 
1 3 9 27 have triple intervals between them.  Further, there are two middle terms in 
each interval, again constituted from the same mixed material. The numbers can be 
arranged into the sacred tetraktys, which is a triangular figure consisting of points 
arranged in four rows; this was, supposedly, an important symbol in the Pythagorean 
tradition. 
 Next, the Demiurge puts harmonic and arithmetic means in the double and triple 
intervals108. It is at this point that we start to approach a scale : a series of neighboring 
tones109. The placement of these means produces ratios corresponding to the musical 
fourth (4:3), the fifth (3:2) and the tone (9:8). After this, the Demiurge ‘fills’ all the 4:3 
                                              
108 The arithmetic mean can be explained as: b=a+c/2. The harmonic mean is: b=2ac/a+c.  For 2 and 3, 
the arithmetic mean is 5/2; the harmonic mean is 12/5. There is no mention of arithmetic and harmonic 
means in the text itself, but every interpreter has assumed that these are the means alluded to.  
 
109 Modern commentators all tend to assume that Plato describes here the Dorian form. This, however, 
is not obvious from the text alone and commentators, ancient and medieval, (e.g. Plutarch, Proclus, and 




ratios with the ratio of the tone. This leaves us with the leimma (literally, ‘the left-
over’)110 or the ratio of the semi-tone, which Pythagorean musical tradition identifies 
with the ratio of 243:256. The placement of the numbers corresponding to the semi-
tones is the third and final step. The leimmata 512:486 and 768:729 are two and three 
times the leimma in lowest terms, 256:243. The numbers 384 through 768 define a 
diatonic scale in lowest terms111. 
 In the end, the amalgam of the soul-stuff is cut into two strips, which are then 
fixed together in an ‘X’ and bent back into a circle (36b-d). Each of these circles is then 
given a particular motion — Same to the outer and Different to the inner. The inner 
circle is sub-divided into seven concentric circles, which depend on the outer circle 
for their motion; they move at different speeds in the same direction.  The circle of the 
Same governs the cognitive powers of the soul with respect to intelligible entities and 
the circle of the Different governs the cognitive powers of the soul with respect to 
sensible entities. It is not the case that the soul is just made up of various ingredients. 
These are ingredients divided up into harmonic intervals and imbued with a particular 
kind of motion that has a particular kind of task.  
                                              
110 Plato doesn’t use “λεῖμμα” which is a technical term in harmonic theory (and one which Proclus uses 
in his commentary to the Timaeus),  but he does use the verb “λείπω” to describe what is left over. 
 
111 A full technical account is beyond my scope here. Jacques Handschin (1950) offers an excellent 
discussion of the technicalities of this passage and also presents a fairly comprehensive survey of the 
readings of various commentators although he does, I contend, misidentify the material components of 




 Several ancient commentators on these passages of the Timaeus have claimed that 
the soul, for Plato, is a mathematical object since, like mathematical objects, it occupies 
an intermediate space between being and becoming112. Furthermore, the soul is 
structured according to a harmonia; this is not, however, some audible harmonia but 
rather an ideal harmonia that is related to number. However, as Brisson (1974, pp. 324-
5) rightly notes, this reading is based partly on Aristotle’s assertion that, for Plato, 
numbers occupy an intermediate space between the sensible and the intelligible and 
such a reading is based on a misinterpretation of the Divided Line in Republic VII 
which, although somewhat ambiguous about the ontological status of numbers, places 
them firmly in the intelligible realm and not somewhere in between the intelligible 
and sensible. We must not make the same mistake as Simmias in simply asserting that 
the soul is a harmonia – recall that the structure of the soul is only part of what it is and 
the discussion of its harmonics has been preceded by an account of its composition. 
The most neutral reading, for our purposes, is that the soul of the world is a mixture, 
composed out of intermediate Being, Same, and Different and then organized 
according to a harmonic structure; this is not the same thing as identifying it with a 
harmonia or equating it to a mathematical entity. 
 From our discussions above, we can see that the soul is a composition, a mixture, 
a gathering. It is not a first principle which possesses a proper and independent nature. 
                                              
112 For example: Plutarch, de an. 1023b ff., and Proclus In Tim. 11, 153. 
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On the contrary, it is the result of a composition between, on the one hand, the 
intelligible and the indivisible, and, on the other hand, the corporeal and the divisible. 
The soul acquires the properties of the intelligible –  unity and perfection – but it also 
acquires the properties of the sensible – becoming and divisibility. Now it is this 
encounter which makes the soul a harmonia in which measure and proportion have a 
fundamental function. This idea is expressed by the proportions that exist within the 
soul. The first principle is in contact with the sensible multitude through the cosmic 
medium of the soul. Having understood what it means for the soul of the world to be 
a harmonia, let us look more closely at the human soul and at Plato’s discussion of 
disorder and chaos.  
II.  The human soul and the human body 
 
 
The human soul is also created by the Demiurge once he has created the world’s soul 
and body as well as the heavenly bodies and the other gods. The Demiurge uses 
leftovers of the same mixture that was used to create the World Soul in order to craft 
the human soul. The description is brief enough to be quoted in full: 
Having said this, he turned again to the same mixing bowl in which he had 
mixed and blended the soul of the universe and poured into it what was left 
of the former ingredients, blending them this time in somewhat the same 
way, only no longer so pure as before, but second or third in degree of 
purity. 
 
Ταῦτ' εἶπε, καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν πρότερον κρατῆρα, ἐν ᾧ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς 
ψυχὴν κεραννὺς ἔμισγεν, τὰ τῶν πρόσθεν ὑπόλοιπα κατεχεῖτο μίσγων 
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τρόπον μέν τινα τὸν αὐτόν, ἀκήρατα δὲ οὐκέτι κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως, 
ἀλλὰ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα. 41d 5-8 
 
It isn’t clear what it means for the human soul to be deutera or trita with respect to its 
purity. Cornford (1937, p. 143) suggests that it doesn’t mean worse and I am inclined 
to agree. The human soul is certainly inferior to the World Soul, but perhaps we are 
best off understanding this as a kind of impurity, much in the way that a metal might 
be baser than another. At any rate, there is no indication that the human soul has a 
different or more inferior kind of structure, and that is all that concerns us here. Recall, 
also, our earlier discussion about the transference of proportions from a model to a 
copy – the substance may differ, but the proportions lend themselves to being 
transposed. The fact that the human soul is structured in the same way as the World 
Soul is not stated here, but it is assumed in the account of the disorderly motion in the 
human soul (43 d), to which I turn next.  
  The most important difference between the World Soul and the human 
soul is that the latter is embodied in an imperfect human body and is consequently 
receptive to external stimulus in a way that the World Soul is not. This human body is 
not created by the Demiurge, who alone is capable of creating incorruptible things, 
but by younger gods. When the World Soul is joined to the body of the world, it 
begins an intelligent life (36 e). On the other hand, the human soul, upon being 
embodied, is assailed by a great number of pleasurable and painful sensations and 
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emotions (42 a ff.) and is subject to violent affections (biaiōn pathēmatōn).   
 We are told that this embodiment causes the revolution of the Same to cease (43 
d) — this is the first mention of the circle of the Same in the human soul and the first 
indication, therefore, that the human soul has the same structure as the World Soul. 
Next, we are told that the harmonic intervals — τὰς τῶν ἡμιολίων καὶ ἐπιτρίτων καὶ 
ἐπογδόων μεσότητας — of the soul are thrown into disarray by this external 
disturbance. We can see this as further confirmation of the fact that the human soul 
has the same harmonic structure as the World Soul. When these intervals are disturbed, 
this causes the circles of the soul to become deformed.  The soul is not governed in any 
way, reason has ceases to function, there is no longer any order in its various motions 
and, for these reasons, “a soul comes to be without intelligence at first, when it is bound 
in a body” (44 b). It is imperative that order be restored and we are told in the following 
passages how this can be done. 
Any reader of the Republic or Laws will be familiar with Plato’s views on the 
didactic potential of music. These works offer lengthy discussions of modes (harmoniai) 
that are and are not suitable for a proper education. In the Timaeus, too, Plato believes 
in the power of music to cultivate the soul, but goes about describing this from a very 
different angle. We have already seen that, as in the Republic, Plato espouses a dualistic 
metaphysics in the Timaeus, since he distinguishes between the intelligible and the 
sensible realms; however, unlike in the Republic, the sensible world occupies a 
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considerable degree of importance and it is perception of sensibilia that ultimately 
allows us to regain intelligible order in our souls. 
A reader  of  Plato’s  earlier  dialogues  will  be  surprised  by  his  claim  that  
sound (phonē) and hearing (akoē) are a god-given gift (θεῶν δεδωρῆσθαι, 47a). This 
follows from  a  passage  where  we  are  told  that  sight,  too,  has  an  ethical  purpose  
—  it  is  not given to us merely so that we may have visual perception; it is given to us 
“so that we may see the revolutions of mind in the heavens and apply them to the cycles 
of our own thought...imitating   the   altogether   unwavering   revolutions   of   the   
divine,   we   may establish soundly their wavering counterparts in ourselves” (47 b-c). 
Hearing and sight are not gifts per se — they are gifts because of the purpose they serve. 
Not everyone will use hearing and sight as gifts.  We are told, next, that: 
λόγος τε γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα τέτακται, τὴν μεγίστην συμβαλλόμενος εἰς 
αὐτὰ μοῖραν, ὅσον τ' αὖ μουσικῆς φωνῇ χρήσιμον πρὸς ἀκοὴν ἕνεκα 
ἁρμονίας ἐστὶ δοθέν. 
 
For not only was speech appointed to this same intent, to which it 
contributes in the largest measure, but also all that part of mousikē that is 
serviceable with respect to the hearing of sound is given for the sake of 
harmonia. 47c 7 – d 2 
 
We know that mousikē was a much broader term than our “music” since its basic 
meaning is simply “any art over which the  Muses  presided”.  Plato emphasizes, 
though,  that  the  art  under  question  concerns  sound which is heard.  Further this 
art is given to us for the sake of harmonia, whose motions are like the revolutions of the 
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human soul (47 d). This harmonia is not merely for  the  sake  of  sensual  pleasure  but  
it  is  meant  to  serve  a  higher  ethical purpose in restoring our disordered soul to its 
original state. While Plato invokes the structure of the human soul here, it seems 
unlikely that he is identifying this harmonia with the suprasensible harmonia according 
to which the Demiurge crafted the World  Soul.  In the first  place,  he  emphasizes  
that  he  is  talking about sound that is perceived by human beings. Furthermore, he 
speaks of people who mistakenly think this  useful  only  insofar  as  they  can  derive  
irrational  pleasure  — hēdonē  —  from  this  harmonia.  It seems unlikely  that  he  
considered  that  the common man would find pleasure in abstract contemplation of 
harmonic ratios or that there was anything irrational about the pleasure derived from 
such a contemplation. Even though the harmonia being discussed in this passage is a 
mere sensible instantiation of a more abstract principle, we should be careful not to 
conflate the two. It is true that sensible harmonia is useful only insofar it allows us to 
ascend to ideal harmonia; nonetheless, this sensible harmonia has an important part to 
play in the restoration of psychic order, as we will see.  
 One of my goals at the outset was to show what, if anything, Plato’s different 
uses of “harmonia” had in common. I argued, in the previous chapter, that all the 
harmoniai in question had something to do with the mathematical harmonics discussed 
in Republic VII. In the Timaeus, we are told that souls participate in harmonia and 
logismos. We are also told that audible harmoniai exist and that they are given to us for 
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the higher purpose of restoring order to the disordered soul.  We are, then, left with 
obvious question: what do the two harmoniai of the Timaeus have in common? In order 
to answer this, we will need to understand how audible harmonia restore intelligible 
harmonia to the human soul. Let us, then, turn to the account of auditory perception 
in the Timaeus.  
 
III. Restoration of order: hearing, music, and the liver 
 
In the Timaeus, perception is, to borrow from Brisson(1997), “a Janus-like 
phenomenon with both a physical and psychological face”; consequently, we must pay 
attention to both aspects. It should also be noted that this account is situated the second 
part of the Timaeus, where the works of necessity (rather than reason) are described. 
According to this account, the objects  of  perception  are  secondary  substances : are  
aggregates  of  the four  elements  —  fire,  water,  air,  earth  —  and  are  responsible  
for  producing  various affections in  human  beings  (56  b-c).  The perception  of  
these  secondary substances is the cause of the initial disorder that human souls are 
thrown into when they are first embodied.   
 Certain affections, such as pleasure, pain, heat, cold, heaviness, and lightness, are 
perceived by the entire body. Other affections have more specialized organs that 
perceive them. For instance, taste is perceived by the tongue, color by the eye, and 
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sound  by  the  ear;  this  is  fairly  intuitive.  However, the  process  doesn’t  end  here.  
All perception ends in another organ — we see with the eye and this perception ends 
in the head, where the actual vision takes place. The same is true of sound — we hear 
with the ear but auditory perception, surprisingly, ends in the liver (67 b). We will 
take a closer look  at this later in the section.   
 In the Timaeus, as in the Republic, Plato offers a tripartite account of the soul. 
However, in the Timaeus, unlike in the Republic, the different parts of the soul are said 
to reside in different parts of the body. Further, the rational part is described as the 
immortal part (49 c-d, 69 c-d, 90a) and the spirited and appetitive as mortal parts. The 
immortal part has its seat in the head; the spirited part has its seat in the region of the 
heart and lungs; the appetitive part has its seat in the region of the belly and liver (69 
c-d).   
 Further, each part of the soul has its own function, which is tied to its physical 
location. The spirited part has its guardroom (δορυφορικὴ οἰκήσις) in the heart which 
is the fountain of blood; when we are agitated in some way, the blood boils, and the 
message is transmitted throughout the body. The lungs, which are in the same part, 
act for the sake of the heart — they cool it when it is boiling so that it can better serve 
the rational part. The seat of the appetitive part is the lower stomach. Here, food and 
drink are collected in order to satisfy our desires. Apart from the stomach itself, the 
liver and spleen are also situated in this part and play important roles. The human body 
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is made up of the same four elements as secondary substances and has its αρχή in the 
marrow (μυελός) (73 b). The organs have not only physiological but also ethical 
purposes. For example, the physiological function of the lungs is the cooling of the blood 
around the heart, but this is for an ultimately ethical purpose: to make the spirit 
responsive to reason (70 c-d)113. 
 Now we know, roughly, what the objects of perception are. We know, also, 
that some are perceived by the entire body whereas others are received by particular 
external organs (ears, eyes, tongue, etc.) and that the perception travels from these to 
parts of the soul that are have their seats in particular parts of the body (head, chest, 
lower abdomen). Further, some organs have specific functions related to the part of the 
soul that is located in their vicinity. The remaining puzzle is the process whereby 
perceptions travel from the external organs to the parts of the soul.   
One likely conjecture is that Plato follows his predecessors by positing that this 
happens via blood vessels. The stomach converts food and drink into blood (79 a); the 
heart, which is the knot (ἃμμα) and the fountain (πηγή) of blood (70 b), is responsible, 
along with the lungs, for pumping it all over the body via narrow channels (πάντων 
τῶν στενωμῶν) (70 a). This reading seems finds support in the definition of sound, 
where sound goes from the ear to the brain and is then conveyed further by blood: 
ὅλως μὲν οὖν φωνὴν θῶμεν τὴν δι' ὤτων ὑπ' ἀέρος ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ 
αἵματος μέχρι ψυχῆς πληγὴν διαδιδομένην, τὴν δὲ ὑπ' αὐτῆς κίνησιν, 
                                              
113 See Steel (2001) for more on the ethical purpose of the human body in the Timaeus.  
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ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς μὲν ἀρχομένην, τελευτῶσαν δὲ περὶ τὴν τοῦ ἥπατος 
ἕδραν, ἀκοήν· 67 a-b 
 
Unfortunately, not much is said, explicitly, about the role of blood vessels in 
perception, but this remains the most likely scenario. 
 So to summarize thus far, an external object, made up of the primary elements, 
causes affections in perceiving beings. In the case of perceptions like sight, hearing, 
and taste, there are specific external organs that receive specific affections. The first 
contact is between the object and the external sense organ. Next, the motion received 
by the sense organ is conveyed to the brain, presumably via the blood vessels. Finally, 
the brain passes this information to the soul; we can infer this final step from the first 
passage on sight, at 45c: 
ὁμοιοπαθὲς δὴ δι' ὁμοιότητα πᾶν γενόμενον, ὅτου τε ἂν αὐτό ποτε 
ἐφάπτηται καὶ ὃ ἂν ἄλλο ἐκείνου, τούτων τὰς κινήσεις διαδιδὸν εἰς 
ἅπαν τὸ σῶμα μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς αἴσθησιν παρέσχετο ταύτην ᾗ δὴ ὁρᾶν 
φαμεν. 
 
And this having become similar because of its similarity, distributes the 
motion of each object it touches or which touch it, through all the body as 
far as the soul and brings about the sense-perception we call seeing. 
(emphasis mine) 
 
Let us now turn to the account of auditory perception in order to see an example of 
the process described above. It should also help us see what it means for sensation to 
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go to (μέχρι) the soul114. Plato’s discussion of sound and hearing at 67a-c is relatively 
straightforward. Sound (φωνη) moves through air, into the ears, then into the brain 
and blood after which it is impressed upon the soul (67a-b). Hearing (ἀκοή) is the 
motion (κίνησις) caused by sound and it ends in the liver, which houses the appetitive 
part of the soul.  As with all perception, there are two aspects to aural perception — the 
purely physiological, which has to do with the interaction of ear drums with external 
air and the psycho-physiological, which has to do with the transmission of this sound 
from the brain to the appetitive part of the soul, housed in the liver.  
 According to the physiological account higher pitches come from swifter 
movements and lower pitches from slower ones; further, regular movements produce  
even (λεῖος) sounds and irregular ones produce harsh (τραχύς) sounds. Plato mentions 
that a discussion of concordance (συμφωνία) will be at a later point in the dialogue; 
this is, indeed, the case if we view 80a as a resumption of his discussion of sound and 
hearing. Here, he explains harmonia in connection with concepts introduced in the 
earlier passage — swiftness and slowness, high and low pitch. We are told that a high 
pitch note and a low pitch note, when heard together, are concordant as long as they 
produce uniform motion in us; notes are discordant when they fail to produce uniform 
motion within us (67a).  
                                              
114 My discussion of perception closely follows that of Barker’s (2000). There are, however, alternative 




 We are told, then, that concordant sound is an imitation of the divine harmonia 
and that all this sound is truly valuable only to the intelligent — even though perception 
isn’t a purely intellectual activity, only the intelligent will derive delight (εὐφροσύνη) 
from it while the unintelligent will only find bodily pleasure (ἡδονή) in it (80a). In the 
Laws, too, we are told how it is not enough to hear ‘sweet harmoniai’; those who know 
take delight in morally good harmoniai which take the kalon as their model.  In order 
to see how the intelligent perceive sound in the Timaeus, we must return to the 
question of how sound is perceived by the liver. 
 On the tripartite model described earlier in this chapter, the spirited part is able 
to communicate with the rational part and is able to be regulated by it because of the 
structure and function of the heart and lungs. However, appetite cannot communicate 
with reason in the way that spirit can, and we need some way to regulate the untamed 
beast that is unable to listen to reason and that is susceptible to all manners of false 
impressions (71a). Since this is a wholly irrational part, the gods found that it could 
communicate with the rational part by means of images, and the liver is responsible for 
receiving and transmitting these images. We are told that its purpose is that “the 
influence proceeding from reason should make impressions of its thoughts upon the 
liver, which would receive them like a mirror and give back visible images" (71 b).  As 
Cornford (1997, p. 282) notes, we should note that the discussion centers around the 
“the purposes organs serve as the seats of feelings and desires that contribute to moral 
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conduct.” The task of the liver is the transformation of concepts (sent to it by the brain) 
into images that are comprehensible to the irrational soul, and all of this is for the 
purpose of being moral.  
 When sound is transmitted to the liver, the liver presumably produces images 
that reflect the sound passed down to it and this must elicit some kind of irrational 
response from the appetitive soul.  This is, perhaps, the case of the unintelligent people 
who only derive pleasure from audible harmonia. But how are we to understand the 
delight of the intelligent ones if it is just the irrational appetite that perceives all sound? 
If audible harmonia allows us to restore order to our souls, it must be because of the 
intelligent ones who recognize it in relation to ideal harmonia.  
 Barker (2000, p. 96 ff.) suggests that we should look at passage in which we are 
told that harmonia gives true delight to intelligent perceivers in its broader context. 
The preceding passages demonstrate how respiration occurs because of the mechanical 
process of periōsis, which Cornford (1997) translates as “circular thrust”. When we 
breathe, there is no void for our breath to go into and so it displaces the nearby air. 
This successive displacement takes place simultaneously so that every time breath is 
expelled, it is replaced as well; this takes place in a circular motion “as a wheel is driven 
round” (79c). This principle can also be used, we are told, to explain other phenomena 
such as the case of medical instruments (79e) and – importantly for our purposes – 
concordant sounds (80a). The movement of hearing is also a cyclical one and, if this is 
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the case, then the sound that goes from the head down to the liver must return, once 
more, to the head where the rational part is capable of recognizing that the audible 
harmonia is an imitation of divine harmonia and, through this recognition, the rational 
perceiver is aided in its assimilation, once more, to the initial harmonic order that was 
bestowed upon the human soul by the Demiurge. 
 While this account may show why and how harmonia must be regained by the 
immortal part of the soul and also what the two harmoniai have in common, prima facie 
it has little to do with the description of the harmonious soul that we encountered in 
the Republic. Unlike in the Republic, Plato makes no special mention of the need to 
harmonize the three parts of the soul in order to attain virtue. However, I contend that 
even though Plato does not make the same argument, such a view is evident in the 
teleological descriptions of the mortal parts of the soul and their bodily dwellings.  
 He repeatedly underscores the fact that these parts  must be obedient to reason’s 
rule and that the mortal soul and body is constructed so as to be conducive to this. Each 
of the mortal parts has its own specific purpose, but everything that it does is in service 
to the immortal part. We are also told that it is imperative that the three parts of the 
soul be kept in due proportion (symmetria) to one another (90a). The immortal part has 
harmonia as a structure but there also must exist a harmonic proportion between the 
three parts (and, indeed, between body and soul, 87c) for the sake of the harmonia of 
the immortal part. As in the Republic, the lower parts of the soul are not to be eliminated 
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but are merely to be brought into order. Further, the proper communication between 
the three parts of the soul is crucial in order for audible harmonia to fulfill its purpose 
in aiding the restoration of the structural harmonia of the immortal part of the soul. We 
needn’t see the account in the Timaeus as one that contradicts that of the Republic; 
indeed, it can be seen as one that augments it. The idea that the three parts of the soul 
must be harmonized is implicit in the discussion here and, further, we learn why 
precisely they must be harmonized.  
 The proportion between the three parts of the soul and the harmonia between the 
body and the soul both serve the highest part of the soul. The highest part of the soul 
is immortal and divine and has been thrown into disarray by the mortal parts. Just as 
the mortal parts were culpable for the disorder they can also be responsible for bringing 
about order.  This harmonic order imitates the harmonic structure of the world-soul 
and it is in this affinity that virtue and happiness consist. This is explicit at the 
conclusion of the dialogue, in a passage that is significant enough to warrant extensive 
quotation: 
   But if his heart has been set on the love of learning and true wisdom and 
he has exercised that part of himself above all, he is surely bound to have 
thoughts immortal and divine, if he shall lay hold upon truth, nor can 
he fail to possess immortality in the fullest measure that human 
nature admits; and because he is always devoutly cherishing the 
divine part and maintaining the guardian genius that dwells within him 
there is but one way of caring for anything, namely to give it the 
nourishment and motions proper to it. The motions akin to the divine 
part in us are the thoughts and revolutions of the universe; these, 
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therefore, every man should follow, and correcting those circuits in the 
head that were deranged at birth, by learning to know the harmonies 
and revolutions of the world, he should bring the intelligent part, 
according to its pristine nature, into the likeness of that which 
intelligence discerns, and thereby win the fulfillment of the best life 
set by the gods before mankind both for this present time and for the 
time to come.  
 
   τῷ δὲ περὶ φιλομαθίαν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀληθεῖς φρονήσεις ἐσπουδακότι 
καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα τῶν αὑτοῦ γεγυμνασμένῳ φρονεῖν μὲν ἀθάνατα 
καὶ θεῖα, ἄνπερ ἀληθείας ἐφάπτηται, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη που, καθ' ὅσον 
δ' αὖ μετασχεῖν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἀθανασίας ἐνδέχεται, τούτου 
μηδὲν μέρος ἀπολείπειν, ἅτε δὲ ἀεὶ θεραπεύοντα τὸ θεῖον ἔχοντά τε 
αὐτὸν εὖ κεκοσμημένον τὸν δαίμονα σύνοικον ἑαυτῷ, διαφερόντως 
εὐδαίμονα εἶναι. θεραπεία δὲ δὴ παντὶ παντὸς μία, τὰς οἰκείας 
ἑκάστῳ τροφὰς καὶ κινήσεις ἀποδιδόναι. τῷ δ' ἐν   ἡμῖν θείῳ 
συγγενεῖς εἰσιν κινήσεις αἱ τοῦ παντὸς διανοήσεις καὶ περιφοραί· 
ταύταις δὴ συνεπόμενον ἕκαστον δεῖ, τὰς περὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἐν τῇ 
κεφαλῇ διεφθαρμένας περιόδους ἡμῶν ἐξορθοῦντα διὰ τὸ 
καταμανθάνειν τὰς τοῦ παντὸς ἁρμονίας τε καὶ περιφοράς, τῷ 
κατανοουμένῳ τὸ κατανοοῦν ἐξομοιῶσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, 
ὁμοιώσαντα δὲ τέλος ἔχειν τοῦ προτεθέντος ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ θεῶν 
ἀρίστου βίου πρός τε τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον. Timaeus 
90b 6 — 90d 7 (emphases mine) 
   
 The best life entails an approximation of the world-soul and becoming as god-
like as possible — ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, as Plato puts in in the Theaetetus 
(176b 1).  The way in which we approximate the world-soul is by apprehending 
harmonic structure in the musical sounds that we perceive, and internalizing it, thereby 
allowing our souls to imitate the world-soul in structure. Since we are mortal 
embodied creatures, due proportion between the immortal and mortal parts of the soul 
as well as between soul and body are necessary for the proper cherishing and cultivation 
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of the divine part.  This passage also recalls Republic VII where we learn that astronomy 
and harmonics, properly speaking, play an important role in dialectic since they lead 
us upwards towards the Form of the Good. Here, too, we are required to ‘see’ beyond 
astronomy115 and ‘hear’ beyond audible harmonia to the underlying structure and 
motion.  
 In this chapter I discussed two kinds of harmoniai described in the Timaeus : the 
one possessed by souls and audible harmonia. We are told, at the beginning, that the 
World Soul, with which the human soul is structurally identical, was constructed by 
the Demiurge with an intelligible model in mind and that the soul participates in 
harmonia and reason (37a).  The divine soul of the world retains the harmonia bestowed 
upon it by the Demiurge but the human soul loses it when embodied in the imperfect 
human body. The end of the Timaeus tells us that the best life consists in regaining that 
psychic harmonia. We saw how audible harmonia helps humans regain this. In 
explaining this, we also saw that all these apparently different harmoniai are harmoniai 
in virtue of possessing a particular structure. The reason that audible harmonia can help 
the intelligent hearer regain psychic harmonia is that the intelligent hearer intellects the 
structure that lies behind the pleasing sounds. We have, then, a confirmation of the 
conclusion that I suggested in the previous chapter: harmonia is an mathematical 
structure which, when various entities participate in it, serves to make them better 
                                              
115 For an overview of the ethical function of astronomy, see Carone (1997). 
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We have now seen, through a survey of some key dialogues, how harmonia functions 
at various levels within the Platonic universe. Let us begin by surveying the manner in 
which harmonia functions in the microcosm and macrocosm before attempting to 
answer our original questions : what, if anything, do these various harmoniai have in 
common and what is the role of harmonia in Plato’s philosophy?  
I. Harmonia in the (human) soul and body 
 
 In the early dialogues, we learned that a good individual is one who is 
harmonious in his words and deeds (Laches) and one whose soul is orderly and thus 
healthy (Gorgias). This order (kosmos, taxis) possessed by a virtuous soul is later 
described as a harmonia. In the Phaedo, for instance, Socrates argues at length that the 
soul cannot be a harmonia of bodily constituents; however, the reason for this is that 
harmonia is something that a soul possesses and not something that a soul is – good 
souls are harmonious ones and bad souls lack harmony. This idea is reinforced first in 
the Republic and then later in the Timaeus.  
One can see Socrates’ description of justice and virtue in the Republic almost as 
a continuation of his argument against Simmias’ soul-harmonia thesis in the Phaedo. It 
wasn’t clear, in the Phaedo at least, what it meant for good souls to be ‘harmonious’ 
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since nowhere in the Phaedo did Plato hint at the soul being mereologically complex. 
The Republic, however, introduces the idea of a tripartite soul and it is here that we are 
given a fully-fledged account of what it means for a soul to have harmonia. If a soul is 
harmonious, each of its parts performs its own function and accepts its role in the 
hierarchical scheme.  The Timaeus introduces harmonia into the soul at two levels : first, 
the rational part of the soul has the same harmonic structure as the soul of the world  
and second, since in the Timaeus, too, the embodied human soul is tripartite, there 
must be a harmonia between the different parts of the soul. As I noted in the previous 
chapter, Plato also claims that the soul participates (metechein) in reasoning (logismos) 
and harmonia, both of which are described as eternal, intelligible entities (Tim. 36b).  
In all these cases, harmonia is always described as the good state of the soul. The 
argument in the Phaedo was that the soul could not be a harmonia since to claim this 
would be to ignore moral distinctions between souls since only good souls possess 
harmonia. In the Republic, degenerate states, such as oligarchy, were marked by their 
possession of dualistic nature rather than a unitary one. The unity that is conferred 
upon the tripartite soul by harmonia is not an unearned unity that just any soul has – it 
is a unity that is possessed only by virtuous souls. Nor is harmonia just a synonym for 
‘proportion’ or ‘fitting together’ since we saw that the soul can be bound together in 
other ways as well – for example, in an isonomic proportion – but that harmonia is a 
proper fitting together in such a way that virtue results. Finally, in the Timaeus, the 
211 
 
soul of the world, which is perfect and created by the Demiurge, possesses harmonic 
structure as does the immortal part of the human soul (which is also created by the 
Demiurge) before it is embodied. Upon being embodied, the human soul loses its 
perfect structure and has to undergo extensive education and training in order to 
regain it. Here, too, harmonia is the best kind of fitting together of a mereologically 
complex entity.  
Not only is the presence of harmonia supposed to bring about goodness and 
health, but its absence leads to vice and to sickness. We saw this, first, in the Phaedo 
where the bad soul was said to be anarmostos (ill-tuned) and lacking a harmonia. Then, 
in the discussion of degenerate constitutions and souls in Republic VIII, we saw that, in 
each case of degeneracy, there was a perturbation of the harmonic order that was 
possessed by the aristocratic constitution and soul.  
The Timaeus (86b – 87b) offers us an extensive account of the origins of sickness 
and vice, in bodies as well as souls. In this dialogue, psychic disease is described as a 
kind of “anoia” – the absence of intellect. We saw, in the previous chapter, that the 
intellect was tasked with restoring the initial harmonia by its apprehension of ineligible 
harmonia and, further, that it was responsible for maintaining a harmonic balance 
between the three parts of the soul. When it fails to fulfil these tasks, ignorance 
(amathia) and madness (mania) result. Thus, the possession of harmonic order is in every 
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way good and its absence results in a degenerate and vicious state. This is true not only 
of the soul but also of the body.  
In the Timaeus, in particular, the harmonizing is not only within the soul, but 
also between the soul and the body – this is, of course, a direct consequence of the fact 
that the various parts of the soul are given bodily locations in this dialogue. . In the 
Timaeus, the body can be both the cause of psychic illness and can help cure it. In this 
dialogue, the right proportion amongst elements means conformity to physis with 
imbalance being a disorder that creates illness in the body and the soul. In fact, physis 
has been created by the Demiurge in the best possible way, yet it presents imbalances 
due to the disorder of elements in the chora. For this reason we have need of both a 
demiurge and the practice of a doctor who heals the soul and the body taking as a 
model the harmonic constitution of the world.  
 Plato’s theory of the somatic health rests on an analogy between the universe 
and the body just like his theory of psychic health. The body is healthy when its parts 
are arranged in harmonic proportion and each of the parts have their own movement 
(vibrations, Tim. 88 d) that is analogous to the movements of the heavens. However, 
since the body is mortal, the environment and the relationship between it and the soul 
can be potential problems. In the Epinomis, Plato remarked that the art of medicine is 
a defense against the ravages of the environment on a living organism (976 a) and in 
the Republic (576 e) we are told that a slight shock from the external world is often all 
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it takes to cause somatic disease. In the Timaeus, too, somatic health is precarious and 
must be defended; this defense requires the imitation of celestial motion in order for 
the preservation of health.  
 We are also told, explicitly, that positive somatic states consist in order, 
proportion, measure, and harmonia: 
πᾶν δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν, τὸ δὲ καλὸν οὐκ ἄμετρον· καὶ ζῷον οὖν τὸ 
τοιοῦτον ἐσόμενον σύμμετρον θετέον. συμμετριῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν σμικρὰ 
διαισθανόμενοι συλλογιζόμεθα, τὰ δὲ κυριώτατα καὶ μέγιστα 
ἀλογίστως ἔχομεν. πρὸς γὰρ ὑγιείας καὶ νόσους ἀρετάς τε καὶ κακίας 
οὐδεμία συμμετρία καὶ ἀμετρία μείζων ἢ ψυχῆς αὐτῆς πρὸς σῶμα 
αὐτό· ὧν οὐδὲν σκοποῦμεν οὐδ' ἐννοοῦμεν, ὅτι ψυχὴν ἰσχυρὰν καὶ 
πάντῃ μεγάλην ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἔλαττον εἶδος ὅταν ὀχῇ, καὶ ὅταν 
αὖ τοὐναντίον συμπαγῆτον τούτω, οὐ καλὸν ὅλον τὸ ζῷον – 
ἀσύμμετρον γὰρ ταῖς μεγίσταις συμμετρίαις – τὸ δὲ ἐναντίως ἔχον 
πάντων θεαμάτων τῷ δυναμένῳ καθορᾶν κάλλιστον καὶ 
ἐρασμιώτατον. 
 
Now all that is good is beautiful, and what is beautiful is not ill-
proportioned. Hence we must take it that if a living thing is to be in 
good condition, it will be well- proportioned. We can perceive the less 
important proportions and do some figuring about them, but the more 
important proportions, which are of the greatest consequence, we are 
unable to figure out. In determining health and disease or virtue and 
vice no proportion or lack of it is more important than that between soul 
and body—yet we do not think about any of them nor do we realize that 
when a vigorous and excellent soul is carried about by a too frail and 
puny frame, or when the two are combined in the opposite way, the 
living thing as a whole lacks beauty, because it is lacking in the most 
important of proportions. That living thing, however, which finds itself 
in the opposite condition is, for those who are able to observe it, the 




While the Republic tells us that somatic harmonia is a pleasing auxiliary to psychic 
harmonia, the Timaeus tells us that we should exercise neither the soul without the body 
nor the body without the soul (88 b). Somatic harmonia requires that the body be 
symmetric to the soul because this lack of symmetry is apt to cause all kinds of bodily 
aches and pains. A soul that is too strong for the body will shake up the whole body 
from within it and cause it to suffer all kinds of ailments and an overly strong body can 
make the soul weaker with excessive food and make it dull and forgetful (Tim. 88 b).  
Even though the Republic doesn’t place as much emphasis on somatic harmonia 
as the Timaeus, it certainly does not ignore the question. In the Hippocratic treatise, 
Airs, Waters and Places a healthy city is characterized by seasons in equilibrium: such 
equilibrium is the equivalent of moderation (metriotes), a state where there are not 
sudden changes (metabolē) because such changes are the ecological equivalent of moral 
hybris. A similar view can be found in Resp. 380 e. Plato recognizes that the body is 
altered by food, drink, labors, and, like all living organisms, by sun, winds, and other 
similar affections as well. However, he says, it is healthiest when it is least altered by 
these. This stability and balance can only come about when it is in a stable state of 
harmonia. Health, for Plato, is nothing besides stable order that involves putting somatic 
elements in their proper balance: 
Ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιεῖν τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι κατὰ φύσιν 
καθιστάναι κρατεῖν τε καὶ κρατεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ νόσον 
παρὰ φύσιν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλου. 
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But to produce health is to put the elements that are in the body in their 
natural relations of mastering and being mastered by one another; while 
to produce disease is to establish a relation of ruling and being ruled by 
one another that is contrary to nature. Resp. 444d 
 
Somatic health is important – the educational program described in Book III 
involves both mousikē and gymnastikē – and somatic health consists in a kind of 
harmonia as well. Howevers, excessive care of the body, without regard for the soul, is 
to be discouraged (Resp. 407 e). At the end of Book IX, we are told: 
Ἔπειτά γ', εἶπον, τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν καὶ τροφὴν οὐχ ὅπως τῇ 
θηριώδει καὶ ἀλόγῳ ἡδονῇ ἐπιτρέψας ἐνταῦθα τετραμμένος ζήσει, 
ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν βλέπων, οὐδὲ τοῦτο πρεσβεύων, ὅπως 
ἰσχυρὸς ἢ ὑγιὴς ἢ καλὸς ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ σωφρονήσειν μέλλῃ ἀπ' 
αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἁρμονίαν τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕνεκα 
συμφωνίας ἁρμοττόμενος φανεῖται. 
 
Second, as regards the condition and nurture of his body, not only will 
he not give himself over to bestial and irrational pleasure, and live turned 
in that direction; but he won’t make health his aim nor give precedence 
to the ways of becoming strong or healthy or beautiful, unless he is also 
going to become temperate as a result of them. On the contrary, it is 
clear that he will always be tuning the harmonia of his body for the sake 
of the concord of his soul. 591 c-d 
 
It is also important for the soul to be harmonized with the body: 
Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτου ἂν συμπίπτῃ ἔν τε τῇ ψυχῇ καλὰ ἤθη ἐνόντα 
καὶ ἐν τῷ εἴδει ὁμολογοῦντα ἐκείνοις καὶ συμφωνοῦντα, τοῦ αὐτοῦ 
μετέχοντα τύπου, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη κάλλιστον θέαμα τῷ δυναμένῳ 
θεᾶσθαι;    
 
When a man’s soul has a beautiful character and his body matches it in 
beauty and is thus in harmony (symphōnia) with it, that harmonizing 
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combination, participating in the same type, is the most beautiful 
spectacle for anyone who sees. Resp. 402d 1-4 
 
The best kind of person is one whose bodily nature matches or harmonizes with 
that of this soul (494 b). Somatic harmonia does not bring about psychic harmonia but 
a good soul, i.e. one that possesses harmonia, is one that will bring about somatic 
harmonia (403d); the reason for this is, perhaps, that the soul can control the body and 
guide it whereas the body cannot do so to the soul and, in general, the soul is more 
“honorable” than the body (592 b). It is also significant that psychic and somatic 
harmonia “participate in the same type”; in other words, there is a common structure 
that is shared by both kinds of harmonia.  
I did not discuss the Symposium but it is worth mentioning that there, too, Plato 
has the physician Erixymachus discourse on somatic harmonia116. According to 
Erixymachus, the body manifests Eros’ double nature in the coexistence of healthy 
desires and unhealthy desires. Medicine is the science of the erotic tendencies of the 
body to fill and empty itself and it enables the distinction between healthy and 
unhealthy desires. The task of the doctor is to transform the strife between the two 
kinds of Eros into agreement by operating on opposites such cold/hot, bitter/sweet, 
dry/wet. The doctor is thus like a musician in that he is able to create harmonia from 
an initial discord. He operates thus through a technique which is able to transform the 
                                              
116 See Edelstein (1945) on why we should take Erixymachus seriously.  
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discordant into concordant. As Candiotto (2015) has noted, music is then the science 
of love of harmonia and rhythm. Bodily health obtains when the opposites find 
themselves reciprocally united in an ordered love and support each other in harmony 
and temperate mixture. Unlike with Heraclitus, the focus is on agreement and on unity 
rather than on dynamic, shifting balance and strife.  
We can conclude, thus, that in the soul and in the body, a positive state is 
characterized as a harmonic order and, further, that harmonia in both these cases seems 
to be a kind of structure that can be imposed upon both body and soul. We also saw 
that, both in the Timaeus and in the Republic, Plato uses the language of participation 
(metechein) when talking about intelligible harmonia; my key contention is that this 
intelligible harmonia is harmonia par excellance for Plato and it is this harmonia that he 
has in mind when he talks about the good and beautiful structure present in virtuous 
human souls and healthy human bodies.  
II. Harmonia in the (cosmic) soul and body 
The Timaeus is our primary point of reference for Plato’s cosmological views, especially 
his views on the harmonically structured kosmos. As I discussed in the previous chapter, 
the Demiurge, who is either identified with divine intellect or bears a close relationship 
to it, creates the body of the world and the body of the soul by copying the structure 
of perfect model. The model to be copied is unique, united, and wholly perfect – it is 
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seemly, then, that the structure that the Demiurge copies is a harmonic one since all 
those are also attributes of harmonia.  
 The world’s body is made out of the four basic elements and the world’s soul is 
made out of intermediates mixtures of Being, Same, and Different. In terms of 
composition, they are wholly different and they are also different in terms of function, 
since it is the soul that is the seat of all intelligence and of motion. However, what the 
body of the world and its soul have in common is that the components, in both cases, 
are arranged proportionally. The four elements are arranged according to a geometric 
mean in the world’s body and the world soul includes arithmetic and harmonic means. 
As Barker ( 2011, p. 200) has noted, these three means together make up the basis of 
the Platonist program of harmonics. Proclus (II.211) also says of the World Soul: 
 
 συλλήβδην οὖν εἴπωμεν, ὅτι πάσης ἁρμονίας τῆς ἐν τοῖς κέντροις, τῆς 
ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις, τῆς ἐν ταῖς σφαίραις ἡ ψυχὴ περιέχει τοὺς λόγους· διὸ 
καὶ τὴν ἁρμονίαν αὐτῆς παντελῆ καὶ νοερὰν εἶναί φαμεν καὶ οὐσιώδη 
κατ' αἰτίαν προηγουμένην τῆς αἰσθητῆς ἁρμονίας… 
 
To sum up, then, we may say that the soul encompasses the ratios of all the 
harmoniai that are in the centers, in the elements, and in the spheres; for this 
reason we say that its harmonia is perfect, intellectual, and substantial 
(ousiōdē), foreshadowing perceptible harmoniai in a causal manner (kat’ 
aitian)… 
 
He is, presumably, claiming that there is a casual relationship between the harmoniai in 
the world-soul and the harmoniai that are perceptible – we saw that the harmoniai in 
the World Soul were themselves copies of something intelligible and the world as a 
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whole serves as a model for the harmonia that is to be approximated by all entities in 
the sub-lunary world. The World Soul is an intermediate entity because it possesses 
the properties of the intelligible and, at the same time, it is in motion. It is therefore 
the principle by which the Demiurge will apply measure to all things. The soul is thus, 
in a certain sense, a principle of measure in that it is the being which, by its relation to 
the intelligible, communicates measure – which is, in this case, harmonic measure – to 
sensible entities.  
 Harmonia is an important element in Plato’s cosmology because the soul of the 
world is imbued with harmonia by the Demiurge and this harmonious soul of the world 
is the very principle of cosmic life. Furthermore, the introduction of rationality by 
means of musico-mathematical proportions is what allows order to be imposed upon 
an otherwise chaotic, irrational, and mechanistic world.  
 
III. Harmonia in the polis 
 
 
We saw how harmonia is present at two levels in Plato’s ideal city in the Republic : in 
the souls of its citizens but also between the classes within the city. The treatment of 
harmonia in the polis runs parallel to the treatment of harmonia in the psychē, and this is 
a natural consequence of the analogy between the two. I do not think it coincidental 
that Plato chose to describe justice as a harmonia in a dialogue that treats the city and 
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the soul analogously – the ability to be transposed from the intelligible to the sensible 
and the ability to be instantiated in various domains is something unique to harmonia 
even in its pre-Platonic usage. In its Platonic usage, as an intelligible structure, it makes 
even more sense to use harmonia to describe parallel states in the city and the soul since 
they are, presumably, the result of parallel structures.  
 A city that approximates harmonia as closely as possible will be a just and 
virtuous city, wherein the appropriate parts master and are mastered. The further a city 
moves away from the ideal harmonia, the less it possesses attributes such as perfection, 
stability, and, most importantly, unity – this is the case for the various vicious 
constitutions discussed in Book VIII of the Republic. We might recall that all the vicious 
constitutions had in common the fact that the worse parts mastered the better parts or, 
as in the case of democracy, the better parts failed to master the worse parts, with the 
result that the cities were fragmented and factious. Thus in the city, as in the universe 
and in the individual, harmonia is a good-making structure.  
 
IV. Plato on harmonia : some answers  
 
In Chapter 1, I showed how harmonia was used by a range of pre-Platonic thinkers in 
a variety of different contexts: Homer used harmonia to describe the joining together 
of planks of wood to make a boat as well as to describe agreement more abstractly; 
Pindar spoke of musical harmonia and also of harmonia in our lives; Heraclitus saw the 
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entire kosmos as being organized by a principle of harmonia; Empedocles introduced 
the idea of number in harmonia and also saw it as a binding, ordering principle in his 
cosmology; Philolaus took the role of number even further and conceived of harmonia 
as a particular numerical structure that manifested itself in various domains, joining 
limited things and unlimited things; the Hippocratics saw harmonia both as a 
mechanical joint and as a regulatory principle; both Homer’s and Pindar’s usages also 
carried political overtones.  I also remarked, in Chapter 1, that harmonia is a remarkably 
productive concept because of its ability to cross over multiple domains. Given all this, 
it is easy to conclude that Plato was simply borrowing a term that was common among 
the pre-Platonics and that he used it, variously, in ways that mapped on to their 
different usages.  
 However, as I hope I’ve shown, in the course of this dissertation as well as this 
chapter, such a characterization would not be wholly accurate. It is indeed the case that 
Plato does not invent the concept of harmonia and nor is he the first to apply it to both 
the macrocosm and the microcosm. He does not, though, simply take over the concept 
without modifying it to fit within his own philosophical framework. I contend that 
Plato takes an extremely rich concept and imbues it with philosophical import when 
he describes it as an intelligible structure that entities can participate in. What the 
various harmoniai – the musical harmoniai, the psychic ones, the political ones, the 
somatic ones, the ones in craft – have in common is a particular kind of intelligible 
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structure. The dismissal of sensible harmoniai in Republic VIII and the elaborate 
discussion of the harmonia in the World Soul in the Timaeus lends further support to 
the claim that harmonia is essentially mathematical. 
Plato’s use of harmonia is at once narrower and philosophically richer than that 
of his predecessors. In the first place, harmonia is not just any kind of glue or bond 
between entities in a state of tension. Second, we have seen that, for Plato, in every 
case of an entity possessing harmonia, it is made good by the possession of that harmonia 
– while harmonia has never had a negative valence, it has not always been seen as an 
earned unity or as a good-making feature. In the Heraclitean universe, for instance, 
harmoniē is all pervasive, but it is a functioning of necessity rather than reason, to 
borrow a distinction from the Timaeus. Finally, we have also seen that the “true” 
harmonia that the philosopher ought to be concerned with, according to Plato in 
Republic VII and the Timaeus, in particular, is not audible harmonia but the harmonia 
that is supra-sensible. Harmonia is, at its core, a mathematical structure and is thus 
imbued will all the goodness and stability of number; it is for this reason that it brings 
about a good state whenever some entity participates in it.  
This was not an uncommon reading among some of the Neoplatonist 
commentators – Proclus, for example, in his commentary on the Timaeus has no 
hesitation in talking about “Harmonia itself” as though it is something like a Form and 
while harmonia contains a range of features that are the proper of Form –  it is 
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something that entities can participate in, it is perfect, good, and beautiful, true 
harmonia is intelligible rather than sensible, the presence of harmonia allows other 
entities to be harmonized, as in the case of musical harmonia – it is not at all obvious to 
me that harmonia is a Form. Rather, I think it much more plausible that it would belong 
with the intermediate mathematical entities since, like them, it is something that is 
essentially intelligible but that also admits of a sensible representation : that heard in 
audible harmoniai. However, just as we were not to confuse images of numbers and 
geometrical figures with the mathematicals themselves, we should not conflate 
intelligible harmonia with its paradigmatic sensible manifestation.  
Its precise ontological status remains somewhat ambiguous in much the same 
way that the status of mathematicals does. Recall that Socrates deliberately refuses to 
discuss the proportions between the objects of the epistemological states discussed in 
the analogy of the Divided Line (Resp. 534). At any rate, the goal of our inquiry was 
not to uncover the ontological status of harmonia – which is a worthwhile project but 
a different one; our goal was, first, to see whether the different harmoniai that Plato 
speaks of do, in fact, have anything in common and second, to see whether or not 
harmonia is as important a Platonic notion as I claimed at the outset. At this stage, I 
believe that we can answer in the affirmative to both those questions.  
The different harmoniai have in common the fact that they all participate in 
intelligible harmonia. The fact that some entities are less harmonious than others can be 
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explained in virtue of the fact that they participate in a lesser degree – the more they 
approximate intelligible harmonia, the more harmonious and thus the more good and 
beautiful they are. This idea is explained particularly well in the Timaeus when the 
intelligible world soul is imbued with this perfect harmonia by the Demiurge and the 
good for human beings is described as coming as close to this ideal harmonia as is 
possible.  
It is important, also, to note that Plato’s views on harmonia have little to do with 
supposedly Pythagorean views about harmonia. In Republic VII, he chastises those 
(presumably Pythagoreans) who look for consonances in audible sounds and ignore 
those that are in numbers. The Pythagoreans did not regard harmonia as a mathematical 
principle – or at least not primarily as a mathematical principle; it was, for them, 
something that was found in music from which we could abstract a mathematical 
structure. Such a view is, clearly, opposed to what Plato is claiming. The Pythagoreans 
would also run in to the problem of determining whether harmonia is a product or 
whether it is a principle, since they look for harmonia in music as well as in 
mathematics. Plato’s dualistic metaphysics allows him to avoid this problem, since the 
source of harmonia will not be empirical; only its instantiations will be so. While 
harmonia and number were reportedly very important principles in Pythagorean 
cosmology, there was a fundamental ambiguity in their thought since number and 
harmonia were physical realities as well. Plato, however, liberates both of these from 
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any physicality and, in the Timaeus, describes the universe as a mixture of the 
intelligible and the sensible which is organized according to an intelligible principle of 
harmonia.   
The answer to the second question is contained, to some extent, in the answer 
to the first. Since harmonia does operate in all these domains, it is surprising that so 
many discussion of Plato’s ethics and politics, in particular, omit any mention of this at 
all. Plato unambiguously describes virtue as a harmonious state in more than one 
dialogue. Furthermore, his use of harmonia throws the isomorphisms between the 
microcosm and the macrocosm into sharp relief. Plato does not consistently identify 
harmonia with virtue but it is important that we recognize that harmonia is at least partly 
constitutive of the good for Plato, in the city, the soul, and the kosmos as a whole and, 
further, that each of these is good, at least partly, in the same way, i.e. by participating 
in harmonia.  
 We can also return to some key passages from the Republic if we need more 
support for this ‘mathematical’ reading of harmonia. Myles Burnyeat (2000, pp. 46 ff.), 
in a paper that is mostly an attempt at understanding why it is that mathematics is 
conducive to the good, has argued that Plato’s discussion of harmonics is the key to 
better understanding how mathematical training is supposed to impart ethical 
understanding. He claims that the Platonic harmonics described in Republic VII imply 
that understanding the concordances between abstract numbers allows us to better 
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understand beauty and goodness. He also offers some valuable insights on why it was 
that certain numbers were seen as harmonious. First, he calls attention to the Archytan 
distinction between the three kinds of mean that were discussed already in Chapter 4 
– the arithmetic, the geometric, and the harmonic (or subcontrary). Then, he draws 
upon Andrew Barker to explain the relationship between these ratios and Greek 
harmonics: 
The series 6, 12, 24 etc., in geometric proportion, represents a sequence of 
notes an octave apart. If we take the first two numbers and insert the 
arithmetic mean, we get 6, 9, 12, the octave being divided into a fifth 
[because 9:6 is 3:2] followed by a fourth [because 12:9 is 4:3]. A harmonic 
mean inserted between the original terms gives 6, 8, 12 divided the octave 
into a fourth [because 8:6 is 4:3] followed by a fifth [because 12:8 is 3:2]. 
When the two sequences are combined, 6,8,9,12, they yield two fourths 
[8:6 is 4:3 and 12:9 is 4:3] separated by the ‘tone’ of ratio 9:8 and can 
represent the fixed notes bounding a pair of joint tetrachords. [A tetrachord 
is a fourth, the upper and lower notes of which are fixed, but not the notes 
inserted in between. By varying the latter – in particular the distance of the 
highest from the upper bound – different musical ‘genera’ were produced: 
the enharmonic, the chromatic, and the diatonic. Thus the tetrachord is the 
basic unit of scalar organization.] These are the fundamental relations on 
which all the complex structures of Pythagorean and Platonist harmonics 
are built. (Burnyeat 2000, p. 51) 
 
We also saw how, in the Timaeus, the Demiurge constructed the soul of the world 
(and, by consequence, the human soul) from 27 notes that began with two proportions: 
1,2,4,8 and 1,3,9,27. Even though Archytas’ definitions were meant to apply to sensible 
entities, i.e. notes, Plato uses them for a non-sensible (or intermediate, properly 
speaking) entity, i.e. the soul. Burnyeat offers yet another piece of evidence in support 
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of Plato’s claims about the concordance of numbers but, before we can fully 
comprehend that, we need to rehearse a little Greek mathematics. We do not know a 
great deal about early Greek mathematics before Euclid117 who, in the preamble 
(section 25) to his Sectio Canonis says: 
 Γινώσκομεν δὲ καὶ τῶν φθόγγων τοὺς μὲν συμφώνους ὄντας, τοὺς δὲ 
διαφώνους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν συμφώνους μίαν κρᾶσιν τὴν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν 
ποιοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ διαφώνους οὔ. τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων εἰκὸς τοὺς 
συμφώνους φθόγγους, ἐπειδὴ μίαν τὴν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ποιοῦνται κρᾶσιν τῆς 
φωνῆς, εἶναι τῶν ἐν ἑνὶ ὀνόματι πρὸς ἀλλήλους λεγομένων ἀριθμῶν, 
ἤτοι πολλαπλασίους ὄντας ἢ ἐπιμορίους.   
 
Among notes, we recognize some as being concordant and others as being 
discordant, the concordant making a single mixture out of the two, the 
discordant not. In view of this, it is reasonable that the concordant notes, 
since they make a single mixture of sound out of the two, are among those 
numbers which are spoken of under a single name in relation to each other, 
being either multiple or epimoric. 
 
This remark has a lot do with the Greek terminology for ratios. Given two 
homogenous magnitudes with the measurements p and q, respectively, the ratio 
between these is the quantitative relation p/q. The integer p is called the prologos or 
hēgoumenos and the integer q is called hypologos or epomenos. The main ratios employed 
in music are the epimeric (epimerēs), which has the form 1+p/q or r+p/q and the 
epimoric (epimorios), which has the form 1+1/q or r+1/q118. Burnyeat (2000) points out 
                                              
117 Leonid Zhmud (2012, p. 275) argues that Hippasus, who lived a century before Plato, was an early 
student of Pythagoras and was studied harmonics and mathematics. However, none of the fragments 
attributed to him have are regarded as authentic and we have only testimonia to rely on. Horky (2013, 
pp. 60–75) offers a useful overview of Hippasus’ thought that deviates somewhat from Zhmud’s (2012).  
118 Most of this terminology is taken from Theon of Smyrna’s Mathematics Useful for Understanding Plato 
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that there were a series of one-word expressions for epimoric ratios – 3:2 (the fifth in 
music) is hēmiolos; 4:3 (the fourth in music) is epitritos, etc. and Euclid’s idea, thus, is 
that “Greek gives apt recognition to the unity of sound in concord by assigning a single 
expression to the corresponding mathematical ratio” (48). According to Ptolemy 
(Harmonics I.5), the Pythagoreans argued, for strictly mathematical reasons, that 
epimoric ratios were preferable to epimeric ratios because of the simplicity of 
comparison between the terms of the ratio. Barker (2011) has argued that Archytas is 
the most likely source for this report of Ptolemy’s.  If this is indeed the case – and 
Barker offers us compelling reasons for accepting that it is – Plato had, in Archytas, a 
basis for claiming that some numbers are more harmonious than others without making 
any reference to sensible entities such as notes. We have reason, then, to believe that 
harmonia proper, the one that is to be found in numbers, has the structure of a ratio.   
However, Plato is not, clearly, just blindly following Archytas, since he would 
presumably hold Archytas at fault for using better and worse ratios to explain less and 
more pleasurable musical experiences. As we saw in the previous chapter, Plato thinks 
that the goal even when listening to audible harmoniē is not to derive thoughtless hēdonē 
from the sounds, but to apprehend the structure of sound and thus derive euphrosynē – 
here, perhaps, is Plato at his most Heraclitean, claiming that the harmoniē aphanēs is 
preferable to the apparent one. Nor are all these ideas developed only in the Timaeus 
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or in the later books of the Republic; these are ideas that have been foreshadowed from 
the Gorgias onwards and I am in complete agreement with Burnyeat (2000, p. 55): 
If readers of the Republic start out with the impression that Plato’s talk about 
concord and attunement in the soul is meant as a metaphor, they should 
have second thoughts when they come to the passage about mathematical 
harmonics, which explicitly denies that concord has to be a relation 
between sounds. In Plato’s view, concord can also be a relation between 
pure numbers. In which case there is no reason to cry ‘Metaphor!’ when 
Plato has Socrates speak of concord between the different parts of the city 
and the soul. For a Platonist, much that we lesser mortals take as metaphor 
comes to be seen as a further instantiation of a concept which is more 
abstract and wide-ranging than ordinary folk suppose. The Timaeus 
account of the musico-mathematical structure of the soul may be hard for 
us to grasp, but to call it metaphorical would be absurd.  
 
Understanding harmonia as an intelligible structure, rather than as merely metaphorical 
or as a term vaguely connoting a good and ordered state, also allows us to solve a few 
puzzles. For instance, we saw that certain musical harmoniai were said to inculcate 
virtue in young children by imitating virtuous individuals – it was not clear, however, 
what was being imitated. We can now posit that the best kinds of harmoniai imitate the 
best kinds of souls and, as we have seen, the best kinds of souls have a particular 
structure that differentiates them from other souls; it would not be unreasonable to 
suppose that it is the self-same structure which is instantiated both in souls and in the 
music that imitates them. We saw that the idea that music can affect a soul did not 
originate with Plato; however, his discussion of harmonic education is distinct from 
Damon’s, for instance, because of the particularities of his metaphysical system.  
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 While anyone can be affected by harmoniai, it is only the philosophers, those 
who study mathematical harmonics, who will understand how and why this is the case 
and they are, thus, to be the only people entrusted with deciding the educational 
program (as in the Republic) and, in general, with governing the city. They alone know 
what intelligible harmonia is and thus they can ensure, for instance, that only those 
modes that participate in it be taught. They are also the only ones capable of statecraft 
because they know what structure is to be imposed upon the best kind of polis – they 
create and maintain good structures, at the level of the institution as well as at the level 
of the psychē.  
The activity of the rulers in the kallipolis also closely parallels the activity of the 
Demiurge in the universe. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the Demiurge is 
responsible for creating the soul and body of the world (to pan) as well as the human 
soul. It is interesting that Plato does not describe the universe as “kosmos” (order) 
initially but rather as “to pan” (the whole) – this makes sense since “kosmos” is something 
that the Demiurge imposes upon it by copying an intelligible structure. The soul and 
body of the world are perfect because the Demiurge constructs them in accordance 
with harmonic proportions.  
We have seen, then, how harmonia as a mathematical structure operates 
throughout the microcosm and the macrocosm and how, in each case, it serves to make 
the entities in which it is instantiated better. We should be careful, though, not to 
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overstate the case. In saying that good souls, cities, and an ordered universe are 
structured harmonically, I am not equating harmonia with the Good. We need 
harmonia in order to be able to ascend to the study of the Good which is, for Plato, the 
highest study (megiston mathēma, Resp. 505a). Sedley (1997) has rightly drawn attention 
to “homoiōsis theiō kata ton dunaton” (becoming as godlike as possible) as being a central 
tenet of Platonism and it is true that the Timaeus describes this as apprehending the 
harmonia of the World Soul and assimilating to it as far as we can. However, it would 
be a mistake to take this as the ultimate goal of human life – indeed this would flatly 
contradict Plato’s claims about dialect and the role of the Good in the Republic and 
elsewhere. Becoming like god is the crucial first step towards understanding the good; 
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